VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRY #0373/01 1771441
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 261441Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3794
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

S E C R E T CONAKRY 000373 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2029 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: GUINEA SECURITY FORCES PART II: A DISCUSSION OF 
TARGETED SECURITY FORCES ASSISTANCE 
 
Classified By: RSO Philip W. Nazelrod for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S)   In examining the current state of Guinea,s 
military and civilian security forces (septel), it becomes 
apparent that there is a compelling need to discuss the shape 
and direction of future USG engagement.  To facilitate free, 
fair, and transparent elections, all but humanitarian and 
election-related aid to Guinea has been suspended.  While 
this approach may properly guide the junta,s actions and 
facilitate elections, it may also lead to missed 
opportunities to steer law enforcement units in the right 
direction and result in an even more entrenched and 
maladjusted military state. For example, the current 
crackdown on narcotics traffickers opened a door to all 
sectors of Guinea,s security forces (the military, police, 
courts, and prisons).  Prior to the coup d,tat, such 
crackdowns were token actions at best, whereas the arrest of 
several kingpins demonstrates a serious change in practice 
from former President Conte,s regime.  Moreover, Guinean 
government requests for US anti-narcotics assistance and 
information sharing has greatly increased.  Our current level 
of access to detained suspects and information is 
unparalleled.  In order to take advantage of this 
unprecedented opening, the following discourse highlights the 
importance of a targeted aid program and suggests two 
specific high impact and low cost strategies to further USG 
goals in the security forces sector. 
 
-------------------------------- 
THE NEED FOR TARGETED ASSISTANCE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S)  In Guinea, assistance affords the USG a strong 
democratic bond with society.  Through the use of aid 
incentives ( the carrot,) we are able to strategically 
emphasize the value of democratization and majority rule. 
Conversely, the suspension of aid or denial of certain 
programs ( the stick,) maintains the Guinean security 
forces sector structures and goals.  Linking the provision of 
aid to free, fair, and transparent elections may influence 
the behavior and capacity of the junta and encourage popular 
support for the elections.  Our integrated approach with 
other donor countries (notably members of the European Union 
or African Union) provides this firm and consistent message. 
 
¶3.  (S)  However, deficiencies remain in linking assistance 
to  elections.   On one hand, stability in the security 
forces sector supports recovery and development.  On the 
other, insecurity hampers such recovery and can make it more 
difficult to manage prospective aid programs in later years. 
The release of aid to the security forces sector - prior to 
elections - can enhance Guinea,s stability and reduce future 
reliance on donor countries.  Furthermore, donor countries 
such as Spain and France are already beginning to express 
interest in coordinating security (and law enforcement) 
efforts with the USG and GOG (the creation of law enforcement 
vehicles such as a &Mini-Dublin Group8 or Narcotics Working 
Group are just two examples suggested). 
 
¶4.  (S)  The junta,s pursuit of high-level narcotics 
traffickers, the crackdown on illegal drug manufacturers, and 
the reported arrest of Red Beret military members (who are 
often suspected of committing acts of banditry) have opened a 
small window of opportunity.  However, the lack of engagement 
our current policy mandates could result in the window 
closing and our opportunity to expand on Guinea,s positive 
security initiatives could be delayed or lost.  In an effort 
to capitalize on these initiatives, manage assistance 
strategically, and assemble donor country support, the 
following paragraphs suggest two areas to consider providing 
targeted assistance. 
 
----------------------------- 
THE NEED FOR PROGRAM GUIDANCE 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S)  In the post election environment, the development of 
effective security strategies will be vital to not only 
ensure the stability of Guinea, but to also enhance human 
rights protections and guard against corruption.  Program 
guidance need not be narrowly defined as the complete 
construction of a law enforcement element.  We may find it 
advantageous to provide consultative resources for the 
development of robust programs. 
 
¶6.  (S)  One example, Major Ibrahima Balde, commander of the 
Gendarmerie, has set the vision of the Gendarmerie as the 
 
premier police force in Guinea.  Using his experience (albeit 
limited) with the United Nations, his goal is to build a 
security force modeled after western policing departments. 
He appears to be advancing his vision within the CNDD as 
evidenced by the Gendarmerie,s rapid assumption of security 
jurisdiction. He does, however, lack much needed experience 
in training, development, and leadership. 
 
¶7.  (S)  Another example, the Ministry of Special Services, 
Anti-Drugs, and Organized Crime (Ministry of High Crimes), 
headed by Minister Moussa Tiegboro Camara,  is staffed by 
short-term teams that straddle jurisdictional boundaries. 
These teams, according to Major Balde who claims to have 
advocated for the creation of the Ministry of High Crimes, 
are modeled after his interpretation of an &Inter-agency 
Task Force8 designed to operate with full jurisdiction and 
complete autonomy.  Balde and Tiegboro want to build a 
full-time task force within the Ministry of High Crimes 
staffed with 800 officers total (400 Gendarme, 200 MOS 
Police, and 200 GAF Officers).  Balde reportedly worked with 
the US Drug Enforcement Agency in Haiti and that interaction 
was his inspiration for the task-force model. 
 
¶8.  (S)  A final example, the Ministry of Security, while 
largely impotent, still employs the largest number of 
civilian security forces.  The failure of the Ministry of 
Security to act on a national scale spurred the initiative of 
many local departments.  A handful of neighborhood mayors and 
police commanders developed local police procedures similar 
to a &neighborhood watch8.  While the motives are, at 
times, questionable, the end result is the creation of small 
pockets of policed areas by officers who are ill equipped but 
trying to improve safety. 
 
¶9.  (S)  By providing consultative services and training to 
the Ministry of High Crimes, Gendarmerie, and neighborhood 
Police Departments, we may be able to steer development in 
proper directions.  These directions include, but are not 
limited to, training standards, ethics, task-force 
development, and community involvement.  Experts, such as 
Department of Justice Legal Advisors, International Law 
Enforcement Academies (ILEA), and Department of State (i.e. 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs(INL)), 
would enjoy the current open-door environment between the USG 
and the various security forces leaders and staffers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE KNOWLEDGE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  In the early weeks of the CNDD,s existence, the 
Ministry of High Crimes conducted sweeping anti-narcotics 
operations which netted a handful of suspected narco-kingpins 
and a slough of lower level operatives.  The arrests garnered 
much needed public and international support and even 
precipitated visits from foreign narcotics officers from 
various organizations, including the United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UN), the Drug Enforcement Agency (USA), and 
Serious Organized Crime Unit (UK).  Tiegboro, along with the 
Ministry of Justice, opened the door for international 
involvement and interviews of key suspects. 
 
¶11.  (S)  The Minister of High Crimes and the Minister of 
Justice, Siba Loholamou, allowed agents from the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) to interview two kingpins, Ousmane 
Conte (former president Lansana Conte,s son) and Mamady 
Kallo.  Both Ministers expressed satisfaction in working with 
the DEA and pleaded for further assistance in conducting 
investigations.  An interesting note:  When queried on the 
evidence collected for prosecution, Loholamou advised that 
the GOG does not have any strong evidence.  He requested 
investigative assistance and appealed for legal assistance 
and claimed the French were able to send two advisors. 
 
¶12.  (S)  The excitement abated quickly as the CNDD realized 
that they lack a defined strategy regarding how to prosecute 
the suspects.  Tiegboro personally petitioned the 
international community to assist in conducting prosecutions. 
 He advised that the CNDD would like to deport the suspects 
to any country willing to prosecute them.  Minister Loholamou 
followed suit, asking the international community to assist 
in building a jurisprudence program capable of prosecuting 
international criminals.  When interviewed, Loholamou told 
the RSO that he is trained only as a military investigator 
and does not have suitable skills in law or the legal system 
(despite the fact Loholamou claims to hold a degree in law). 
 
¶13.  (S)  Furthermore, theft, assault, rape, and various 
other crimes are noticeably rising in the capital city. 
Arguably, the frustration resulting from a lack of experience 
can be noted in recent decrees issued by the Ministry of High 
Crimes.  Tiegboro authorized law 4550 which, in effect, 
legalizes vigilante justice.  This law provides for citizens 
who witness or catch a criminal to burn him alive as 
punishment for their crime. 
 
¶14.  (S)  Focusing on increasing the investigative capacity 
of the security forces can multiply the success of arrests, 
prosecutions, and stability.  To wit, investigations in cases 
of human, narcotics, and currency trafficking will place the 
international spotlight on Guinea which would force Guinean 
authorities to deal with these issues.  Embedding US criminal 
investigators, such as from the Drug Enforcement Agency, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of State 
would assuredly assist in the success of criminal 
investigations and prosecutions of international suspects. 
This must also be accompanied by increased assistance for 
courts and prisons. 
 
¶15.  (S)  It must be noted that this openness does not lessen 
the quite real indictment of many leaders currently in 
positions of power.  Suspected narcotics and human 
traffickers (often times high ranking military officers) 
function with impunity, a trend that is likely to continue 
under any new regime which comes into power.  Considering, 
however, the value that can be obtained in establishing 
investigative footholds with available resources; the impact 
of our involvement would be quite positive. 
 
¶16.  (S)  COMMENT.  What does exist, at least for the moment, 
is the opportunity for us to enroll ourselves in the 
development of the security forces with relatively little 
risk or cost.  Decreasing our engagement certainly will not 
produce dire consequences.  It will, however, hamper the 
development of Guinea or ) at the very least ) diminish our 
capacity to affect political or policy changes in the future. 
END COMMENT. 
RASPOLIC