VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRY #0372/01 1771441
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 261441Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3791
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

S E C R E T CONAKRY 000372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2029 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: GUINEA SECURITY FORCES PART I: AN EXAMINATION OF 
KEY SECURITY FORCES 
 
REF: CONAKRY 0316 
 
Classified By: RSO Philip W. Nazelrod for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S)  Six months ago, a coup d,tat brought a military 
junta to power under the auspices of the National Council for 
Democracy and Development (CNDD).  Led by President Moussa 
Dadis Camara, the CNDD embarked on a campaign to reframe and 
restructure the military and civilian security forces.  The 
marginalization of the Ministry of Security gave rise to the 
Ministry of Special Services and recast the military-led 
Gendarmerie as a national police force.  This first part 
examines these changes and discusses the policy implications 
resulting from a merge of civilian and military security 
forces.  The second part (septel) discusses the need for 
future aid and provides an analysis of two specific 
opportunities for assistance. 
 
 
------------------------ 
THE LEAD SECURITY FORCES 
------------------------ 
 
-- THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY -- 
 
¶2.  (S)  The once powerful Ministry of Security finds itself 
increasingly marginalized, shifting from an organization of 
relative authority to one of mistrust and apathy.  Much of 
the Ministry,s jurisdiction has been ripped away and 
assigned to military elements, notably the Gendarmerie. 
Those activities not reassigned, such as petty theft 
investigations, have largely been ignored.  The schism 
between the Ministry of Security and the Guinean Armed Forces 
(who form part of the Ministry of Defense) which dates to 
2005, has widened dramatically in recent months. 
 
¶3.  (S)  Headed by Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) General Mamadou 
Toto Camara, First Vice President of the CNDD, the Ministry 
employs approximately 11,000 commissioned police officers and 
support staff.  Of the 11,000, roughly 6,500 are new recruits 
hired following the military mutiny in May 2008.  The once 
well-regarded police academy was shuttered in 2006 and 
equipment warehouses were emptied during the 2008 mutiny. 
With no formal training and a severe lack of equipment, 
police officers attempt to learn through on-the-job training. 
 More often than not, however, many officers simply sit on 
the sidelines and are unwilling or unable to perform. 
 
-- THE GENDARMERIE -- 
 
¶4.  (S)  Conceptually constructed based on the historic 
French Gendarme model, Guinea,s Gendarmerie was originally 
mandated to serve as military provost.  Traditionally they 
provided services designed to police the GAF.  They limited 
their civilian engagement to specific events such as crowd 
and riot control. Since the coup, the Gendarmerie is 
increasingly engaged in policing the civilian sector. 
 
¶5.  (S)  Commanded by Major Ibrahima Balde, Chief of the 
National Gendarmerie, the Gendarmerie recently assumed law 
enforcement responsibilities in several key areas: (a) 
Airport Security (b) Seaport Security (c) Customs and (d) 
Immigration.  Balde, a career Gendarme Officer, is a stark 
contrast to the former commander, General Jacques Toure. 
Uneducated and illiterate, Toure built a reputation as being 
one of the most corrupt officers serving in former president 
Conte,s regime.  Toure, who was in the United States during 
the December 23 coup, returned to Guinea early in 2009 and 
was promptly arrested by the CNDD.  As of this cable, Toure 
remains in prison pending a trial date.  On the other hand, 
Balde is fluent in five languages and has been an active 
participant in three United Nations (UN) missions.  Most 
recently, he was assigned as a judicial police officer for 
the UN Mission to Haiti.  While in Haiti, Balde reported 
directly to two US Civilian Police (CIVPOL) officers, Richard 
Warren and Michael Antonik. 
 
¶6.  (S)  Balde claims his primary mission is to ferret out 
the corruption within the Gendarmerie and the GAF.  The 
corruption, he intimated, is pervasive - specifically 
identifying the intelligence units - and is a symptom of the 
fact that the Gendarmes occupy a role &in the middle8 of 
the Ministry of Security and Ministry of Defense.  This role 
(part civilian police and part military police) creates 
confusion in Guinea, specifically outside of Conakry where 
the Gendarmes are typically the sole policing agency (as 
civilian police officers are rarely stationed outside of the 
 
capital city).  This confusion also lends itself to 
noticeable tension between civilian and military forces and 
rivalries are often pervasive as evidenced by the violent 
military versus police clashes in June 2008. 
 
¶7.  (S)  A recent recruiting drive swelled the number of 
Gendarmes from 2,500 to an estimated 6,500 officers and 
enlisted personnel.  Enjoying the only law enforcement-type 
academy in Guinea, the recruits have access to a new school 
house and firearms range built with donations from the French 
government. 
 
-- THE MINISTRY OF SPECIAL SERVICES -- 
 
¶8.  (S)  Shortly after seizing control of the Government of 
Guinea, the CNDD created the Ministry of Special Services, 
Anti-Drugs, and Organized Crimes (Ministry of High Crimes). 
The exact mission of the new ministry is largely undefined. 
Through CNDD decree, however, the ministry is tasked with the 
investigations of four principal criminal enterprises: (a) 
trafficking in illegal narcotics (b) trafficking in persons 
(c) laundering of money and (d) organized crime. 
 
¶9.  (S)  Leading the Ministry of High Crimes is Captain 
Moussa Tiegboro Camara, a Gendarme officer who, prior to the 
coup, earned a reputation as being an intellectual.  Sources 
claim that former Gendarmerie commander General Toure was 
suspicious of Tiegboro,s reputation so he had him 
transferred to serve as the liaison officer between the 
Ministry of Defense and Gendarmerie.  As liaison officer, 
sources report Tiegboro built strong relationships with 
Ministry of Defense officers and, as a result, he was one of 
a handful of Gendarme Officers selected to attend Commando 
training offered by the Chinese government.  This training 
sent Tiegboro overseas during 2008 and he returned a few 
weeks prior to the coup and was appointed Minister in January 
¶2009. 
 
¶10.  (S)  Staffing the Ministry of High Crimes has proven a 
difficult chore for the CNDD.  According to Tiegboro, the 
Ministry does not have any permanently assigned officers or 
agents.  To investigate criminal activity, Tiegboro relies on 
a small cadre (estimated at 100) of loyal officers from 
various groups - notably the Gendarmerie, Judicial Police, 
and select military officers from the Red Beret units.  This 
cadre forms a makeshift unit that typically operates under 
Tiegboro,s leadership for a finite period of time.  Once an 
investigation is concluded, the members are returned to their 
permanent duty stations.  It is not uncommon for Tiegboro to 
personally lead investigations. 
 
¶11.  (S)  At the six month mark following the creation of the 
Ministry, Tiegboro (and the CNDD) finds himself unable to 
establish a strategy to deal with even basic crimes. 
Tiegboro appeals to the citizenry for assistance and even 
goes so far as to voice CNDD decrees condoning vigilante 
justice. A number of Tiegboro,s activities have, in fact, 
raised human rights concerns (see reftel). 
 
 
--------------- 
HOMOGENIZATION 
--------------- 
 
¶12.  (S)  The fractured security forces appear to be in the 
process of being rapidly folded into a military-led national 
police force.  The civilian component (commonly referred to 
as &blue8) under the Ministry of Security remains the 
largest policing organization and the only viable balance to 
the military junta.  However, it is distracted and its 
influence rarely extends outside of Conakry. Further, the 
strain of political marginalization, weakened influence, and 
a lack of training and equipment gives one pause to reflect 
on the future of the organization. 
 
¶13.  (S)  The military component (commonly referred to as 
&green8), represented by the Gendarmerie and Ministry of 
High Crimes, are benefiting from astute jurisdiction 
annexing, structured recruiting, and a sympathetic 
population.  It is possible that the military will continue 
to amass authorities that should rightly belong to the civil 
police.  The danger of allowing the military to accrue both 
civil and military policing authorities will result in less 
transparency and does not provide for any kind of check and 
balance within the nation,s security forces. 
 
¶14.  (S)  We should not dismiss the trajectory the junta is 
 
taking by establishing a homogenized security force.  While 
free and fair elections may restore civilian leadership to 
Guinea, the role of the military in civilian policing will 
most assuredly grow.  In addition, if the military eventually 
downsizes, it would be a logical step for these former 
soldiers to take assignments in the policing sector. 
 
¶15.  (S)  Focusing on the security forces sector  en masse, 
and without assigning a green versus blue determination, may 
be the most effective method to effect positive change. 
Assistance given at any level would, arguably, be shared 
across many boundaries and the US must consider tailoring any 
future cooperation/assistance packages so that they can 
address this reality. 
RASPOLIC