VZCZCXRO1831
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHRH #0699/01 1440727
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240727Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0843
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/RA(YAPHE) AND NEA/ARP(HARRIS) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SA IZ IR GCC
SUBJECT: REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR IRAQ/VIABILITY OF 
NEW REGIONAL NETWORKS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 48144 
     ¶B. RIYADH 439 
     ¶C. 08 TOKYO 02730 
 
Classified By: CDA David Rundell, 
reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Embassy answers to questions posed in ref A 
are listed below.  In general terms, the Saudis have strained 
relations with Iraq, continue to drag their feet in sending 
an Ambassador or forgiving Iraqi debt for reasons outlined 
below.  They are not likely to welcome new regional 
mechanisms or organizations, if only because of their own 
limited capacity for sustained engagement.  Another factor is 
the Saudi leadership's distrust of Iraqi PM Al-Maliki, who is 
seen as unreliable, under Iranian influence, and Shi'ite. 
Saudi calculations will always be driven by their assessment 
of how much any initiative affects Iranian influence in the 
region.  They are likely to be open to incrementally 
improving bilateral security and commercial ties with Iraq. 
End summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
PRESSING SAUDI-IRAQI BILATERAL ISSUES 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) QUESTION: In what issue areas is the host government 
already engaging in bilateral and/or multilateral discussions 
on functional issues (water, energy security, refugees, 
border security, health, education, etc.) with other 
countries in the region, regional and international 
organizations, and NGOs and other private sector actors like 
foundations and philanthropic organizations? 
 
¶3. (C) ANSWER:  According to newly appointed Iraqi Ambassador 
to Saudi Arabia Dr. Ghanim Al-Juwaily, Iraq's most pressing 
bilateral issues with the Kingdom include the appointment of 
a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad and forgiving Iraqi debt, but 
he does not believe there is much he personally can do to 
achieve either goal.  The Saudis cite security concerns as 
the reason they have yet to send an ambassador.  While they 
have made positive statements about Iraqi debt, they have yet 
to act, in Al-Juwaily's view, because of Kuwaiti pressure not 
to resolve this issue until Kuwait resolves a host of its own 
issues with Iraq.   However, there remains no consensus on 
how much the Iraqis owe the Saudis, and we understand 
proposals to bring together experts from the two countries to 
discuss technical debt issues have languished since September 
¶2007.  U.S. efforts to resolve this at a political level also 
need to focus on bringing together working-level officials to 
do additional legwork. 
 
¶4. (C) ECONOMIC & SECURITY: Therefore, Al-Juwaily has decided 
to practice the "art of the possible," and focus his efforts 
on economic and security cooperation.  This includes opening 
the border with Saudi Arabia; re-establishing commercial 
ties; and security cooperation against Al-Qaeda, on the 
border, and combating drug trafficking.  The Saudis are very 
worried about their "flat and porous" border with Iraq, which 
they see as largely uncontrolled on the Iraqi side and a 
potential entry point for returning extremists and 
contraband.  Common concerns and evidence of Iraqi 
seriousness of purpose would likely spur Saudi cooperation. 
 
¶5. (C) SECURITY AGREEMENT: Al-Juwaily reported that he would 
like to conclude a draft security agreement negotiated with 
the Saudis primarily by National Security Adviser Muwaffaq 
Al-Rabiae.  (Comment: One factor in renewed Saudi hesitation 
on Iraq ties is unhappiness that Muwaffaq al-Rabiae, one of 
the few Iraqi officials with good ties to Riyadh, appears to 
have been fired from his position.  The Saudis view this as 
evidence that the Al-Maliki government is not serious about 
improving ties. End comment.) 
 
¶6. (C) PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGE: On the political front, 
Al-Jumaily believed he might secure Saudi agreement for an 
exchange of parliamentarians.  The Majlis Al-Shura could be 
encouraged to invite Sunni parliamentarians to Riyadh for 
discussions, to address Saudi concerns about Sunni 
participation in the government.  Embassy agrees that the 
Saudis might be amenable to this sort of quasi-official, low 
profile engagement. 
 
----------------------------- 
EXISTING MULTILATERAL EFFORTS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) QUESTION:  From the host country's perspective, which 
of these groups are working effectively to produce joint 
action to solve common problems, and which are largely talk 
 
RIYADH 00000699  002 OF 003 
 
 
shops that have not produced and are unlikely to produce 
concrete outcomes?  Are there best practices in this area 
that could serve as a model for other taskforces- or lessons 
learned, both positive and negative -- from previous 
experience that should inform the Department's thinking? 
 
¶8. (C) ANSWER:  The Saudis have been constructive 
participants in the GCC plus 3 process.  They have in the 
past voiced support for the "Neighbors Process," launched to 
underscore the concept of non-interference in Iraqi affairs. 
Saud Al-Faisal has suggested that the Neighbors Process might 
be a useful vehicle for isolating the Iranians, so long as 
the others were united. 
 
¶9. (C) The current Saudi efforts to achieve a reconciliation 
on the Saudi/Egyptian/Syrian/Jordanian front would improve 
regional integration of Iraq. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
LIMITED ENTHUSIASM FOR NEW ORGANIZATIONS/MECHANISMS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10. (C) QUESTION:  Where would the host government see gaps 
in the capacity of existing multilateral arrangements to 
agree on regional solutions to regional problems?  Are there 
any specific 
functional issues for which the host government would support 
the formation of ad hoc multilateral task forces? Are there 
subjects where host country would serve as a natural leader? 
 
¶11. (C) ANSWER:  Saudis see themselves as already playing a 
major role in existing forums; i.e., GCC and Arab League. 
Given their limited institutional capacity for sustained 
engagement in any initiatives, and their likely skepticism 
regarding the utility of any additional mechanisms, they are 
not likely to be enthusiastic about new mechanisms. 
 
 
------------------ 
OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 
------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) QUESTION:  What other stakeholders - countries within 
and outside the region, including the U.S., and regional, 
international, and non-governmental organizations - would the 
host government want to include in these discussions? What 
kind of U.S. role would host country feel would be 
useful/acceptable in such fora? 
 
¶13. (C) ANSWER:  The Saudis would likely favor efforts 
undertaken under the auspices of the Arab League and OIC, 
with minimal overt US presence. 
 
------------------------------- 
ISSUES RIPE FOR NEW COOPERATION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) QUESTION: From the embassy's lens, are there any 
specific functional issues, such as water, the environment, 
health, or education, that might be ripe for an early harvest 
- i.e., good candidates for pilot projects to prove the value 
of new regional networks that would empower countries to 
reach multilateral solutions to functional, transnational 
problems? 
 
¶15. (C) ANSWER:  The Saudis are likely to be suspicious 
and/or skeptical of most new mechanisms. 
 
------------------------------------- 
COUNTRY ALLERGIES: THE USUAL SUSPECTS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) QUESTION: What other sensitivities would the host 
government have in terms of membership (Iran, Israel, Iraq, 
etc.)? 
 
¶17. (C) ANSWER:  The Saudis would not agree to participate in 
any activities that included Israel.  They would also 
hesitate to engage in any mechanisms that they viewed as 
expanding Iranian influence. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
FUNCTIONAL ISSUES MOST LIKELY TO EXPAND MEMBERSHIP 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶18. (C) QUESTION:  What functional issues or organizational 
arrangements would best encourage host governments to expand 
membership as comprehensively as possible (including Iran, 
Israel, Iraq, etc. 
 
 
RIYADH 00000699  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶19. (C) ANSWER:  Per the restrictions noted above, the Saudis 
are likely to participate most comprehensively in 
security-related discussions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT TO ADVANCE BILATERAL TIES 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶20. (C) QUESTION: What would be an effective diplomatic 
engagement strategy for us to advance such a concept in the 
region, and in particular, with your host government? 
 
¶21. (C) ANSWER:  Iraqi Ambassador Jumaily believes that 
Saudi-Iraqi ties could be strengthened by actions on the part 
of the Al-Maliki government that would demonstrate its 
political independence from Iran and demonstrate its 
commitment to preserve Iraq's Arab identity.  Of particular 
importance would be an endorsement of the Arab Peace 
Initiative.  Embassy shares this assessment. The Saudis might 
be receptive to requests to mediate national reconciliation, 
so long as these were low-profile. 
 
¶22. (C) The Embassy plans to host several dinners for Al 
Jumaily in the next few weeks, including one with prominent 
Saudis with significant family/business ties to Iraq. 
RUNDELL