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Viewing cable 09ASTANA1015, SUMMER WORK AND TRAVEL: VIEWS FROM CENTRAL ASIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA1015 2009-06-15 08:52 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana
VZCZCXRO8631
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHSK
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1015/01 1660852
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150852Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5603
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1657
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 7003
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 1605
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD KZ KG TJ UZ TX
SUBJECT: SUMMER WORK AND TRAVEL: VIEWS FROM CENTRAL ASIA 
 
ASTANA 00001015  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
1. SUMMARY. The Summer Work and Travel (SWT) programs of Central 
Asia are all tiny compared to our neighbor to the north. 
Nonetheless, the countries of Central Asia each have interesting 
insights into the program.  There are few commonalities among SWT 
experiences in the region, which is not surprising given the 
tremendous variance from country to country in consular portfolios 
and visa issues in general.  Refusal and non-return rates differ, as 
do program concerns and sheer size.  What the region offers is a 
study in programs at various stages of development, from the 
well-established to almost non-existent. The following is a 
country-by-country overview of SWT programs and issues in Central 
Asia.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
KAZAKHSTAN'S NUMBERS PLUNGE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2. After several years of rapid growth, the number of Kazakhstanis 
participating in the SWT program plunged by 47% in 2009, presumably 
due to the world financial situation.  In 2008, almost 4300 students 
applied for the program.  This year, Astana and Almaty processed 
only 2263 SWT applications.  Anecdotally, concern over finding good 
jobs in the U.S. has kept some students away.  Devaluation of the 
Kazakhstani currency has also made it more expensive for students to 
participate.  Astana, despite processing half the number of overall 
nonimmigrant visa (NIV) applications as Almaty, continues to handle 
about 55% of SWT workload. The two consular sections felt the 
reduced number of 2009 applications proportionately. 
 
3. The refusal rate for SWT applicants was 9%, up slightly from 
2008.  Almost all of the non-qualified applicants were graduating 
students.  A validation study conducted after the 2008 season showed 
a 7% non-return rate for Kazakhstani SWT participants.  Most of the 
students who stayed in the U.S. beyond the summer legally changed 
status, primarily to F1.  Fraud in the program exists but is not 
widespread.  The most serious fraud case post encountered involved a 
pair of coordinators from a newly-founded, independent agency who 
arranged for fake student documents to make themselves and two of 
their 17 clients appear eligible for the program despite the fact 
they had already graduated from university. 
 
4. The vast majority of Kazakhstani SWT participants return home on 
time and report having good experiences in America.  The number of 
students who participate for a second time is high.  Popular 
destinations include Pensacola, Ocean City, Virginia Beach, the New 
Jersey shore, Alaska fisheries, and McDonald's restaurants in the 
Yellowstone area.   About forty Kazakhstani students worked last 
year for Century Pool Management and are still owed back wages from 
the bankrupt company.  Their plight has received attention from the 
Kazakhstani Embassy in Washington and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Astana. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
KYRGYZSTAN - IT'S CERTAINLY NO KAZAKHSTAN 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5. Where other sectors of the world economy record slumps in the 
past two years, SWT programs in Kyrgyzstan grow in leaps and bounds. 
 FY 2008 reported a 275% increase in the number of applicants 
compared to the previous year.  Even in the face of the current 
economic crisis, SWT applications for FY 2009 have decreased an 
estimated 13% only compared to the near 50% decreases reported in 
other neighboring Central Asian countries.  However post finds this 
year that many of the applicants cannot speak sufficient English to 
perform their chosen jobs - especially for the most popular job of 
lifeguard - or do not have realistic plans about their ability to 
support themselves once in the United States and earning minimum 
wage.  This is evidenced by the high number of applicants seeking to 
work in Manhattan.  Validation studies done for 100% of applicants 
for the past two years show that 25% - 35% of Kyrgyz SWT students 
fail to return at the season's end.  One would expect that the 
population of overstays would come from economically disadvantaged 
areas and lesser known universities, but the vast majority of 
overstays are students at the most prestigious universities in 
Kyrgyzstan - American University of Central Asia being the main 
source.  F1 visa applications in Kyrgyzstan have a high (almost 55%) 
refusal rate.  In FY 2008, 50% of overstays changed to F1 status at 
various community colleges and evaded review by a consular officer 
regarding their intent to immigrate. 
 
6. Traditionally post experienced low fraud in SWT recruiters until 
this year.  One recruiting company, owned and operated by a 
Kyrgyz-American citizen, was found to be providing forged student 
documents to many of their applicants and is now under investigation 
by Kyrgyz and U.S. authorities.  Another company - whose students 
have yet to be interviewed as of this date - is owned and operated 
by a Nigerian national and has presented highly suspect job offers 
 
ASTANA 00001015  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
with each applicant.  Students are charged an average of $1200 - 
$1500 US for the privilege of looking for SWT jobs and receiving the 
necessary DS 2019 form.  Post surveyed students the past two years 
and discovered that these fees do not include airfare and do not 
provide any refunds other than the MRV fee should students be denied 
a visa.  Considering that a "good" salary in Bishkek is $500 a 
month, SWT fees represent a huge burden for parents and students. 
Last year, post refused an estimated 32.5% of SWT applicants and has 
refused 40.7% of SWT applicants this year to date. 
 
7. COMMENT: Kyrgyzstan occupies a unique place in SWT programs for 
the region. As remarked in a recent Central Asian Fraud Conference: 
"It's not [as economically depressed as] Tajikistan but it's 
certainly no Kazakhstan either." Post has found only one reliable 
recruiter amongst the eight companies currently operating.  The 
program is advertised to students as a quick way to earn thousands 
of dollars in a short time.  Post has seen little oversight of the 
U.S. recruiting companies over their local offices.  Post raised 
concerns over the high SWT costs for such a poor country, but U.S. 
companies replied that fees are determined by the local offices at 
their discretion.  Given the relatively high rate of overstays, post 
is forced to devote more resources and interview time to this 
program.  SWT represents almost 30% of post's annual visa workload 
and is processed in a mere two or three months placing added burdens 
on a small, one-officer section.  Given the limitations of one 
officer interviewing all 900+ applicants, not all intending 
immigrants will be detected.  The ability of SWT students to change 
to F1 status only encourages Kyrgyz students not to return at the 
end of the summer as they pursue their dreams of living in America. 
Thus, what is intended as a summer work and travel program is viewed 
by many prospective Kyrgyz participants as a summer work and stay 
for study program. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
TAJIKISTAN - GROWING SLOWLY, MAYBE MORE NEXT YEAR 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8. This current SWT season, Dushanbe received 136 applications from 
six different recruiting agencies. Of these, 121 visas were granted 
while 15 were refused. The number of applicants is only slightly 
higher than the 110 applications received last year, the first year 
for Summer Work and Travel in Tajikistan.  The overstay rate from 
the 2008 program was 11% based on a validation study conducted as of 
November 2008. 
 
9. In the beginning of this calendar year, Dushanbe expected a 
dramatic increase in number of SWT applicants based on the 
predictions of recruiting agencies.  However, closer to the dates of 
visa interviews it became clear that the number of applicants was 
only slightly more than last year. Representatives explained that 
many students expressed their interest in participation, but far 
fewer actually ended up applying for the program, possibly a 
reflection of difficult economic circumstances in the country that 
could make upfront costs prohibitive.  There may also have been 
issues related to facilitating agencies receiving DS2019s in a 
timely way (something post intends to check into) which caused 
agencies to end recruiting earlier than expected. 
 
10. To address fraud concerns, the consular section instituted a 
requirement that all SWT agencies submit documents at least one week 
in advance of the interview.  This allows the Fraud Prevention Unit 
(FPU) time to prescreen applications and supporting documents and 
detect trends which are difficult to see on the visa line. Post was 
strict with the English language requirement both in 2008 and 2009. 
As the overall economic situation in Tajikistan continues to 
deteriorate, there is concern that SWT will be used as a means to 
seek a better economic opportunities.  Post did notice some increase 
in number of SWT applicants from poor regions of Tajikistan this 
year. 
 
11. In an effort to get a message to the participants that the first 
point of contact for them should be the U.S. sponsor if there are 
difficulties, Post developed a SWT handout which described rules and 
policies of the program and included Tajik Embassy contact 
information in the U.S.  Handouts were distributed to all issued 
applicants. 
 
12. Sizable groups of SWT applicants from Tajikistan were placed in 
the same jobs, including pedicab drivers in San Diego, fish factory 
workers in Alaska, and cleaning staff in a particular hotel in the 
Outer Banks.  This leads the consular officer to wonder whether it 
is a true SWT experience if students tend to remain with and depend 
heavily on their friends from their home country.  Nevertheless the 
overall caliber of applicants seemed to have improved from the 
previous year, including that of the more rural candidates.  Post 
plans to meet again with facilitating agencies and to conduct 
another SWT validation study during this second year of the program 
to gain insight into how successfully - or not - the program is 
 
ASTANA 00001015  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
working in the poorest of the 'stans. 
 
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TURKMENISTAN - A UNIQUE PLACE 
----------------------------- 
 
13. Citizens of Turkmenistan applying for the SWT program present a 
unique challenge to adjudicators since so many Turkmen citizens 
study abroad:  they are either applying where they study, making it 
difficult to evaluate their ties to Turkmenistan, or return to 
Turkmenistan solely to apply for the visa, making it difficult to 
evaluate their academic credentials.  Of those who apply in 
Ashgabat, many have recent refusals in the country where they are 
studying, and others assume that their chances are better applying 
in their home country. 
 
14. Ashgabat saw two applicants in summer 2009, and issued both. 
One is studying in Turkey who had traveled to Australia in the past 
on a similar program (and whose family is well-established).  The 
second studies in Ukraine and was refused in Kyiv prior to her 
application in Ashgabat.  This applicant benefited from excellent 
CCD notes from Kyiv that attested to her academic credentials.  In 
the context of Turkmenistan, her family situation was significant 
enough to overcome 214(b), but this would have been nearly 
impossible for a consular officer in Ukraine to determine, lacking 
the local context.  Post plans to follow-up with both students once 
the program is over. 
 
15. In the summer of 2007, issued five SWT visas.  All five 
successful applicants were studying in Turkey.  One of them 
overstayed, and one of them did not complete the program, rather, he 
returned to Turkey because "he did not like the United States."  In 
the summer of 2008, post interviewed nine SWT applicants, issuing 
four of them.  Post did not conduct a validation study after the 
2008 season.  Again, all applicants were studying in Turkey at the 
time of their application. 
 
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UZBEKISTAN - IMPROVING NON-RETURN RATE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
16. Tashkent issued 226 SWT visas in 2009, the same number as in 
2008.  Refusal rates also remained steady at about 45%.  Post's 
validation study of the 2008 program confirmed an overstay rate of 
13 percent, down slightly from 17 percent in 2007, and down 
significantly from 43 percent in 2006, despite more issuances for 
2008.  These figures suggest that post has been doing a more 
effective job of screening and issuing qualified SWT applicants. 
 
17. Tashkent's ability to conduct SWT outreach is limited due to 
local government roadblocks, suspicion of US travel on the part of 
university officials, and a history of fraud among local SWT 
facilitators.  We have conducted some outreach through presentations 
at the Embassy and one local university.  However, most university 
officials do not wish to engage with the US embassy on this topic. 
In fact, students themselves have expressed that they do not inform 
university officials and at times even attempt to conceal their 
participation in the program for fear of repercussions following 
their return from the US. 
 
18. Additionally, post lacks contacts with reliable, proven SWT 
facilitators.  The local SWT companies open and close frequently; 
therefore cultivating these contacts is currently not feasible. 
Likewise a history of fraud among several facilitators makes it more 
difficult to engage with unproven facilitators. 
 
19. In the current year due to the economic situation in the US, 
Tashkent's adjudicating officers have been even more discerning than 
last year. We learned during a panel of SWT returnees from last year 
that getting a second or third job during the program is not 
uncommon.  For many Uzbek students, this program is not only a way 
to travel, but also a means to make money to bring home funds to 
their families.  While we do not have the final figures yet for 
issuances this year, we were attempting to be more strict on the 
financial ties this year and most likely our refusal rate will 
reflect these higher standards. 
 
20. Almaty would like to thank Joe Chamberlain in Ashgabat, John 
Lankenau in Astana, Valerie Chittenden in Bishkek, Elisabeth Wilson 
in Dushanbe and Cynthia Day in Tashkent for their contributions. 
 
 
HOAGLAND