VZCZCXRO7137
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #1275/01 1520841
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010841Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4950
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7832
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001275 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: WHERE TO GO WITH ASWJ 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO.  REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C/NF)  Summary.  In the view of Embassy Addis Ababa, 
U.S. pressure is needed if an alliance is to be formed 
between the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and 
Alhu Sunnah Wal Jammah (ASWJ).  We believe that an alliance 
would be a natural progression of the TFG's ongoing 
reconciliation efforts with various Somali entities, and 
would have the potential to broaden popular support for the 
government, increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali 
people, and expand the government's military capability to 
fight the extremists.  We recommend that any U.S. support for 
ASWJ be given only if the group joins the TFG, otherwise 
direct support would undermine the already fragile political 
state of the government.  End Summary. 
 
Background on ASWJ 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  ASWJ, in the context of the group now negotiating 
with the TFG for an alliance, is a relatively new phenomenon 
evolving since 1991 from a gathering of Sufi religious 
scholars into an emerging political and military force after 
the rise of the Islamic Courts in 2006 fighting to preserve 
its traditions and beliefs against al-Shabaab,s imposition 
of radical Islam.  The group takes it names from the 
traditional order of Sufism in Somalia, but until the last 
few years, the broader network of ASWJ sheikhs and clerics 
refrained from politics or military activities as an 
organization.  By tradition and religion, most Somalis 
consider themselves part of the broader ASWJ religious 
community.  The emerging political ASWJ arose to combat 
al-Shabaab,s attack on Sufism including, for example, the 
closing of traditional Sufi schools and mosques and 
desecration of the graves of revered Sufi religious clerics. 
The leadership committee members of the ASWJ now fighting 
al-Shabaab are primarily the sons of prominent Sufi sheikhs 
who live in Somalia, and they were organized and tasked by 
their fathers to defend their people and beliefs.  The 
al-Shabaab threat showed ASWJ that they needed to move into 
the political and military arena out of self-preservation. 
There is no doubt that some of the leaders of ASWJ are taking 
advantage of the situation to advance their self-interest, 
nevertheless,  the group appears fully committed to fighting 
Islamic extremism because it has become such a threat to 
their way of life that it can no longer be ignored.  The 
leadership committee is cross-clan, and they claim that their 
militias are as well, although their claims of not suffering 
from clan divisions almost certainly are overstated.  We have 
no way to verify the composition of their militias, but we 
have noted Dir commanders leading Hawiye militias, and ASWJ 
has militias in Hawiye, Darood, and Rahanweyn-dominated areas 
suggesting at least a minimal level of multi-clan support. 
 
TFG-ASWJ Alliance Needed 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  In our view, it is in the U.S. interest that the 
TFG and ASWJ ally together against al-Shabaab and the other 
extremists elements within Somalia.  Inclusion of ASWJ has 
the potential to broaden popular support for the TFG, 
increasing its legitimacy, and providing it with needed 
military capability to help fight the extremists.  ASWJ 
demonstrated in central Somalia, where it probably has the 
most support, that it can defeat al-Shabaab and clear 
territory of extremists. Furthermore, if the TFG is to 
succeed and expand its influence, it will need to accommodate 
ASWJ sooner or later because of ASWJ,s growing influence. 
While impossible to conclude with certainty, there is 
considerable strength to the argument that the emergence of 
ASWJ has forced al-Shabaab to divide its forces and kept it 
from being able to concentrate on toppling the TFG.  Beyond 
military support, the emergence of an alliance will give the 
perception that the TFG is becoming more powerful, and that 
perception, all important in Somali politics because Somalis 
support whoever they think is on top, could push fence 
sitters to commit to the TFG. 
 
Where Negotiations Stand 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C/NF)  The TFG leadership and ASWJ remain strongly 
distrustful of each other, but both recognize the value of an 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001275  002 OF 002 
 
 
alliance providing they can come to mutually acceptable 
terms.  The TFG fears ASWJ will rise to overshadow the TFG 
and render it increasingly irrelevant within Somali politics 
because of ASWJ,s military success and more broad based 
religious appeal.  In our view, this fear is well founded 
because of the apparent inability of the TFG to function and 
because of its dominance by former Islamic Courts officials, 
many of whom were former allies of al-Shabaab.  As a result, 
the TFG wants to incorporate ASWJ now, before it becomes too 
powerful, and by incorporation dilute its status as a 
separate identity.   The TFG has offered ASWJ deputy minister 
positions and sharing of resources for military operations. 
The TFG also wants to break-up ASWJ militias and put them 
under TFG commanders, a feat it has yet to accomplish with 
its own former TFG and ICU militias.  The TFG has been more 
willing to accommodate former warlords and proven extremists 
within its ranks who are seen as less of a threat. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  ASWJ distrusts the TFG because it remains 
uncertain whether Sheikh Sharif and his leadership have 
abandoned their radical past, or remain, in their view, 
Wahhabi.  ASWJ leaders want to join the TFG, and eventually 
become the dominant power within it.  They value order and 
have pledged to never take up arms against the TFG, although 
politically they may continue to ignore it if an alliance is 
not possible.  They fear being used by the TFG to defeat 
al-Shabaab and then be cast away, thus losing the ability to 
protect themselves politically from a TFG they inherently 
distrust as hostile to their Sufi beliefs.   ASWJ needs 
resources to fight the extremists, and they insist that they 
must be allowed to maintain their separate identity in the 
not unreasonable conclusion that their identity has been the 
key to their success against the extremists.  Nevertheless, 
both sides continue to try to manipulate the other. 
 
U.S. Pressure Needed to Form Alliance 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6.  (C/NF)  We believe that U.S. pressure is needed if an 
alliance is to be made, and we think support, lethal or 
non-lethal, should be provided to ASWJ only as part of the 
TFG.  Providing support to ASWJ independent of the TFG will 
undermine it politically, and be counterproductive.   Based 
on our judgment of where things stand, we think the best 
option is for the two sides to agree to share military 
resources now to fight al-Shabaab and the extremists, and 
agree to postpone political power sharing negotiations until 
a later date (as we have explained to ASWJ, this is only an 
unproven transitional government, and it may not be in their 
interest to take high profile positions in it now).   To make 
this happen, we suggest that the U.S. inform the TFG that 
unless they come to an agreement with ASWJ, the U.S. will 
explore providing direct assistance to ASWJ (again we think 
direct support is not a good idea, but it should be a threat 
sufficient enough to motivate the TFG).  The U.S. should also 
inform ASWJ that there will be no support of any kind if they 
do not come to terms with the TFG.  ASWJ claims they would 
agree to such a pact if the U.S. is involved.  Obviously, the 
U.S. cannot be a guarantor of such an agreement, but we can 
facilitate it, and assure both sides we will pressure the 
other to abide by it. 
YAMAMOTO