VZCZCXRO7147
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1431/01 1520900
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010900Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3282
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001431 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL IZ SA
SUBJECT: IRAQ-SAUDI ARABIA:  NO RAPPROCHEMENT IN SIGHT 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 1280 
     ¶B. RIYADH 699 
     ¶C. RIYADH 730 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John Fox for reason 1.4 (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  On May 29, Prime Minister Maliki publicly 
complained about Saudi Arabia's "negative stance" toward 
Iraq's efforts to improve the bilateral relationship.  In his 
sharp response two days later, the Saudi Interior Minister 
suggested that Maliki himself was working against Iraq's 
interests with the Kingdom.  This "media war," which has been 
extensively covered in the local media, reflects genuine 
frustration at Saudi Arabia's unwillingness to reciprocate 
what Maliki perceives to be GOI gestures toward the Saudis, 
as well as growing public anger toward Saudi Arabia among 
Iraqi Shi'a, who were outraged by anti-Shia comments recently 
made by a prominent Saudi cleric in Mecca.  The upcoming 
national elections are likely to see an increase in Iraqi 
nationalist rhetoric, as candidates compete to burnish their 
patriotic credentials.  There will likely also be a fierce 
battle for Shi'a votes between Maliki's Dawa party and its 
rival, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and no 
Shi,a politician will want to appear weak in defending Shi'a 
interests or Iraqi honor.  End summary. 
 
------------ 
War of Words 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (U)  Asked by Iraqi News on May 29 why no senior Saudi 
officials have visited Iraq and whether he intended to 
initiate relations with Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Maliki 
responded that "We have succeeded in opening up to most 
countries, but Saudi Arabia has negative stances.  We have 
initiated (attempts) to create normal and positive relations, 
but these initiatives were understood in a negative way as 
weakness.  We remain ready to accept a Saudi initiative 
because initiatives on our side have run out, and there is no 
use of repeating them unless Saudi Arabia expresses its 
desire for a relationship."  The comments, widely portrayed 
in he media as an attack on Saudi Arabia, were posted on the 
official National Media Center's website. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz 
responded on May 31, telling "Al-Watan" newspaper that "The 
Kingdom wants only the good and stability for Iraq, in all 
aspects, but if there is someone in Iraq working against its 
interests and expecting the Kingdom to support him, this will 
not happen."  He charged that Baghdad was not doing enough to 
control its borders and that Iraqis were infiltrating into 
Saudi Arabia.  "The Iraqi government knows where the 
(foreign) fighters come from," he said.  Nayef said that "The 
Kingdom would not allow any harm against Iraq's government 
and people." 
 
¶4.  (U)  Responding to Nayef's comments, close Maliki advisor 
and Dawa MP Sami al-Askari told al-Iraqiyya TV May 31 that 
"His statements are astonishing, especially since we know 
that half of, or more than half, of the foreign terrorists 
that entered Iraq and carried out acts of killing are Saudi 
nationals.  Meanwhile, Saudi security forces did not arrest 
any Iraqis involved in terrorism in the Kingdom."  He noted 
that "We still hear fatwas (issued by Saudi scholars) that 
harm the political situation in Iraq, stir up terrorism, and 
sanction the killing of Iraqis...I do not say that the Saudi 
government is the party that sends them, but I say that the 
fatwas issued in Saudi Arabia are the reason that encouraged 
these Saudi young men to come to kill Iraqis and kill their 
children, women and elderly people."  Askari reiterated 
Iraq's desire for good relations with Saudi Arabia, but 
regretted that "these efforts were not received positively by 
Qregretted that "these efforts were not received positively by 
the Saudi government."  Iraq has done everything in its power 
to improve relations, he said, "The ball is now in the Saudi 
court.  If they want to develop these relations, then they 
are more than welcome, but if they choose not to, then Iraq 
will not be the only loser.8 
 
---------------- 
Possible Reasons 
---------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Assistant Minister for Reconciliation Saad Mutalibi 
(Shi'a independent) told Poloff on May 30 that Maliki's 
comments were "restrained," considering that Riyadh had 
rebuffed several Iraqi efforts over the last two years to 
restore relations.  For example, Maliki appointed a Sunni 
ambassador to Riyadh at the SAG's request, but he had 
difficulties presenting credentials and has had limited 
access to the Saudi leadership.  (Note:  The Saudis also have 
not sent an ambassador to Baghdad.  End note.)  The Prime 
Minister also sent two delegations to Riyadh to discuss 
security cooperation and overall relations, but neither was 
 
BAGHDAD 00001431  002 OF 002 
 
 
able to get high-level meetings.   Saad claimed that Maliki's 
posture toward Riyadh is more than pandering to sectarian 
feeling; he is, rather, exerting nationalist muscle and 
"standing up" to an affront to Iraq's dignity. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Maliki's May 29 comments may also be at least in 
part in response to a speech made by Saudi cleric Adil 
al-Galbani broadcast in the Arab media earlier this month 
claiming that in the "House of God in Mecca" Shi'a were 
infidels.  Iraqi Shi'a leaders were outraged by the speech. 
Al-Galbani's remarks were the subject of debate in Iraq's 
parliament May 12, with MPs demanding an apology and saying: 
"in light of the fact that no cleric dare give a speech 
without the approval of the Saudi authorities, we consider 
this action as an attempt to regenerate sedition within Iraqi 
society by calling the majority of the people infidels."  The 
speech came up again in Parliament on May 26, with a Shi'a MP 
stating that "hundreds of Shi'a are still demonstrating 
against al-Galbani's lies and it is important for the 
Parliament to express support for the people."  PRT Najaf 
reported that there was a peaceful demonstration in Najaf 
against Al-Galbani's anti-Shi'a statements after Friday 
prayers on May 29. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Maliki,s recent comments reflect two things: 
genuine frustration at Saudi Arabia's unwillingness to 
reciprocate what Maliki perceives to be GOI gestures toward 
the Saudis, and growing public anger toward Saudi Arabia 
among Iraqi Shi'a.  We predict that Iraqi nationalist 
rhetoric and sentiment will rise during the campaign period 
for the Iraqi parliamentary elections planned for January 
¶2010.  There will also likely be fierce battle for Shi,a 
votes between Maliki,s Dawa party and its rival, ISCI.  No 
Shi,a politician will wants to appear weak in defending 
Shi,a interests or Iraqi honor.  Maliki may also have 
learned a lesson from the criticism he received from fellow 
Shi'a after he called for reconciliation with Sunnis.  At 
that time, his rivals tried to portray him as pro-Ba'ath.  If 
Maliki attempts to form a cross-sectarian national alliance 
for the elections, he will have to continually boost his Shia 
credentials by making statements like the one he made on 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
¶8.  (C)  In current conditions, it will be difficult to 
achieve a major bilateral breakthrough before the 
parliamentary elections.  In the meantime, we are exploring 
ways to encourage "track two"-type engagement that might 
foster a better bilateral climate.  First, we will press 
Iraqi leaders to tone down the rhetoric.  In addition, as 
proposed by both us and Embassy Riyadh (reftels), we will 
encourage reciprocal legislative exchange visits by Iraq's 
highly regarded new (Sunni) Speaker of Parliament and his 
Shura council counterpart (We were heartened to read -- ref c 
-- that such an exchange has been approved on the Saudi 
side).  We could also encourage Saudi investment and 
development assistance to Iraq, perhaps through a GCC 
mechanism if the Saudis are hesitant to do this 
government-to-government.  Finally, we note Embassy Riyadh's 
accurate description of problems resolving Iraqi debt (ref 
B), including the likelihood that Kuwait factors into this 
issue, and will work with our Riyadh counterparts to try to 
bring together Saudi and Iraqi working-level officials to 
discuss technical debt issues.  Embassy Riyadh's report (ref 
C) noted Iraqi Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Ghanam al-Jumaili's 
surprise at Maliki's comments and that he planned to seek 
clarification of the Prime Minister's remarks from the Iraqi 
MFA.  We will also follow up with the MFA. 
QMFA.  We will also follow up with the MFA. 
HILL