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DE RUEHIN #0570/01 1320951
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1556
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9171
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0150
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0683
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 3093
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0240
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0603
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2548
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 7041
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 000570 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2019 
TAGS: PREL KCRIM KJUS PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN HOPES CROSS-STRAIT LEGAL COOPERATION 
AGREEMENT WILL LEAD TO RETURN OF FINANCIAL FUGITIVES 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 480 
     ¶B. OSC CPP20090426072004 
 
Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, 
For Reasons 1.4(B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and 
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (cross-Strait MLAA) signed 
in Nanjing on April 26 (See ref B for text of agreement), is 
intended to expand and regularize the judicial cooperation 
already enjoyed on a case-by-case basis under the 1990 Kinmen 
Accord.  A key priority for Taiwan is establishing a 
mechanism for the return of Taiwan's criminal fugitives from 
the mainland, particularly those charged with white-collar 
economic crimes.  Officials have expressed hope Taiwan will 
be able to negotiate similar agreements with Japan and the EU 
and an extradition agreement with the U.S.  End Summary. 
 
In Pursuit of Economic Criminal Fugitives 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chair Lai Shin-yuan 
underlined the broad domestic consensus in Taiwan for 
cross-Strait joint crime-fighting efforts, particularly the 
return of economic criminals, in her press conference 
following the third round of cross-Strait talks between the 
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China's Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).  MAC public 
survey results announced on April 23, just three days before 
the signing of the agreements in Nanjing, indicated 79.6 
percent of respondents supported an agreement on joint 
cross-strait crime prevention, and survey results announced 
by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on April 
25 indicated that 88.4 percent of respondents supported 
including provisions for the repatriation of economic 
criminals within a cross-Strait joint crime fighting 
agreement. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) took out a half-page 
newspaper ad outlining the five areas of cooperation in the 
cross-Strait MLAA, and featuring a cartoon figure lounging 
under two palm trees, with "The Other Side of the Strait is 
no longer a heaven for criminals," written beneath. 
According to the MOJ's Investigation Bureau (MJIB), at least 
84 Taiwan fugitives are currently hiding out in China, most 
of whom are white-collar criminals convicted of 
economic-related crimes.  One prominent example, former 
Legislative Yuan Speaker Liu Sung-pan, was convicted in 2004 
of breach of trust for accepting a NTD 150 million bribe in 
return for help brokering a NTD 1.5 billion loan to the 
Kuangsan Group.  SEF Legal Services Director Ho Wu-liang said 
Taiwan is already drawing up a list of fugitives to submit to 
the mainland for help in repatriation to Taiwan. 
 
Taiwan Hopes for U.S.-Taiwan Extradition Agreement 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶4. (C) According to Taiwan data, there are currently 137 
Taiwan criminal fugitives in the U.S., and President Ma 
Ying-jeou has repeatedly expressed his hope to negotiate an 
extradition agreement with the U.S.  Officials at MOJ, the 
Judicial Yuan (JY) and MAC have made clear their hope that 
the new cross-Strait MLAA will encourage the U.S. and others 
to begin negotiations on similar agreements with Taiwan. 
Media commentators and others have pointed to the similarity 
between the new cross-Strait agreement and the 2002 
U.S.-Taiwan MLAA, but with provisions added for joint 
crime-fighting and the return of fugitives.  According to 
National Chengchi University (NCCU) Law Professor Bruce Liao, 
the Ma administration probably hopes the agreement with 
Beijing will help assuage concerns the U.S. or others may 
have about PRC objections to their own extradition agreements 
with Taiwan.  MAC Legal Affairs Department officials asked 
AIT whether cross-Strait agreements would make it easier for 
the U.S. to negotiate extradition and other agreements with 
Taiwan. 
 
 
TAIPEI 00000570  002 OF 004 
 
 
Practical Cooperation and Good-will Gesture 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Speaking shortly before the talks in Nanjing, MAC 
Chair Lai Shin-yuan told AIT that discussions on anti-crime 
cooperation had gone more smoothly than expected and that the 
resulting agreement would give Taiwan and the PRC greater 
scope to repatriate financial criminals and cooperate in 
criminal investigations (ref A).  MOJ and JY officials 
believe Beijing concluded the agreement not only to establish 
a regularized mechanism for judicial assistance, but also as 
an expression of China's good will toward Taiwan under the Ma 
administration.  Prof. Liao suggested that Beijing at this 
point is looking for ways to convince the Taiwan public that 
closer ties with the mainland will serve their interests.  An 
MLAA that provided for the return of financial fugitives 
would enjoy broad-based public support in Taiwan and is 
practical enough in nature not to raise significant 
sovereignty issues, he observed. 
 
Will China Repatriate Taiwan's Economic Fugitives? 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6. (C) Liao suggested the new agreement will lead PRC central 
government officials to press local governments to comply 
with repatriation requests.  Previously, said Liao, PRC local 
officials were the main stumbling block to securing the 
return of financial fugitives.  Now, Beijing must prove its 
sincerity by sending back fugitives or else risk undermining 
cross-Strait detente.  According to other sources, there 
could be several test cases already in the pipeline.  One 
case involves a Taiwan financial fugitive in Shanghai, who is 
currently applying for a U.S. visa.  Already, Taiwan police 
are working with Shanghai authorities to apprehend the 
subject and prevent the flight of another Taiwan financial 
fugitive to the United States. 
 
¶7. (C) MAC Legal Affairs Department Director Wu Mei-hung, a 
member of the SEF delegation in Nanjing, noted that mainland 
officials cited Chen You-hao as an example of how dual 
nationality could complicate efforts to repatriate certain 
high-profile fugitives.  According to Wu, PRC officials 
claimed Chen You-hao's "U.S. citizenship" (Note: Our 
understanding is that Chen You-hao only has a pending LPR 
application with USCIS.  End note.) could cause the U.S. to 
protest his return by China to Taiwan.  Moreover, Wu said, 
Chinese officials pointed out that some high-profile economic 
fugitives have large enterprises on the mainland that employ 
many people.  Therefore, the potential economic impact of a 
factory-owner's forced return to Taiwan could give local 
officials pause.  In the end, both sides agreed that dealing 
with corruption, embezzlement, and other crimes is a larger 
concern, though Beijing's view seems to be that legal 
cooperation will expand gradually as cross-Strait links 
increase over time. 
 
Provisions of Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The cross-Strait MLAA provides for cooperation in 
"joint crime fighting," the exchange and delivery of judicial 
documents, investigation and collection of evidence, 
recognition and enforcement of civil judgments and 
arbitration awards, and the apprehension and return of 
convicted criminals and criminal suspects.  The agreement 
also permits the repatriation of Taiwan nationals serving 
sentences on the mainland (and vice versa), provided 
officials from both sides and the subject agree to the 
transfer.  Cross-Strait crime prevention efforts will focus 
on major crimes such as manslaughter, kidnapping, human 
trafficking, cross-border organized crime, etc; economic 
crimes such as embezzlement, fraud, money-laundering, etc; 
crimes involving corruption; crimes involving terrorist 
activities; and other criminal acts.  MAC Legal Affairs 
Director Wu noted that mainland officials preferred a 
court-to-court implementing mechanism, similar to their 
arrangement with Hong Kong.  Taiwan, however, could not agree 
 
TAIPEI 00000570  003 OF 004 
 
 
to an arrangement modeled on a mainland-Hong Kong precedent, 
said Wu, a point understood by the Chinese officials. 
Therefore, MOJ will serve as Taiwan's implementing authority 
for the agreement.  While Beijing has not yet identified its 
corresponding implementing authority, Taiwan's MOJ will 
coordinate with those mainland agencies involved in the 
judicial process, specifically the Public Security Bureau, 
the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Justice. 
 
¶9. (C) Following the Kinmen Accord precedent, DG Liu noted, 
the new agreement uses the term "repatriation" rather than 
"extradition" in order to avoid the sensitive sovereignty 
issue.  The new agreement does not permit the extradition of 
Taiwan nationals to China, which is prohibited by Taiwan's 
Extradition Law unless otherwise provided, said Director 
Chen.  Taiwan officials told their mainland counterparts that 
this prohibition would even extend to people from the 
mainland who later became Taiwan passport-holders, e.g. 
mainland spouses of Taiwan nationals, said MAC Legal Affairs 
Director Wu.  Mainland officials accepted Taiwan's position 
but did not raise concerns about transferring PRC criminals 
to Taiwan, Wu added, since Beijing views Taiwan as part of 
China. In addition, Article 6 of the agreement states that 
should the party which receives a repatriation request have 
important concerns or interests, these concerns or interests 
must be considered (See ref B for full text of the 
agreement).  Wu clarified that both sides explicitly agreed 
that Article 6 would preclude the repatriation of political, 
military, and religious fugitives/dissidents.  SEF Legal 
Service Department Director, Ho Wu-liang, also a member of 
the Taiwan delegation at the talks, added that the PRC 
indicated it would include concerns about the economic impact 
on employment when deciding whether to grant repatriation 
requests. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Executive Yuan (EY) approved the cross-Strait 
MLAA and several other agreements on April 30 and these 
agreements were submitted to the LY last week. The 
cross-Strait MLAA should take effect by June 25, 60 days 
after its signing. 
 
Cross-Strait MLAA Expands on Kinmen Accord 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) According to both MOJ and the JY, the MLAA expands on 
the Kinmen Accord, but does not supplant it.  The new 
agreement does not cover illegal immigrants, who will still 
be repatriated under the Kinmen Accord.  The new MLAA 
systematizes cross-Strait cooperation and provides practical 
guidelines for working level implementation of a variety of 
issues from the recognition and exchange of official 
documents to returning assets acquired or used in criminal 
offenses.  It also increases the venues available for 
returning and receiving criminal fugitives beyond Matsu/Mawei 
and Kinmen/Xiamen to include all direct air and sea links. 
Following the signing of the new agreement, China has already 
repatriated one fugitive to Taiwan via Macau. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) Domestic support for the new agreement is high, based 
on the expectation that Taiwan will finally be able to bring 
to justice some high-profile economic fugitives who have been 
living on the mainland.  That some of the these individuals 
have large investments in China could be a complicating 
factor.  After Taiwan submits requests for well-known 
fugitives, the public and media here will be watching closely 
to see whether Beijing will actually follow through by 
returning them to Taiwan.  At the same time, Taiwan 
authorities are clearly sensitive to the issue of political 
dissidents being repatriated to the mainland, and have 
incorporated measures to prevent such cases.  Taiwan is 
hopeful that the new cross-Strait agreement will be a 
positive step helping its quest to sign an extradition 
agreement with the U.S., where even more Taiwan fugitives 
 
TAIPEI 00000570  004 OF 004 
 
 
have sought refuge in recent years. 
YOUNG