VZCZCXRO0939
PP RUEHBZ RUEHGI
DE RUEHGI #0120/01 1680829
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 170829Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0923
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0172
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0275
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0285
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0186
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0130
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0464
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0450
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0123
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0445
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1158

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000120 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL,CKOCH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: FRENCH-CAR RELATIONS SERIOUSLY STRAINED 
 
REF: 09 BANGUI 118 
 
1.(SBU) SUMMARY: In the 49 years since the independence of the 
Central African Republic (CAR), the French have been the 
dominant foreign force and their military and financial aid 
continues to be an essential crutch supporting the government of 
President Francois Bozize.  Yet despite France's historic 
engagement in the CAR and the traditional deference which the 
CAR's population holds the power of the French government, it is 
increasingly clear that French patience is wearing very thin and 
may be approaching its limit. Bozize, and indeed most Central 
Africans, appear to be blind to what we see as clear signals 
from Paris. President Bozize may still believe himself 
indispensible to France, but Post suspects he is wrong. END 
SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (SBU) For at least the last eighteen months, in both Bangui 
and Paris, the French have consistently expressed deep 
frustration with the Central African Government (CARG) to 
Embassy Bangui staff. They are now willing to express that 
frustration directly to the highest levels of the United 
Nations. The French ambassador was extremely candid with United 
Nations Undersecretary for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe 
during a recent lunch at the U.S. Ambassador's Residence. (NOTE: 
Pascoe is the former U.S. ambassador to Indonesia. Also, present 
was the United Nations' interim resident representative). On a 
macro level, President Sarkozy has been calling for a 
reorientation of French policy vis a vis Africa, away from the 
post colonial patronage of previous Gaullist governments to a 
more pragmatic relationship based on French economic interests. 
An advisor on Sub-Saharan African Affairs to President Sarkozy 
further confirmed this attitude in regards to Central Africa in 
separate meetings with the Ambassador and POLOFF several times 
over the last eighteen months. The Bozize/Sarkozy meeting of 
twelve minutes in 2007, and the tongue lashing that accompanied 
it, is renowned and symptomatic of the frosty relations between 
the two capitals. According to reliable sources, Sarkozy said: 
``This is what I/France have done FOR you and this is what you 
have done TO me/France.'' The French refer to the meeting as the 
``icy shower.'' The follow-on meeting at the Quai was longer and 
chillier. It is very clear that the days of Valery Giscard 
D'Estaing calling Emperor Bokassa his ``friend and family 
member'' are long gone, even if this fact escapes most Central 
Africans, especially those in the CARG. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Central Africans have not made this a difficult 
decision for the French. The constant frustrations facing French 
commercial giants such as Total and AREVA are well known. While 
France used to count on the CAR as a valuable reserve of 
uranium, it is very clear that the double dealing of the 
Minister of Mines, among others, in renegotiating contracts is 
pushing the French beyond even their normally generous limits. 
Additionally, the obtuse behavior of the CARG in naming Saifee 
Durbar, a man wanted for fraud in France, as Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs has seriously strained relations. While it 
appeared at first that the French might hold their noses and 
grant a diplomatic visa to Durbar in exchange for the Areva 
deal, it is now clear that this is not the case. French 
indignation was probably increased then they learned that 
Durbar's Hydro-Finance company had been given exclusive rights 
to provide electrical power to Areva. Post does not have all the 
details, but it is clear that the dam needed to provide this 
power does not exist. Durbar has also secured the rights to 
large concessions all around Areva's holdings for his Swiss 
company, Uranio, AG. Again, Post do not have the details, but is 
willing to speculate that Areva might be boxed in. The United 
Nations' interim Resident Representative marveled to the U.S. 
ambassador that in personal conversations with him, President 
Bozize continued to defend Durbar. He dismissed any French 
objections to Durbar as being simply sour grapes as Durbar had 
defended Central African interests. NOTE: The French were not 
amused when an anonymous leaflet appeared in Bangui inviting 
violence against the French Deputy Chief of Mission for his 
actions against Durbar. This is the first time that anyone can 
remember such a leaflet circulating in Bangui. END NOTE. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Furthermore, the French military, which has poured 
surplus material and training into the FACA, the gendarmes and 
 
BANGUI 00000120  002 OF 002 
 
 
the police for many years, only to see the material fall apart 
and the training ill used, is deeply frustrated as well. After a 
French Gendarme was assaulted during the 14 July national day 
ceremony in 2007 by a member of Bozize's Presidential Guard 
(GP), all cooperation with the GP was cut off. (Bozize declined 
to attend the French National Day in 2008.) Furthermore, the 
French, who in the late 1990's had four military bases in the 
CAR, now have 250 soldiers total in the country, based mostly in 
Bangui. So while the French may still be at the center of 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration efforts and 
Security Sector Reform, as well as the main contributor of 
bilateral aid, it is clear that this is more of a historic 
remnant than a forward moving policy leading to deeper 
cooperation. Indeed, the French say that they are shifting all 
of their regional/geostrategic military engagement to MICOPAX. 
To that end, they are helping to set up a headquarters staff in 
Libreville. It appears that they hope eventually to be able to 
use MICOPAX troops as a quick reaction force, until they can fly 
in their own troops from Gabon, in the event of evacuation. 
 
¶5. (SBU) COMMENT: If the French were indeed to retract all 
political, economic and military aid, it is almost certain the 
Bozize government, as it currently behaves, would crumble (RRF 
09 BANGUI 118). Yet it is unclear that Bozize thinks this even a 
remote possibility. In spite of, or because of, being raised in 
the court of Emperor Bokassa and witness to his deposition by 
the French, and to the various French military actions in the 
CAR over the past 30 years (including the bombardment of rebels 
headed towards Bangui in 2007), Bozize, and indeed most Central 
Africans, remains blind to the shifting signals from Paris. 
Bozize may believe that he has successfully rendered himself the 
least of the evils in the CAR political landscape. He thus 
appears to imagine himself indispensible to his neighbors and 
the French, an assumption that AmEmbassy Bangui believes may be 
badly mistaken. END COMMENT 
COOK