VZCZCXRO9616
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHSH #0090/01 1410200
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210200Z MAY 09
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8725
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 0727
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0182
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0134
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0094
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0149

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/K, INR 
MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION 
TAGS: CH ECON KN KS PGOV PREF PREL RS
SUBJECT: PRC-DPRK BORDER: QUIET REFUGEE FRONT, LOCAL AID 
UNIMPEDED, PUST SPUTTERS ALONG 
 
REF: A. SHENYANG 76 
     ¶B. 06 SHENYANG 1184 
     ¶C. SHENYANG 39 
 
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman.  Reasons 1.4(b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In the aftermath of the DPRK's detainment of two 
American journalists, China's increased security posture along the 
border (Ref A) does not seem to have translated into increased pressure 
on illegal border-crossers from the DPRK.  Amcits working for non-U.S. 
projects in Rason and other areas far from Pyongyang are still residing 
in the DPRK, while U.S.-connected aid operations run out of Yanji 
continue to distribute food.  The Pyongyang University of Science and 
Technology (PUST) will not be opening anytime soon.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) Congenoff and assistant visited the Yanbian Korean Autonomous 
Prefecture May 13-17 to record developments along the PRC-DPRK border o 
the Tumen River.  Anecdotal observation of economic activity at 
Nanping/Musan, Songhakri, Yuson, Sanhe/Hoeryong, Kaishantun/Sambong, 
and Tumen/Namyang is reported septel. 
 
QUIET REFUGEE FRONT: NO CHINESE BACKLASH, FEWER PEOPLE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶3. (C) Asked if increased Chinese security presence along the border 
after the capture of two American journalists on March 17 had also 
increased Chinese scrutiny of North Korean border-crossers, 
long-standing consulate contacts uniformly reported they had not 
witnessed any changes in the Chinese security posture since mid-March. 
 One missionary's wife commented that security at tourist sites such as 
the Tumen/Namyang bridge crossing was more restrictive but, along with 
others, said she had neither neither heard any rumors nor seen any 
evidence of the roundup or harassment of DPRK border-crossers.  She 
added that even the Olympics crackdown at the time was not particularly 
directed at defectors, but rather at everyone.  Regardless of 
nationality or field of work, Americans, South Koreans, and Sino-Korean 
offered similar assessments (NOTE: The only hints of a potential recent 
crackdown, which we have been unable to corroborate, were some early 
April reports from South Korea-based NGOs and organizations, such as 
NKnet and Free NK Radio.) 
 
¶4. (C) In a trend that dates back over half a decade (Ref B) contacts 
commented that the flow of border-crossers, has dwindled to such a low 
level that even possibly increased Chinese scrutiny was less a factor 
than it might appear to be.  Father Lian Changyuan of the Yanji Catholi 
Church reported that ten years ago one could almost find one defector 
living with every family in Yanji.  He said he dreaded wearing his 
collar because groups of several border crossers would run up to him on 
the street seeking aid that he was not in a position to offer.  Now, 
Father Lian says he wears his collar freely.  While he knows of a 
handful of border-crossers from the past who have settled in Yanji, 
fewer and fewer are choosing to stay in the prefecture.  If newcomers d 
arrive, they quickly move on to other parts of China.  Lian speculated 
that North Korean border guards and internal security guards were simpl 
becoming more successful in stopping would-be border-crossers before 
ever getting to the border.  Lian did not sense any change in the 
Chinese security posture vis-`-vis border-crossers in the last couple 
months and that any possible increase in security was the result of a 
gradual change over the last decade and the latest Olympics crackdown. 
 
¶5. (C) Pastor Jin Guangshu of the Yanji Pingan Church said that the flo 
of border-crossers had been reduced to a trickle.  When pressed, Jin 
said he did not sense any new pressure from the local Public Security 
Bureau (PSB) and nothing related to the detainment of the American 
journalists.  Jin also cited the belief that North Korean security 
apparatuses and border guards were now better-fed and now more 
bribe-proof, stopping border-crossers inland or along the Tumen River 
before they reached China.  Jin surmised that most of the people in 
North Korea with the appetite or need to defect had already done so, 
evidenced by those repeat border-crossers who still managed to escape 
even after refoulement.  Jin classified these people as those with the 
personality and temperament willing to take on such risks, along with 
those individuals escaping real problems and issues. 
 
LOCAL AID UNIMPEDED: PROJECTS ONGOING 
------------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Yanbian University of Science and Technology (YUST) Professor 
Sang Hoon Lee is in charge of YUST's food distribution network in North 
Korea.  Lee accompanies groups to the border, where some of YUST's 
Sino-Korean staff takes the food across the border and directly 
distributes it in cooperation with the local authorities.  Lee has been 
in China for over a decade and said that the border areas immediately 
 
SHENYANG 00000090  002 OF 002 
 
 
adjacent to the Tumen River and Pyongyang were now doing comparatively 
well.  He said the greatest need was in those areas far from Pyongyang 
yet unable to access the border.  Lee was focusing on the southern part 
of North Hamgyeong province at the invitation of the provincial and 
municipal DPRK officials. 
 
¶7. (C) YUST's Dean of International Academic Affairs Norma Nichols 
commented that the various aid programs and economic development 
programs were still running as normal.  While YUST continued to be 
unsuccessful in getting a permanent staff presence at their orphanage i 
Rason, Nichols said that there were several Amcits working and living i 
the DPRK, including a few families who were permanently stationed in 
Rason with their dependents.  These individuals were all working on 
behalf of Australian- or European-led projects, such as goat farms and 
yogurt plants.  Professor Taeik James Min said that he was running a 
soybean paste/soy milk plant in Rason that supplied these products to 
locals and exported the rest to South Korean church groups to generate 
revenue to reinvest in plant operations.  Min's plant stores some 
product for each Busan-bound ship that departs Rason.  Upon arrival in 
Busan, the Korean Customs Service has an agreement to stamp the product 
origin as "Korea." 
 
PUST UPDATE: REALITY SETS IN, GOING NOWHERE SOON 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶8. (C) YUST Vice President David Kim admitted that after further 
negotiations with the North Koreans, it was clear that even the most 
optimistic opening date for the Pyongyang University of Science and 
Technology (PUST) would have to be pushed back to sometime in late 2010 
(Ref C.)  Looking back upon the rejection of South Korean instructors a 
the facility, Kim attributed North Korea's increasingly strident stance 
against PUST as a reflection of worsening North-South ties and the 
conservative Lee Myung-bak government's hard-line stance since its 
inauguration in February 2008.  While he had recently received 
notification from the North Korean Ministry of Education that he would 
receive an official, press-focused "opening announcement" slated for 
sometime within the next few months, Kim believed the DPRK had agreed t 
do this simply to overcome the appearance that YUST was losing steam an 
face and to show current and future donors that the project was not 
completely failed. 
 
¶9. (C) Kim forecast continuingly unfavorable conditions as the DPRK 
government stuck to the line that PUST could not open until every singl 
last building on the master plan was completed and ready for business, 
citing an old story involving an angry Kim Il-sung and a half-finished 
university campus.  Construction of all of the main buildings was long 
complete, but PUST had never planned on completing every single 
peripheral building on the master plan, so without factoring in more 
DPRK intransigence, just the construction alone would add a significant 
delay.  As for delays involving the export of American computers, Kim 
admitted that the request for a Commerce Department license was more 
about money than anything else: PUST had received a sizeable in-kind 
QKQ">>6Q donation of controlled, American computers. Kim said that he was 
exploring how to procure Chinese computers instead.  With donations at 
an all-time low and other roadblocks in the way, he said PUST had been 
hoping that the licensing issue could be resolved. 
 
¶10. (C) YUST President Chin Kyung Kim was as ebullient and energetic as 
ever.  He spoke excitedly about his credentials, upcoming plans for 
PUST, and his "excellent" relationships with everybody, including the 
local government, the DPRK government, ROK President Lee Myung-bak, 
etc.  Dean Nichols, however, evinced concern that the North Korean 
Ministry of Education had intentionally signed a contract with Chin 
Kyung Kim as an individual citizen and not with PUST as a whole or an 
organization.  Nichols said that the YUST contract with the Chinese 
Ministry of Education was also written in this fashion and could pose a 
legal crisis were President Kim to end his involvement with the 
operation.  President Kim dismissed these concerns and said that the 
contract was between his foundation and the North Koreans (NOTE: A clos 
read of the contract in some PUST promotional materials that are no 
longer circulated but that were passed to congenoff would seem to 
validate Dean Nichols' concerns.) 
 
WICKMAN