VZCZCXRO9339
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0391/01 1280656
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080656Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0086
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1631
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4586
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1150

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000391 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR OES/IHB - JJONES AND CPATTERSON 
STATE ALSO FOR EEB/TPP/MTAA/ABT - ARYAN AND NEA/MAG 
AID/W FOR GBH 
USDA FOR FAS, APHIS, AND OSTA 
HHS FOR CDC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC AMED CASC TBIO PINR AMGT TF KFLU KFLO
KSAF, KPAO, MO 
SUBJECT: TFFLU01: MOROCCAN INFLUENZA PREPARATIONS 
 
REF: RABAT 0390 (NOTAL) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Morocco has reinforced its influenza 
surveillance and response measures as H1N1 influenza cases 
draw nearer to the Kingdom.  The Government of Morocco (GOM) 
has instituted surveillance of arriving travelers and is 
purchasing more anti-viral medication to add to its current 
stockpiles.  Morocco's previous pandemic planning includes 
pandemic influenza/avian influenza (PI/AI) committee chaired 
by the Prime Minister, a national command structure for PI 
response, and national response plans for individual agencies 
and ministries.  Although response plans and preventive 
measures are well defined (with CDC assistance), Morocco's 
health system would likely be overwhelmed by a full-blown 
epidemic of any highly-lethal influenza strain.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
NO CURRENT H1N1 CASES IN MOROCCO 
    (OR IN SPANISH ENCLAVES) 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) As of May 7, Moroccan authorities had registered no 
suspected or confirmed cases of A/H1N1 type influenza in the 
Kingdom.  A May 6 public statement from the Spanish Ministry 
of Health confirmed that an Italian tourist quarantined on 
May 4 in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta on the northern 
Moroccan coast did NOT/NOT have the A/H1N1 flu strain. 
 
---------------------------------- 
INFLUENZA COUNTERMEASURES IN PLACE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Morocco has deployed thermal imagers supervised by 
Ministry of Health (MOS) doctors to ports of entry to monitor 
arriving passengers.  (Note: As reported to the Task Force, 
GOM contacts were unable to specify the model of imagers, but 
EconOff believes based on visual comparison to published 
photographs that the thermal imagers are identical to or 
similar to SEMA WORLD product HFTCI TCS PCA5-8.  End Note.) 
The imaging devices are deployed at all international 
airports, and at the larger marine ports, according to 
Moroccan National Institute of Hygiene (INH) Influenza Chief 
Dr. Amal Barakat.  Barakat was unable to identify more 
precisely the number or names of the marine ports. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Passengers from all flights regardless of 
provenance are screened for temperature via thermal imaging. 
In addition, the MOS teams at the airports have requested 
that carriers provide a list of transit passengers who joined 
the flight to Morocco from a prior leg along with their 
original point of departure, in order to identify the 
countries visited by travelers on the arriving flight. 
According to Barakat, if a passenger is found to have a 
temperature above 38 degrees Celsius, he/she is detained 
briefly to answer a questionnaire on travel and other 
information, and requested to provide a specimen for 
laboratory analysis.  (Note:  Morocco conducts influenza 
analysis at the INH and the Pasteur Institute of Casablanca. 
End Note.)  The MOS also notes the names and contact 
information for other passengers on that individual,s 
flight.  The MOS then recommends that the passenger remain at 
home and rest for the next several days, while it maintains 
telephone contact at least once per day.  If the case is 
confirmed positive for H1N1, the MOS will then follow up with 
the other passengers to recommend they stay home, and test 
them for influenza as well. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Morocco's Ministry of Agriculture and Maritime 
Fisheries instituted a ban on importation of pigs and pork 
products on April 26.  After Charge demarched Minister of 
Agriculture Aziz Akhannouch on May 5 regarding the ban, 
Akhannouch replied that the ban was only temporary to ease 
public concerns (Reftel).  Morocco has only a small domestic 
pig-raising sector, comprised of six commercial pig farmers 
near Agadir, with a total stock of only 4,000 animals.  The 
Ministry of Agriculture has been vocal in reassuring the 
 
RABAT 00000391  002 OF 003 
 
 
public that these pigs are not carriers of the H1N1 virus, 
and the Ministry has stepped up veterinary surveillance of 
the farms to tamp down fears. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Minister of Health Yasmina Baddou announced on May 
5 that the GOM has committed an additional USD 100 million to 
influenza countermeasures.  Ministry of Health Deputy 
Director of Epidemiology Abderrahmane Benmamoun told EconOff 
on May 6 that the majority of that sum will be used to 
purchase 3 million courses of Tamiflu (in addition to the 
current 1 million-course GOM stockpile) to bring the total 
treatment courses to 4 million, sufficient for approximately 
10 percent of the kingdom's population.  The rest of the 
money is intended to purchase additional personal protective 
equipment (gloves, masks and suits for medical personnel), 
and laboratory reagents for diagnostic tests.  Benmamoun said 
that the GOM preferred to stick with one type of anti-viral 
medicine instead of alternating Tamiflu with other types of 
medication, and expected that a "good part" of its 3 million 
course order could be delivered with ten days or so despite 
heavy demand on medication producer Roche. 
 
------------------------------- 
NATIONAL PANDEMIC RESPONSE PLAN 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The GOM created in 2005 two principal bodies for 
dealing with PI/AI.  The Inter-Ministerial Committee for 
Pandemic Influenza is chaired by the Prime Minister and 
includes the Ministers of Agriculture, Health and Interior. 
It is responsible for strategic oversight of GOM planning and 
response to PI/AI.  The Central Command Post (PCC) is the 
operational committee for specific responses to PI.  Members 
of the PCC include representatives of the Ministries of 
Agriculture, Health and Interior, as well as representatives 
from the National Police, the Gendarmerie and the military. 
The PCC meets weekly during normal periods and more 
frequently during outbreaks, and it supervises the work of 
Provincial Command Posts (PCPs) in each of Morocco's 
provinces. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The PCC developed a National Plan for PI, and each 
constituent agency has developed an individual plan to 
fulfill its mission as elaborated under the National Plan. 
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control have assisted in 
formulating the GOM's handbook for PI response, including 
assisting in tabletop exercises to train PCC participants in 
response. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The National Plan guided spending of approximately 
USD 25 to 30 million in 2007-2008, divided approximately 
evenly among treatments (i.e., Tamiflu) and supplies (e.g. 
personal protective equipment, much of it now prepositioned 
around the country).  The GOM has already stockpiled courses 
of Tamilflu to treat 1 million influenza cases, in two forms, 
gel and powder.  Based on Ministry of Health planning 
(borrowing from U.S. and French planning models for epidemic 
propogation), a PI episode in Morocco would likely require 
treatment for 7 million cases; the capability for 1 million 
was a compromise based on available resources.  The gel 
dosage has an expiration date of 2011 (the powder expires in 
2014), and the GOM is currently debating disposition/use and 
replacement plans for the stockpile. 
 
------------ 
SURVEILLANCE 
------------ 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Ministry of Health has a nationwide integrated 
surveillance system for influenza-like illness (ILI), in 
which hospitals are required to report ILI cases to the 
Ministry, which follows the cases to conclusion.  Hospitals 
send virus samples to the 16 regional laboratories, which 
then send suspect cases, including any suspected AI samples, 
to the National Institute of Hygiene (INH) for confirmation. 
 
 
RABAT 00000391  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Ministry of Agriculture, the High Commission 
for Water and Forests, and the Gendarmerie share 
responsibility for animal surveillance.  Industrial livestock 
and poultry companies are required to have veterinarian 
inspections, and local authorities are responsible for 
surveillance of other domesticated animals.  The GOM pays 
farmers and private livestock owners for providing samples of 
dead animals, resulting in very high incidence of reporting 
and testing of dead animals.  Under recent regulatory 
reforms, now over 85 percent of poultry raising takes place 
under some sort of organized capacity subject to regulatory 
control (as opposed to unregulated raising in private homes). 
 The High Commission for Water and Forests traps and samples 
migratory birds during each seasonal migration, and forestry 
employees and rural gendarmes are trained and required to 
collect dead wild birds and send them to laboratories for 
testing. 
 
----------------- 
PI RESPONSE PLANS 
----------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The GOM Pandemic Influenza response plans assume 
that the Ministry of Interior will be primarily responsible 
for any actions involving quarantine or other restrictions on 
movement.  The MOI will also be responsible for providing 
supplies to households or communities under quarantine.  As 
noted above, although modeling of PI suggests that 
approximately 7 million persons would benefit from Tamiflu 
treatment under a pandemic situation, the GOM currently 
possesses only sufficient stocks to treat 1 million people 
(with more purchases planned as noted above).  MOS officials 
suggested that a triage would identify patients likely to 
recover without assistance of medication, allowing treatment 
of more severe cases with Tamiflu. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Individual ministries and agencies (Interior, 
police forces, transportation industries, etc.) have 
participated in formulating response plans, and are each 
responsible for developing their own response plan to carry 
out actions that may be required.  The PCC has also developed 
a communication plan for internal and public communications 
to convey instructions to government officials and the 
general public in case of an emergency; MOS officials note 
that the communications planning has been the most beneficial 
outcome of PI planning, as the capabilities can be used in 
response to any other type of emergency. 
 
-------------------------------- 
GOOD PLANS BUT LIMITED RESOURCES 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Comment:  The GOM has worked out serious and 
credible response plans to pandemic influenza, including 
several simulations in the past three years for personnel who 
would be responsible for any response.  The CDC's liaison for 
collaboration with Morocco told EconOff that Morocco is far 
ahead of any other developing country in the Mediterranean 
region in planning and capacity for handling pandemic 
influenza.  That said, the Mission assesses that in a 
pandemic situation, the number of victims would likely 
overwhelm the limited number of medical personnel and 
facilities, leaving most affected persons to be cared for by 
relatives.  Post is highly cognizant of these infrastructure 
and personnel limitations in evaluating our own options in 
responding to an epidemic in Morocco.  End Comment. 
 
 
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Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
 
Jackson