VZCZCXRO3728
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHVN #0249/01 1461059
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261059Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2595
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7983
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 1946
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2293
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0671
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0064
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0462
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 VIENTIANE 000249 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR CA/FPP (Overstrom) 
STATE FOR CA/CI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC LA
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY-(VIENTIANE): SPRING 2009 
 
REF:  (A) 08 Vientiane 558 
 
VIENTIANE 00000249  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY:  Vientiane is a medium fraud level post, with 
significant percentages of immigrant visa (IV) cases returned and a 
very large number of nonimmigrant visa (NIV) cases refused.  The 
Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) in Vientiane currently consists of one 
full-time Locally Employed Staff (LES) who also heads NIV.  The 
Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) is the Vice Consul who has other 
collateral duties at post, including visa and ACS interviews.  The 
most prominent fraud experienced at post involves K-1 petitions. 
Fianc(e) and spousal related visa cases consume 83% of immigrant 
visa workload, almost doubling in numbers since 2004 and straining 
FPU resources.  A newly hired LES member should allow devotion of 
more resources to fraud prevention and detection.  FPU logged a 
total of 81 NIV, 157 IV and one ACS investigations, with 30 field 
investigations, from September 2008 to March 2009. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
 
¶2. (U) The Lao People's Democratic Republic is a least-developed 
country with a single-party communist government.  An estimated 
US$572 per capita income ranks Laos as one of the poorest countries 
in East Asia.  Some 70% of the population live on less than $2 a 
day; 23% live on less than $1 per day.  Illiteracy is at nearly 50%. 
 Agriculture is the dominant sector of the economy, contributing 46% 
of the GDP and employing approximately 79% of the population, mostly 
through subsistence farming. 
 
¶3. (U) Laos is a medium fraud level country.  The main contributors 
to fraud in Laos are the large proportion of the population with 
family ties in the U.S., and the intention of many to work illegally 
in the U.S.  Most of the applicant pool at Embassy Vientiane, as 
well as most of the fraud, comes from two of Laos's 49 official 
ethnic groups: the ethnic Lao and the Hmong.  Ethnic Lao are the 
largest ethnic group in the country.  The Hmong constitute less than 
ten percent of the population but make up an estimated 25 to 30 
percent of our visa applicant pool.  The most recent U.S. census 
estimated that 170,000 ethnic Lao and 170,000 ethnic Hmong currently 
live in the United States. Hmong-American petitioners of K-1 visas 
have tripled in number since 2004, possibly due to a change in Lao 
immigration policy allowing longer stays for U.S. citizens born in 
Laos. 
 
¶B. NIV FRAUD 
 
¶4. (U) Eighty-six percent of NIV applicants at post request B1/B2 
visas, the majority of whom are applying to visit relatives. 
Identity fraud is one of the largest problems currently facing the 
consular section.  Some applicants after being refused visas return 
at a later time with a new identity which is reflected in a new 
national ID card, new household registration, and new passport. 
Vientiane has one of the highest adjusted NIV refusal rates in the 
world at 68%.  A 2006 B1/B2 validation study indicated a 39% 
non-return rate and 2008 R-1 validation study indicated a 20% 
non-return rate. Very few third country nationals apply at post; for 
the reporting period only 66 third country nationals out of 3,558 
applicants applied for nonimmigrant visas; forty seven were issued 
visas. 
 
¶5. (U) From September 2008 to March 2009, NIV applications decreased 
27% compared to the same period last year.  Refused applicants have 
reported to officers during fraud investigations that family members 
in the U.S have told them that finding work in the U.S. is now much 
more difficult due to the economic decline in recent months.  In 
addition, many of those applicants who have family members in the 
U.S. report that they can no longer depend on financial support from 
abroad for their travel. 
 
¶6. (U) Although the U.S. is still the most popular destination for 
Lao travelers, an increasing number of those issued visas do not 
actually use them for travel.  Instead, they use them to bolster 
their credentials to apply for visas from Australia, Canada, the 
U.K. and other European countries. 
 
¶7. (U) R-1 visa applications were previously rife with fraud.  A 
2008 validation study showed that 20% of issued applicants remained 
in the U.S. and that many did not work at the temples that 
originally sponsored them.  Since December 2008, when USCIS began 
requiring an approved I-129 petition for R-1 religious workers, post 
has seen a dramatic drop in new applications, and did not see a 
single approved petition in the first three months of 2009. 
 
¶8. (U)  Post does not handle many H and L cases.  For the reporting 
 
VIENTIANE 00000249  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
period, Embassy Vientiane adjudicated one H1B for a Chilean citizen 
and no L cases. 
 
¶C. IV Fraud 
 
¶9. (U) Relationship fraud is rampant in immigration cases; this 
generally includes sham marriages and divorces, among close family 
relatives, and relationships simply for immigration purposes.  FPU 
has developed a list of fraud indicators commonly seen in sham Lao 
relationships. The limited education of most Lao applicants and the 
culturally accepted practice of arranged marriages means that some 
bona fide applicants and their fianc(e)s in the United States who 
have every intention of marrying and following immigration law may 
not have strong evidence of relationship that one might expect (such 
as specific knowledge about each other's lives, interests, etc.). 
 
¶10. (SBU) Over the past four years, post has seen a 66% increase in 
K-1 petitions, from 472 in 2004 to 783 in 2008.  During this period, 
K-1 applications stayed steady at 75% of the total IV application 
intake.  However, given their complexity and high fraud potential, 
K-1 petitions take up the bulk of FPU resources and time in 
examining relationships and fraud indicators.  FPU recently 
conducted a K-1 visa validation study of applicants issued in 2004 
that showed 14% of issued visa cases contained fraud.  Fraud rates 
seem to be increasing significantly.  For example, in 2004 only 29 
cases were returned for revocation, where as 150 cases were returned 
for revocation in 2008.  The primary reasons for requesting petition 
revocation were a lack of evidence of relationship (66%), hidden 
spouses and pseudo-bigamous petitioners (21%), invalid divorces 
(8%), and suspected underage beneficiaries (5%). 
 
¶D. DV FRAUD 
 
¶11. (SBU) Post experiences high fraud in managing diversity visa 
cases.  Many 2007 DV lottery "winners" could not substantiate 
education, bona fide marital status, or vocational qualifications. 
Many students either do not receive or do not keep school documents 
issued at the time of graduation. Few receive formal vocational 
training in qualifying skills. Derivative spousal relationships can 
often be documented only after principal applicants have been 
notified of being selected for the DV program.  In 2008 and 2009, a 
U.S. citizen visa consultant, who served as the primary form filler 
for Lao DV applicants in the U.S. turned her efforts to K-1 visas. 
Since then, we have seen a large drop in the number of successful DV 
applicants coming to interview.  Only two cases reached Post in 
2008, and both were unable to complete the requested documents 
before the September 30th deadline. 
 
¶E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
 
¶12. (U) FPU experiences low fraud rates for ACS and passport 
services.  The number of American citizens traveling to Laos for 
tourism, business, or retirement continues to increase, but so far 
without apparent increased fraud. 
 
¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD 
 
¶13. (SBU) Adoption fraud rates remain at a medium rate.  Adoption of 
Lao children by foreign citizens is prohibited in Laos.  However, 
because it was prohibited by Prime Ministerial decree, the Prime 
Minister's office can waive the restriction. Until recently, post 
saw very few adoption cases (seven in 2007).  This number increased 
to 23 in 2008 as a number of expatriate U.S. citizens resident in 
Laos adopted Lao infants. FPU and the IV Unit are working closely 
with the Ministry of Justice office that oversees the adoption 
process to monitor potential fraudulent applications and potential 
child trafficking issues.  To date, no cases of "child buying" or 
other fraud indicators have been detected. 
 
¶G. USE OF DNA TESTING 
 
¶14. (U) In cases of suspected relationship fraud, or where 
sufficient evidence of relationship is lacking, post has requested 
DNA tests to prove a biological relationship.  Five mala fide 
applicants were discovered through DNA testing in the last 12 
months, two involving CRBA cases.  Laos has several complicating 
factors, including lack of a centralized civil records system, lack 
of popular awareness of any need to register births or other 
important life events, and poor record keeping in general. It is not 
uncommon to have extended and polygamous families living together. 
Often, cousins or family friends are listed as children of the head 
of the household, and are commonly referred to in conversations as 
siblings or children.  Post is increasing its usage of DNA testing, 
 
VIENTIANE 00000249  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
and now monitors CRBA and IV cases for possible abandonment after 
requesting DNA.  In the last six months, it appears that about 60 to 
70 percent of cases follow up on DNA requests within one to three 
months. 
 
¶H. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD 
 
¶15. (U) There is little or no asylum or DHS benefit fraud from the 
limited number of Visa 92/93 cases that post processes. 
 
¶I. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORIST 
TRAVEL: 
 
¶16. (U) Laos is a source and transit country for Trafficking in 
Persons (TIP).  Applications by third country nationals, outside of 
resident NGO foreign employees, are rare.  Consular officers do rely 
on translators for applicants who do not speak Lao, Hmong or 
English.  In some cases, applicants supply their own translator, 
which could provide opportunities for traffickers.  Post also works 
closely with the Regional Fraud Prevention Manager and the 
Department of Homeland Security for cases suspected of involving 
regional smuggling rings.  For cases with a U.S. nexus, the Regional 
Security Officer works with U.S. and local law enforcement for 
arrest and prosecution. 
 
¶J. COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
 
¶17. (U) The Consular Chief meets regularly with working level 
counterparts at the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to discuss an array of issues, including Lao passport fraud. 
 Each month, three to five applicants present duplicate passports 
issued with new names, surnames and dates of birth.  This is done to 
hide prior refusals or derogatory information in our database. 
Post's consular officers confiscate these passports, which are 
detected by the IDENT system, and return them to MFA with 
information about the applicants and their claimed identities.  MFA 
officials have stated that the false identity problem is a local 
problem, as vital documents are issued at the village level, 
household registrations are issued at the district level, identity 
cards are issued at the provincial level, and passports are issued 
based on those local documents. 
 
¶18. (U) While the MFA has stated that holding two identities is a 
crime under Lao law, they have not clarified what penalties these 
crimes might warrant, and what procedures one must follow to legally 
change one's name (a common occurrence in Laos, generally to change 
one's luck).  The MFA has requested that we send any fraudulent 
identity passports to them for their action, but there seems to be 
little follow-up by authorities to punish offenders. 
 
¶19. (U) Consular officers at post also work in close coordination 
with Bangkok's Immigration Compliance Experts (ICE) Team in training 
Vientiane immigration officers at the Wattay International Airport 
and at the Friendship Bridge land border connecting Laos to 
Thailand.  Training sessions are taught on a variety of immigration 
issues such as detecting imposters, false documents, passports, and 
visas, and working with Thai immigration and airline colleagues. 
 
¶20. (U) Post holds consular lunches with other Embassies' consular 
representatives on a quarterly basis to share issues of concern and 
fraud trends. Consuls and immigration officers from Australia, 
France, Germany, Japan, South Korea and Singapore usually attend. 
FPU recently cooperated with counterparts at the Australian Embassy 
on detecting fraudulent bank books and marriage certificates.  We 
shared exemplar mala fide documents to improve our adjudications. 
 
¶K. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
 
¶21. (U) The consular section requests assistance from the Regional 
Security Office to investigate one to three suspected cases of NIV 
and IV fraud each month.  A local RSO investigator assists with 
verifying employment, identity and claimed relationships of visa 
applicants. 
 
¶L. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
 
¶22. (SBU) Laos does not have a well-established system for issuing 
civil documents.  There is no standardized form for birth or 
marriage certificates and no centralized authority for the issuance 
of such documents.  Many documents are handwritten and issued by a 
village chief.  Passports and national ID cards are the only 
nationally issued forms of identification.  The information on a Lao 
passport or ID card cannot always be accepted at face value.  False 
 
VIENTIANE 00000249  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
or duplicate identities are common among visa applicants.  Forged or 
false business licenses, bank books, identity cards, and household 
registration books are common.  Detection of altered or fraudulent 
documents is also common, as production is generally 
unsophisticated. 
 
¶M. Areas of Particular Concern 
 
¶23. (U) Adjudicating officers have encountered applicants who have 
purchased visa packages and interview coaching from nefarious 
individuals and businesses throughout the capital.  In March 2009, a 
woman appeared for an NIV interview with a falsely claimed purpose 
of travel and counterfeit government and supporting documents.  When 
interviewed for an hour by FPU, she admitted to purchasing a visa 
package from an individual outside of MFA for $3,000-$4,000.  The 
package even included borrowed clothing (to look professional), 
jewelry, and a designer name purse.  It turned out that the 
applicant sought to engage in unauthorized employment in the U.S., 
either at a farm or a restaurant in California, should her visa be 
granted. 
 
¶N. Staffing and Training 
 
¶24. (U) In March, the Regional FPM based in Bangkok and one FPU 
LES-Investigator visited Vientiane and provided valuable training 
for officers and LES on interviewing methodology, field visit 
techniques, maintaining fraud statistics and reporting. 
 
¶25. (U) The Fraud Prevention Manager at post is Neal Turner.  Post 
has no LES Investigators at this time, but selects LES from the Visa 
Unit to assist with cases.  The LES NIV Manager serves as the 
designated FPU LES and works closely with the FPM on SOPs and 
caseload management. 
 
HUSO