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S E C R E T COLOMBO 000576 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM, SCA/RA AND SCA/INSB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019 
TAGS: MARR PGOV PTER PREL ECON EAID CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ARMY'S FIVE-YEAR STRATEGY FOR EXPANSION 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Michael R. DeTar, for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY:  In an ambitious five-year plan for 
expansion, the Sri Lankan military plans to roughly double 
its size to deal with the need for security in the 
post-conflict situation.  The Army Commander has already 
announced plans to recruit about 100,000 new soldiers at an 
accelerated pace over the next few months.  In addition, the 
government has announced the creation of two new military 
commands at Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, the main towns in the 
formerly LTTE-controlled areas.  The cost of the project may 
be nearly $3 billion.  Post assesses that the plan as it now 
exists is unaffordable for the Sri Lankan government under 
any scenario.  However, its existence gives early clues to 
the intentions of the military leadership for handling the 
post-conflict scenario in the areas until recently under LTTE 
control.  End summary. 
 
MILITARY ANNOUNCES PLANS FOR NEW RECRUITMENT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Sri Lankan military plans to enlist at least 
100,000 additional soldiers to head off a possible resurgence 
by the LTTE.   According to media reports, the Sri Lankan 
military is now seeking a number of suicide bombers believed 
to be hiding in Colombo and other Sinhalese-majority towns. 
General Sarath Fonseka has stated that there are also smaller 
rebel teams in jungles.  According to Fonseka, the proposed 
troop buildup addresses concerns that remnants of the LTTE 
currently living abroad my resurrect under new leadership. 
"There may be people abroad trying to promote a new leader 
and stage a comeback," Fonseka told state-run Independent 
Television Network. "Our strength is 200,000 and it will 
become 300,000 soon.  It will not be easy for them to build 
up a terror group as they did before."  In order to keep the 
LTTE from rebuilding, General Fonseka is calling on more men 
to enlist in the Sri Lankan military.  "We like to see young 
men joining us more quickly," he said.  "We don't mind 
enlisting even 10,000 a month; we need a lot more soldiers to 
reach our goal." 
 
¶3. (SBU) In the same interview, as reported by 
government-owned Sinhala newspapers, General Fonseka 
announced plans to establish new commands in Kilinochchi and 
Mullaitivu (the main towns of the Vanni, occupied by the 
Tamil Tigers for many years).  The Media Center for National 
Security confirmed to Pol section that Mullaitivu and 
Kilinochchi Army camps will be upgraded to "Security Forces 
Headquarters" (SFHQ), commanded by Major Generals, along the 
lines of the existing SFHQs in Vavuniya and Jaffna. 
 
FIVE YEAR PLAN WOULD DOUBLE SIZE OF FORCES 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Consistent with the public announcements of an 
expansion, Embassy has received a copy of a report and 
supporting documentation indicating that the Sri Lankan 
military plans to expand greatly over the next five years. 
Post is not in a position to establish the authenticity of 
the documents with certainty.  Nevertheless, the source has 
demonstrated consistent contacts with senior military and 
intelligence officials who could have given him this 
information. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  The documents contain a rationale for the 
expansion, which includes:  "Sri Lanka, even though being an 
Island with insignificant landmass, her strategic location in 
the world map with a large Tamil speaking community living 
across the Palk strait is a factor in the overall 
geopolitical frame work in the South Asian region... 
Maintaining a large Ground Force to act as a deterrent 
against any Internal and External Threats and Aggressions 
Targeting the Sovereignty of the Nation and the populace is a 
viable option to overcome such negative influences.  The 
entire plan for the future expansion/deployment has been 
worked out in keeping with the above indicated requisites in 
mind...  maintaining a Military presence with strength and 
depth to hold the strategically important Townships and 
Communication Centers is critical in an overall perspective 
to subdue any acts of Terrorism or Sabotage reoccurring 
whilst continuing with Pacification Operations to win over 
the public.  Conduct of Aggressive Intelligence Operations 
and pursuing Psychological Operations to rehabilitate the 
mind set of the public to tilt their affinity will also be 
facilitated by such a deployment.  In this context the Sri 
Lanka Army persists with the view that the control of the 
major Townships, Population Centers and the Population should 
be vested with them." 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) The package includes organizational charts of the 
desired end state of the armed forces, spreadsheets 
containing the proposed strengths of the various units, 
recruitment goals, maps of the deployments (to the northern 
and eastern areas, where Tamils are in the majority), and 
detailed cost estimates.   A committee composed of the three 
service chiefs reportedly drafted the plan.  It entails 
increasing the size of the armed forces by a total of 210,000 
soldiers over the next five years to a final strength of 
410,000 ) 63% regular forces and 37% "volunteers."  The 
projected cost is 331.9 billion rupees, or about USD 2.8 
billion at current exchange rates.  The fiscal impact is 
greatest in the out-years, as the Army reaches its final 
intended size, but also because of an equally ambitious 
procurement program. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7.  (S) An interesting omission in the plan is any 
substantive discussion of a role for Sri Lanka's police in 
providing security in the north.  This may reflect a lack of 
confidence that the police have the capacity to assume 
greater responsibility for internal security, particularly in 
the the former conflict zone.  It may also reflect the 
service chiefs' desire to continue receiving priority for GSL 
resources in the post-conflict context and to avoid being 
subjected to rapid demobilization. 
 
¶8.  (S) COMMENT continued:  Embassy has no indication as yet 
that the GSL plans to fund the plan, in part or in full.  In 
our view, the plan is simply unaffordable under any scenario. 
 Such an enormous increase in defense costs would presumably 
require a Cabinet decision.  Further, the project for 
military expansion brings into question the seriousness of 
the government's commitment to the IMF to reduce the overall 
fiscal deficit to 7% of GDP.  The plan nevertheless offers a 
valuable perspective into the mindset of the officers who 
produced it and their intentions for pacifying the 
post-conflict north.  The military already has an important 
voice in shaping government policy.  That voice, even if this 
plan cannot be carried out, appears to want to remain the 
decisive one in determining the GSL's development and 
reconstruction strategy for the North.   In Post's view, this 
underlines the need for international organizations and 
bilateral donor governments to remain vigilant in reminding 
and encouraging the government to follow through on its 
commitment to treat Tamils fairly, especially the ones 
currently interned in IDP camps, to reach out to Tamils and 
other minorities living in the Sinhalese-majority south and 
west, as well as to the Tamil Diaspora, and to put forward a 
proposal for a political solution that safeguards minority 
rights and addresses the legitimate aspirations of those Sri 
Lankan citizens who do not belong to the dominant community. 
 
 
MOORE