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FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1362
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 0028
RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 000506 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KVIR SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: VISA LIBERALIZATION MAY BE PRESSURE POINT 
FOR PROGRESS ON KOSOVO 
 
REF: A) BELGRADE 306 B) BRUSSELS 809 
 
Classified By: Bradford Bell, Deputy Political Chief; reasons 1.4 (b, d 
). 
 
 Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The Government of Serbia,s overwhelming desire to 
secure visa liberalization with the EU is a pressure point 
that could facilitate Serbia,s cooperation on Kosovo issues. 
 According to EU Special Representative in Belgrade Sorensen, 
the GoS had lost its footing on Kosovo as a result of the 
EU,s recent tough line on visa liberalization standards. 
The GoS is now concerned that unless it is able to show that 
Serbia is cooperating fully with the EU Rule of Law Mission 
(EULEX), its goal of visa free travel to the EU may be 
jeopardized.  Serbia now seems to be scrambling to be 
cooperative, and is close to signing an MOU on police 
cooperation with EULEX, from which other substantive 
cooperation could flow.  In addition, internal Kosovo 
Ministry squabbling is further weakening Serbia's negotiating 
position with EULEX.  Foreign Minister Jeremic, while still 
pushing his international agenda on Kosovo, appears sidelined 
on internal Kosovo issues.  This may present an opportunity 
for progress in Kosovo on police and customs.  That trickle 
of progress could lead to more cooperation, if the EU is able 
to keep its finger on the right pressure point * Serbia,s 
access to the EU.  End Summary. 
 
Visas: Serbia,s Incentive to Cooperate with EULEX 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2.  (C) Not wanting to jeopardize its goal of visa free 
travel to the EU by the end of 2009, the GoS is looking to 
cooperate substantively with EULEX.  On June 8, Serbia,s 
Ministry of Interior presented to EULEX a draft MOU which 
would facilitate cooperation between the GoS and EULEX on 
police, customs and intelligence sharing.  EUSR Peter 
Sorensen told us on June 10 that Serbia,s push for this MOU 
began in earnest once it realized that without full 
cooperation, EULEX would have to report to Brussels that 
Serbia was unable to guarantee the security of its border 
(which Serbia still considers a boundary line), an important 
precondition for Schengen "White List" status and visa free 
travel.  He expected that EULEX would be able to accept the 
MOU with minor changes. 
 
Possible Progress in Police and Customs 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Sorensen said he expected that once implemented the 
MOU could lead to substantive coordination between EULEX and 
the GoS on the ground.  The MOU would facilitate the sharing 
of intelligence information regarding customs and border 
activity.  According to Sorensen, customs points in the North 
(Gate 1 and 31) would need to be fully operational and EULEX 
police would need to have a more robust presence in North 
Kosovo in order for Serbia to fulfill its obligations under 
the MOU. 
 
Dacic Cooperative, Bogdanovic to an Extent 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Sorensen said the Interior Ministry (MOI), led by 
Ivica Dacic, appeared willing to cooperate with EULEX and had 
appointed Serbia,s Deputy Police Commander as EULEX,s MOI 
point of contact. (Per reftel A, Interior Minister Ivica 
Dacic of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) has strongly 
tied himself to the goal of obtaining Schengen White List 
status for Serbia, which involves sorting out the thorny 
issue of the issuance of Serbian passports to residents of 
Kosovo.  Dacic has a strong incentive to cooperate with 
EULEX, in part hoping to gain EU flexibility on the passport 
issue.)  Kosovo Minister Goran Bogdanovic was also playing a 
more constructive role out of concern not to be blamed for 
losing Serbia,s chance at White List status, Sorensen said. 
This concern spurred Bogdanovic to take action in May against 
a train which was carrying illicit fuel from Serbia into 
Kosovo.  Bogdanovic,s definitive action against the train 
smugglers lead to threats against his family who still live 
in Kosovo, Bogdanovic,s chief of staff Vlada Jovicic told us 
on June 4.  Sorensen readily admitted that Bogdanovic still 
remained uncooperative in other areas, such as his insistence 
on traveling officially to Kosovo and his June 3 statements 
to parliamentarians that the GoS had not agreed to EULEX,s 
partial return to customs posts in northern Kosovo.  EULEX 
sources, who have apprised us of their ongoing talks with the 
Kosovo Ministry on this issue, say that there was mutual 
agreement between EULEX and the GoS on the customs issue. 
 
 
Jeremic Absent from Issue 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic appears to have removed 
himself from internal Kosovo issues, choosing instead to 
travel the globe beating his anti-Kosovo recognition drum and 
harping on Serbia,s International Court of Justice strategy. 
 In the interim, Jeremic has left internal Kosovo issues to 
his advisor Damjan Krnjovic-Miskovic, who appears to be 
coordinating with Bogdanovic to make certain EULEX 
cooperation moves ahead.  Sorensen also said he received on 
June 9 a commitment from Krnjovic-Miskovic that UNMIK no 
longer needed to be present in EULEX and GoS meetings. 
Jovicic told us on June 4 that the Kosovo Ministry had no 
concerns about meeting alone with EULEX ) as they had done 
in the past.   Sorensen was optimistic that this would give 
EULEX greater freedom to deal with the Serbian ministries 
directly responsible for cooperation with EULEX, particularly 
Interior and Justice. 
 
Progress on Police, Customs, Then What? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) After securing greater cooperation on police and 
customs through the MOU, judiciary would be the next area for 
progress, but Sorensen was more sober and pragmatic on what 
could be accomplished in that regard.  Without a clear 
understanding of the applicable law issue (whose law to 
apply: Kosovo, UNMIK, or Serbian) it would be difficult to 
move beyond removing the administrative backlog of cases in 
Mitrovica.  Looking even further down the field, Sorensen did 
not see what incentive Serbia would have to cooperate on 
other pending issues, such as decentralization or local 
elections, which are scheduled for later this year. 
Bogdanovic, however, realized Serbia must engage on 
decentralization or the GoS could be further marginalized in 
Kosovo, Sorensen said.  Bogdanovic remained unwilling or 
unable to meet with International Civilian Representative 
Feith, Sorensen said. 
 
Kosovo Ministry:  Internal Divisions 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Internal divisions within the Kosovo Ministry have 
also caused Serbia to lose its footing on Kosovo.  Jovicic 
told us that the divide between Minister Bogdanovic and State 
Secretary Oliver Ivanovic continued to grow.  Ivanovic was 
making things difficult both within the Ministry and between 
Serbia and the international community, Jovicic said. 
Ivanovic,s frequent off the cuff remarks to the media had 
eroded support from the international community, he added. 
Jovicic admitted that the Ministry had little control over 
Ivanovic, saying he did not know "what exactly Ivanovic was 
up to."  Sorensen said Ivanovic,s recent decision to 
politically align himself with Nebojsa Covic of the 
newly-resurrected Social Democratic Party had further 
isolated Ivanovic, making DS and SPS the powerbrokers in the 
Kosovo Ministry.  Sorensen believed these mixed signals from 
Belgrade could work to the advantage of institutions in 
Kosovo, if Kosovo Serbs get sick of looking to the MoK for 
guidance and chose instead to engage directly with the 
Pristina government or the International Civilian Office. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Although Sorensen,s optimism may be premature, it 
appears the EU may have found the right pressure point to 
obtain greater cooperation from Serbia on Kosovo issues.  The 
GoS,s willingness to conclude this MOU, particularly Dacic's 
interest, is an indication that Serbia,s political leaders 
may now fear the inability to deliver visa free travel to 
Serbian citizens more than they fear appearing "soft" on the 
Kosovo issue.  The EU may have finally seized upon a useful 
carrot and stick, but even this tool has a limited lifespan. 
Serbia will expect to be rewarded for its cooperation, and 
will be bitterly disappointed if its flexibility on issues 
such as police cooperation with EULEX does not lead to 
flexibility from the EU on concerns about passport issuance. 
Lack of success on the visa issue, a gut issue for many 
Serbs, will leave the "For Europe" coalition, headed by 
President Tadic, with little to show on progress toward 
European integration.  Tadic,s main political rival Tome 
Nikolic, head of the Serbian Progressive Party (which broke 
from the Radicals last year), already has told us this 
"failure" will be his main campaign issue as he calls for new 
elections.  End Comment. 
 
BRUSH