VZCZCXRO7160
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #1305/01 1520920
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010920Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7157
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9707
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1649
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7090
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5530
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 6606
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PINS ECON ETRD TH BM LA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES SECURITY, REFUGEES, CUSTOMS, AND 
OTHER ISSUES WITH DEPUTY PM SUTHEP 
 
REF: BANGKOK 1203 (RAID ON MARKET) 
 
BANGKOK 00001305  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d). 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban assured the 
Ambassador that there would be no security problems during 
Secretary Clinton's July visit, in part because the 
authorities and local population in Phuket were sympathetic 
to the government.  Suthep complained that former Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra aimed to subvert the monarchy and 
was engaged in public relations efforts to misrepresent 
conditions in Thailand.  The Ambassador lobbied for a 
transparent screening mechanism for Lao Hmong in Thailand and 
for better conditions for Lao Hmong refugees currently held 
in a detention facility in Nong Khai.  Suthep expressed 
compassion for Rohingya refugees but hoped they would 
resettle in Muslim-majority countries rather than in 
Thailand.  He also said the RTG might provide Thai 
citizenship to stateless persons born in Thailand.  The 
Ambassador expressed concern about the Customs Department 
assessment of a 200 million USD fine for U.S. company Amway, 
and commended recent RTG efforts to clamp down on 
intellectual property rights violations.  Suthep vaguely 
requested that the USG ease regulations affecting Thai shrimp 
exports, and he said RTG efforts in the South would focus 
more on economic development and protecting the population 
rather than on killing insurgents. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment: Despite the calm of the past few weeks, 
Suthep remains concerned about both the security environment 
and the efforts required to ensure that the governing 
coalition remains intact.  Suthep appeared willing to assist 
on the issues of concern to us, and we will follow up to 
provide him with enough details that he might be able to take 
effective action.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
THE POLITICAL/SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
AND SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In a June 1 lunch at the EMR, Deputy Prime Minister 
Suthep Thaugsuban told the Ambassador that former Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was exacerbating the political 
divisions plaguing Thailand.  Fundamentally, Thaksin aimed to 
overthrow or marginalize the monarchy, Suthep believed. 
Thaksin and his allies would likely aim to break apart the 
governing coalition so as to push the Abhisit government from 
office by October, in order to prevent the Democrat Party 
from controlling budgeting for the next fiscal year.  Were 
the Democrats able to allocate the 2010 budget, they might 
successfully pull support from Thaksin. 
 
¶4. (C) The government had difficulty controlling mid-April 
protests because the vast majority of the police in Bangkok 
and Pattaya were sympathetic to Thaksin, Suthep said. 
Therefore, it had been necessary to involve the military in 
crowd control.  Suthep noted that the government had not 
caused any fatalities during the riots; those who claimed 
otherwise were lying.  In fact, the government had turned a 
blind eye to a policeman's shooting of a soldier, so as not 
to fuel institutional conflicts between the military and 
police.  Suthep said he believed that the violence in April 
had discredited Thaksin in many Thais' eyes. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador sought Suthep's assurance that there 
would be no security problems during Secretary Clinton's July 
visit for the ASEAN Regional Forum ministerial meeting. 
Suthep remarked that the Secretary "has a lot of fans here," 
and he confidently predicted that there would be no problems, 
because the ministerial would take place in Phuket, and the 
police and local population in Phuket, like most other 
southern provinces, were sympathetic to the current 
government.  Suthep also said he would involve the military 
in security preparations and establish extensive checkpoints 
to block any attempts to bring large numbers of protestors to 
Phuket. 
 
¶6. (C) Suthep asked that the Ambassador explain to Washington 
 
BANGKOK 00001305  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
the situation in Thailand.  He worried that Thaksin had 
extensive wealth and was engaging in a public relations 
effort that misrepresented the nature of the anti-government 
movement, portraying it as focused on democracy.  In fact, 
Suthep alleged, many of the people behind that movement were 
former communists who now were "almost terrorists" because of 
the methods they employed.  (In this context, he named 
Thaksin associates Prommin Lertsuridej, Phumtham Vejjayachai, 
Pansak Vinyaratn, Chaturon Chaiseng, and Kriangkamon 
Laohapairot.) 
 
LAO HMONG, ROHINGYAS, AND STATELESS PERSONS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador raised concern for Lao Hmong in 
Thailand, acknowledging that the majority likely had no claim 
to refugee status.  It was important that the RTG establish a 
transparent screening mechanism to ensure no one with a valid 
claim to refugee status might be involuntarily repatriated. 
The Ambassador stressed the Administration's and the U.S. 
Congress' high level of interest in the Lao Hmong.  Suthep 
readily agreed with the Ambassador, noting that the RTG had 
followed up on prior returnees and had seen that Lao Hmong 
who return to Laos were generally content with their 
circumstances. 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador expressed support for international 
monitoring of any returns of Lao Hmong to Laos.  He also 
raised the disposition of Lao Hmong who were currently in a 
Nong Khai immigration detention facility.  The Ambassador 
urged that, pending resettlement to a third country, these 
Lao Hmong -- including a significant number of children -- be 
allowed to remain with relatives in Lopburi province, rather 
than remaining essentially imprisoned.  Suthep promised to 
look into this matter. 
 
¶9. (C) Suthep raised the plight of Rohingyas, saying they 
presented a much more difficult problem than the Hmong. 
Suthep said the Rohingyas deserved international sympathy; 
the RTG could not openly welcome them but believed there 
should be a "regional solution," which Suthep saw as 
resettlement in Muslim-majority countries such as Malaysia or 
Indonesia.  The Ambassador urged that the RTG not undertake 
any actions that would appear to jeopardize the safety of 
Rohingyas, such as preventing those approaching Thailand by 
sea from landing.  Suthep acknowledged that the RTG had at 
times done this, but in such cases had ensured the Rohingyas' 
boats were seaworthy and had provided them with food.  The 
Ambassador countered that that approach was not flawless and 
could still imperil the lives of Rohingyas. 
 
¶10. (C) Suthep said that the RTG was leaning toward providing 
Thai citizenship to all stateless people born in Thailand -- 
not simply stateless refugees, but also members of hill 
tribes.  Naturally, however, the RTG could not be equally 
accommodating for stateless persons born outside of Thailand. 
 
AMWAY AND THAI CUSTOMS 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador raised concern about the Thai Customs 
Department, noting that Amway, which works with approximately 
100,000 Thais and was the largest American importer of goods 
into Thailand, had been assessed a 200 million USD fine in 
connection with the valuation of certain imports.  Refusal to 
pay could result in the imprisonment of certain Amway 
executives and a five-fold increase in the fine.  The 
Ambassador stressed that the key problem in this case was the 
lack of transparency by the Customs office in its valuation 
process.  Other members of the American business community 
also had repeatedly complained about the Department of 
Customs, whose actions appeared to be scaring away potential 
American exporters and investors. 
 
¶12. (C) Suthep appeared to acknowledge that the Customs 
Department's operations could be problematic and 
non-transparent.  He encouraged the Ambassador to provide him 
with written information on Amway's case, and he said that he 
hoped that in the near term a friend of Suthep's would become 
Permanent Secretary of the Finance Ministry; this appointment 
would provide Suthep greater means to assist informally. 
 
BANGKOK 00001305  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
(The RTG has several Deputy Prime Ministers, and Suthep does 
not have formal authority over the Customs Department.) 
 
IPR 
--- 
 
¶13. (C) The Ambassador remarked that Deputy Commerce Minister 
Alongkorn Ponlaboot had made significant efforts to crack 
down on IPR violations.  Suthep said he had encouraged 
Alongkorn to go after the factories that produced pirated 
merchandise, rather than pursuing the low-level street 
vendors, as in a high-profile May raid that became something 
of a fiasco (reftel). 
 
SHRIMP EXPORTS 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Noting that he had a shrimp farm in southern 
Thailand, Suthep lamented that Thai shrimp exporters were 
still having difficulty in the U.S. market.  The Ambassador 
responded that we were complying with the WTO ruling on 
continuous bonds.  Suthep urged the U.S. to improve the 
regulatory environment in the U.S. market. 
 
THE SOUTH 
--------- 
 
¶15. (C) Suthep said that the Abhisit administration hoped to 
promote the development of the South by providing small 
communities with credit, encouraging the production of 
agricultural commodities, handicrafts, and extending aid to 
fishermen.  He hoped to double household income within three 
years, from 60,000 Baht to 120,000 Baht.  In the Deep South, 
there were 7,000 - 10,000 people "against the government" (we 
interpreted this as meaning insurgents or active supporters 
of the insurgency); Suthep said the RTG would not try to 
solve the insurgency using heavy-handed Thaksin-era methods; 
rather then trying to confront and kill insurgents, the RTG 
would focus primarily on protecting the rest of the 
population. 
JOHN