VZCZCXRO6941
OO RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #0573/01 1520303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 010303Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0055
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1227
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0297
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 3870
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 1715
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8727
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 6961
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5015
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3093
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4974
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4080
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 9346
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 6652
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO 1181
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3571
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APCW/APOP//
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J3/J332/J52//
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000573 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA (BOUCHER), SCA/INS AND PRM 
STATE ALSO PASS USAID 
AID/W FOR ANE/SCA, DCHA/FFP (DWORKEN, KSHEIN) 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA (MORRISP, ACONVERY, RTHAYER, RKERR) 
ATHENS FOR PCARTER 
BANGKOK FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA (WBERGER) 
KATHMANDU FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA AND POL (SBERRY) 
GENEVA FOR RMA (NKYLOH, NHILGERT, MPITOTTI) 
USUN NEW YORK FOR ECOSOC (D MERCADO) 
SECDEF FOR OSD - POLICY 
PACOM ALSO FOR J-5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF MOPS PHUM PGOV PREL ASEC CE ECON
SUBJECT:  SRI LANKA:  NEED FOR RAPID PROGRESS IN RESOLVING 
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 
 
REF:  A) COLOMBO 474 B) 2008 COLOMBO 1071 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  USAID/OFDA and PRM officers' monitoring of 
Vavuniya area sites for internally-displaced persons (IDPs) on May 
18-22 revealed the post-May 15 outflow of civilians from the 
conflict severely stretched the Government's capacity to respond. 
While US-funded UN agencies and INGOs are aiding the Government in 
providing life-saving assistance, the Government's heightened 
security concerns have resulted in restrictive conditions on 
humanitarian assistance.  The primary expected outcome of UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon's May 22-23 visit, unfettered UN 
access to the camps, was not realized, however agencies are working 
out compromises on access.  If screening for LTTE is not carried out 
expeditiously, the continued confinement of men, women, and children 
in these restrictive sites will raise serious concerns.  Post 
recommends close attention to a timeline to ensure U.S. humanitarian 
funding does not enable a long-term, confined camp environment which 
violates international humanitarian principles as well as the Sri 
Lankan constitution.  ACTION REQUEST: Please see paragraphs 12-14. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
OFDA AND PRM MONITORING; 
GOVERNMENT NEEDS OUTSIDE AID, 
BUT CREATING RESTRICTIONS 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) USAID OFDA Regional Advisor and PRM Regional Deputy RefCoord 
visited Vavuniya on May 18-22 to survey response to the final 
outflow of roughly 80,000-90,000 IDPs from the conflict zone. 
Officers monitored US-funded assistance, particularly to IOM and 
UNHCR, and discussed a potential donor coordination strategy with 
officers from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) 
and the European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO). 
 
¶3. (U) The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
reports that 286,721 persons fled the final phase of conflict from 
October 27, 2008 through May 22, 2009.  Many now reside in the 
massive new camp at Manik Farm, soon to gain the dubious title of 
largest camp for displaced persons in the world.  SPHERE standards 
are not yet being met given severe overcrowding and nascent health 
and sanitation systems.  There are no data available on crude 
mortality or morbidity rates; anecdotal evidence indicates high 
malnutrition rates among new arrivals. 
 
¶4.  (U) The Government maintains a heavy military presence at the 
Manik Farm sites, including armed soldiers in and around the zones, 
concertina wire ringing the sites, and multiple checkpoints on all 
roads.  The camps are located on former forest land remote from any 
major towns.  Government registration of camp residents continues 
but only summary data is shared with UN agencies, precluding efforts 
to reunite families split between different locations. 
International visitors are not permitted to speak at length with 
camp residents, and are prohibited from taking any photographs. 
 
¶5.  (U) Officers observed the Government's efforts to catch up to 
 
COLOMBO 00000573  002 OF 004 
 
 
the influx through military razing of forest land.  Roughly 20-30 
acres of new land was cleared per day in Zone 4 and officers 
witnessed IOM and UNHCR efforts to erect approximately 600 
two-family shelters per day as arrivals were coming in.  Government 
buses continued bringing new arrivals to the sites as soon as 
shelters were erected; officers heard from an aid worker that 300 
unaccompanied minors were staying in three tents.  OCHA reports that 
even once Zone 4 is entirely cleared (estimated within two weeks) 
and the maximum number of shelters are put in place, there will 
still be overcrowding.  UNHCR plans to push for more land in other 
districts and an expansion of Zone 4, as well as the release of 
individuals to live with host families in order to ease 
overcrowding. 
 
¶6.  (U) The health response is much improved from the late April 
2009 visit by USAID Mission Director and OFDA Regional Advisor (Ref 
A); each Manik Farm zone now has a medical clinic staffed by Sri 
Lankan doctors and nurses, and ample bed space is available at both 
established and field hospitals in the region.  However, patients 
must get to the clinics, as there is no health surveillance system 
in place conducting shelter-to-shelter visits; in some zones 
shelters may be over a mile from the nearest clinic and staffing is 
still inadequate.  WHO and the Ministry of Health have yet to begin 
immunizations for children; measles is among the largest killers of 
children in camps worldwide, and vaccination rate is unknown here. 
Officers witnessed obvious war wounds among new arrivals at health 
clinics and hospitals, in particular persons with feet or hands 
entirely bandaged, including children and the elderly.  Officers 
heard from health workers that post-May 15 arrivals from the 
conflict zone presented with fresh war wounds. 
 
¶7.  (U) OCHA and UNHCR have recently sent two senior level (P5) 
officials to Vavuniya to coordinate the UN response effort.  OCHA's 
Mark Cutts and UNHCR's Johann Siffointe have already made important 
steps in consolidating UN positions and raising the profile of 
field-level concerns.  OFDA Regional Advisor recommended the UN 
consult more closely with INGOs to ensure all aid agencies are 
involved in a unified platform, and avoid fractious tensions between 
agencies. 
 
¶8. (U) Officers visited Zone 2 on foot during the vehicle 
restriction on May 21.  Many new latrines have been constructed to 
improve poor sanitation conditions; however, stagnant pools of water 
and uncollected garbage remain.  (Note: trench latrines, which have 
been the standard, are purportedly not used due to rumors that they 
are dangerous.)  Non-food relief items were plentiful, and soda was 
available in a camp market; however residents' queues for water (via 
spaces reserved by jerry cans) numbered well over one hundred, as 
water tankers had not yet replenished the day's supply. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The International Committee of the Red Cross has decided 
that it will not remain involved with assistance in Manik Farm sites 
so long as the Government's encampment is not time-bound and as long 
as restrictions on protection activities continue.  (Note: A water 
plant set up by the ICRC will continue to provide enough water for 
 
COLOMBO 00000573  003 OF 004 
 
 
up to 30,000 Manik Farm residents per day.)  ICRC plans to continue 
monitoring of detainees and support of general health facilities but 
will not assist displaced persons camps. 
 
ACCESS RESTRICTIONS 
MAY BE EASED 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) During the officers' monitoring visit, aid agencies 
eagerly awaited the May 22-23 visit of UN Secretary General Ban Ki 
Moon, believing the Government would agree to Ban's request for 
unfettered humanitarian access.  (Note: the restrictions since May 
16 restricting entry to only those vehicles with military escort 
stemmed in part from reports that INGO local staff attempted to 
smuggle IDPs out of the camps.  End note.)  However, the Government 
rebuffed the request.  An influential local NGO reports that the 
Government had been prepared to ease the access restrictions during 
the UN SYG visit, but changed its mind after 14 NGOs released a 
letter criticizing the restrictions. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) While the issue of UN and INGO access to Manik Farm was 
not resolved during the UN Secretary General's visit, agencies have 
been working out a compromise in the field.  Aid agencies are now 
able to access the camps provided insignia on vehicles are removed 
and provided the vehicles are transporting relief materials in the 
camps. (Protection and monitoring activities alone are still 
effectively barred, though protection staff can enter with aid 
deliveries.)  If Government-imposed access restrictions hamper 
life-saving assistance in the future, Post will further engage the 
Government on this issue as needed. 
 
US RESPONSE PLANNING 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  The immediate issue of Government 
restrictions on UN and INGO access threaten to overshadow 
longer-term concerns on the militarized nature of the camps and on 
lack of freedom of movement for its residents, who are citizens 
entitled to rights under the Sri Lankan Constitution and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 
Sri Lanka has ratified.  Senior Government officials have pledged on 
multiple occasions to return 80% of the camp residents to the North 
by the end of CY 2009; however, other signals indicate the camps 
will remain for 2-3 years.  UNHCR, the UN lead for camp management, 
has communicated its concerns and expectations regarding the sites 
in official correspondence with the Government and in private 
conversations with senior leaders on many occasions.  It is likely, 
however, the goalposts will shift without close attention by donor 
governments.  The Government's screening of 800 residents confined 
in two camps in Mannar district, Kalimoddai and Sirukandal (Ref B), 
has been ongoing for fourteen months, providing basis for concern 
that the rapid screening of 300,000 new arrivals is beyond the 
Government's capacity absent significant effort and the commitment 
of new resources to expedite the screening process. 
 
 
COLOMBO 00000573  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Post recommends that Department conduct a review of the 
humanitarian situation as of August 31, 2009.  Post anticipates 
Government achievement of the following goals within three months: 
1) registration of camp residents completed, families scattered 
among sites reunited;  2) combatants identified and separated from 
camp population;  3) some individuals released to live with host 
families;  4) significant demining efforts underway in the North; 
and 5) start of returns to the North to certified mine-free areas. 
If the above steps are not achieved, the Department should signal to 
the Government that future USG assistance within the camps hinges 
upon demonstrated progress.  The U.S. Government would communicate 
its intention to discontinue direct support within the camps by the 
end of the year.  (Note: US support for demining, IDP returns, and 
rehabilitation efforts in the North would continue regardless of the 
decision on funding within the camps). 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Post recommends that Department liaise with UN agencies 
to ensure that CY 2010 Sri Lanka planning assumes a significant 
percentage of displaced Sri Lankans are returnees.  UN planning 
should be on the basis of the Government's pledge to return a 
significant number of the IDPs by end of CY 2009, which will require 
ample resources into 2010.  Senior Government officials have 
repeatedly stated that 80% of camp residents will be returned to the 
North by the end of CY 2009.  Most recently, the Government 
committed to 100,000 returns by end of 2009 as part of the UN Common 
Humanitarian Action Plan mid-year review.  UN agency appeals should 
permit the US and other donors to allocate resources appropriately, 
for example, to support assistance packages for IDPs returning to 
the North, while being assured the same contributions are not also 
continuing a long-term camp system.  If significant returns (or 
release to host families where demining needs prevent returns) take 
place by the end of CY 2009, the US and the UN may determine that 
continued aid within the camps is still appropriate.  Post suggests 
the Department establish a goal (perhaps 25% of new IDPs returned or 
released to host families by the end of calendar year 2009) as an 
internal measure of progress which will guide funding decisions. 
END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
MOORE