VZCZCXRO9766
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHSL #0289/01 1771309
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 261309Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0029
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0011
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000289 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/CE, INL/C, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/26/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KJUST LO
SUBJECT: CHIEF JUSTICE HARABIN'S TERM: "1825 DAYS OF DARKNESS"? 
 
REF: BRATISLAVA 282 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Keith A. Eddins, CDA, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Introduction and Summary: In a matter of weeks, 
significant negative developments have taken place in the Slovak 
judiciary. It will take some time to assess fully the 
ramifications of the June 22 election of Stefan Harabin as Chief 
Justice and the June 18 vote by the Slovak Parliament to 
establish a new "specialized" court against corruption and 
organized crime. While the latter development was a positive 
step in response to the Slovak Constitutional Court's earlier 
ruling that the Special Court against corruption is 
unconstitutional, Harabin's election constitutes a severe blow 
to rule of law in Slovakia. End Introduction and Summary. 
 
 
 
 
 
Specialized Court: Looking Ahead 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (U)  The new "Specialized" court, which will come into effect 
when the Constitutional Court publishes its May 20 decision on 
the Special Court (there is no deadline for this), retains most 
of the competencies as the Special Court.  It will also deal 
with additional types of cases, including premeditated 
homicides, public procurement fraud, and "extraordinary" cases 
of misusing power.  An important and potentially negative change 
in competency is that the new court will lose jurisdiction over 
"high state officials." 
 
 
 
¶3. (U)  Many legal experts and supporters of the Special Court 
have expressed appreciation for the new law's provisions to 
retain the court's current personnel and to maintain protection 
for the sitting judges.  However, experts also suggest that 
personnel continuity may be difficult to sustain for a number of 
reasons. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) We learned on June 24, for example, that the legislation 
doesn't permit the current Chief of the Special Court, Judge 
Michal Truban, to continue serving in this capacity once the 
transition occurs.  Thus, the future head of the Specialized 
Court will be nominated by Harabin and the Judicial Council. 
Constitutional lawyers have also flagged a potential basis for a 
wholesale change of court personnel: According to the Slovak 
Constitution, judges must be nominated by the Judicial Council. 
In this case, the composition of the specialized court was 
determined by legislation.   Another avenue for the dismissal of 
 current judges might be found in the recently-stated opinion of 
the Judicial Council, which asserts that since the 
Constitutional Court has declared security clearances for judges 
to be unconstitutional, it is not possible for the current 
judges (who hold clearances) to serve on the new Specialized 
Court. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C)  The Judicial Council's highly negative statement 
regarding the new Specialized Court, while merely advisory, is 
viewed with concern by advocates of an effective anti-corruption 
court.  The Judicial Council, which voted overwhelmingly on June 
22 to elect former Justice Minister Harabin as Chief Justice, is 
widely seen as his mouthpiece. The Judicial Council's assertions 
that the new court does not reflect the Constitutional Court's 
verdict on the Special Court can be expected to form the crux of 
what are expected to be a raft of petitions by persons convicted 
by the new court. Similarly, the Constitutional Court's ruling 
will open the way for hundreds of appeals by those previously 
convicted by the Special Court. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Finally, we have been struck by Harabin's own stance 
toward the Specialized Court. Although he has been the Special 
Court's most vociferous opponent, he made two statements 
expressing his general support for the new Specialized Court. 
It is easier to understand his acquiescence when one takes into 
account the fact that not only will Harabin appoint the head of 
the Specialized Court, but that the Supreme Court, which he now 
leads, is the court of appeal for the Special Court and will be 
for the Specialized Court, as well. 
 
 
 
Harabin: Still Reaching 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000289  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (C)  Developments regarding the Special/Specialized Courts 
must be viewed in the broader context of Slovak justice, and, in 
particular, Harabin's move to the Supreme Court.  Only a day 
after his lopsided victory (ref a), a Supreme Court Judge who 
supported the candidacy of Harabin's opponent received an 
insinuating and threatening letter.  The substance and 
specificity of it, which were described to us by the judge, 
suggest that its author comes from within judicial circles.  It 
implied that because the judge had expressed publicly her 
opposition to Harabin, she should expect similar attacks and 
public scrutiny of her performance.  Given Harabin's documented 
record of suspending judges and subjecting them to lengthy and 
spurious disciplinary proceedings, there is a broad expectation 
that any of those who had the courage to speak out against him 
will be punished by one means or another. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C)  Flush from his victory, the newly-minted Chief Justice 
presented for the government's consideration during its June 26 
session several proposals on the judiciary. These include: 
 
 
 
--Strengthening the powers of the Judicial Council (which 
Harabin leads); 
 
--Increasing the number of judges by 200 (these are named by the 
Judicial Council); 
 
--Increasing judges' salaries (thereby increasing their 
appreciation for Harabin); 
 
--Introducing a Constitutional amendment requiring any changes 
in the judicial system to be approved by a super-majority of MPs 
(thus further undermining checks and balances); 
 
 --Introduce new control mechanisms, which would enable the 
recall of judges for "serious or repeated insufficient 
fulfilling of duties," without going through the disciplinary 
senate process (another, faster avenue for Harabin to remove 
judges); and 
 
--Constructing a new Supreme Court building (estimated to cost 
30 million euro). 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C)  As previously reported, legislation is also pending to 
transfer additional, important powers to the Chairman of the 
Supreme Court.   Judges and constitutional lawyers who in 
principle support the idea of an independent judiciary have 
raised red flags about the draft legislation's effect on the 
balance of power among the branches of government and the 
concentration of so much power in the hands of one individual. 
Constitutional expert Radoslav Prochadzka told us that, 
according to the current wording of the draft, the Judicial 
Council has no choice but to  approve the decisions of the 
Chairman regarding the appointment of regional court presidents. 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) During his first in-depth television interview following 
election, Chief Justice Harabin attacked Zuzana Wienk, the 
director of the NGO "Alliance Fair-Play," which had organized 
the largest "Stop Harabin" initiative.  He called her a fraud 
and claimed falsely that she had admitted that she has a 
database of non-existent persons that she utilizes in her email 
campaigns.   He also recommended that the Prosecutor monitor the 
group's activities. Wienk told us that she had begun to receive 
obscene phone calls criticizing her for her protest against 
Harabin.  He then stated that the prosecutor's office should 
also look into the activities of his predecessor at the Court, 
Milan Karabin, because under his leadership, "invoices totaling 
17 million crowns went missing."  Finally, he said he could only 
laugh at the activists (or sapheads, as he called them) who had 
gathered in protest against his candidacy.  On June 26, 
 
 
 
Embassy Comment: 
 
-------------------- 
 
 
 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000289  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶11. (C) In the wake of Harabin's election, the mood among our 
judicial and NGO contacts is bleak.  While almost no one 
expected any other outcome, the courage of judges and citizens 
who spoke out against his election inspired many to believe that 
Harabin's elevation might be blocked.  Reality is now setting in 
(one editorial on the topic was entitled 1825 Days of Darkness, 
in reference to the length of Harabin's tenture).  That not even 
one of the country's most influential judges cast a vote against 
Harabin confirms the depth of his power and influence.  In 
almost every conversation about Harabin's landslide election, 
our interlocutors comment that "now the revenge will begin." 
EDDINS