VZCZCXRO2389
PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNK #0327/01 1321718
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121718Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8406
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0647
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0569
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0632
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2174
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0979
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0204
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1090

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL USAU SG MR
SUBJECT: THE FNDD'S EVER-CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE 
SENEGALESE MEDIATION 
 
REF: NOUAKCHOTT 323 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The FNDD, while suspicious of Senegalese 
President Wade's intentions, is again looking at the 
Senegalese mediation as a method to derail the regime's 
election agenda.  The FNDD has multiple conditions, but sees 
the Senegalese proposal as the basis to start talking about 
talking -- with the emphasis being on setting up face-to-face 
discussions between the FNDD, RFD, and Aziz' political 
coalition.  The FNDD is concerned the RFD's Ahmed Ould Daddah 
may be seduced back towards Aziz through guarantees of 
electoral transparency.  SEPTEL will cover President 
Abdallahi's discussions with Ambassador concerning the 
mediation.  End Summary 
 
The Senegalese Proposal 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) DCM met May 11 with FND "Foreign Minister" Mohamed 
Ould Maouloud to gethis impressions of the most recent 
mediation attmpt by Senegalese Foreign Minister Gadio. 
Althouh Ould Maouloud and other FNDD leaders had been 
egatively dismissive of Senegalese actions on the ee of 
Gadio's visit (REFTEL), Ould Maouloud was mre open to the 
initiative following their meetins with Gadio.  Ould 
Maouloud said the Senegaleseproposal included: 
 
--  An unspecified "special ole" for President Abdallahi in 
h(  r"n*i(i(n* prcess (Gadio told Ould Maouooddhh  oold 
e p a n*how Dakar envisioned that role when he met with 
Abdallahi), 
 
--  An agreement to reach a consensual date for new elections 
to be supervised and monitored by the international community, 
 
--  A new revision of the electoral list and the Electoral 
Commission, 
 
--  A consnsual establishment of a new Government of 
Nationl Unity, 
 
--  The naming by anti-coup forces of he Minister of 
Interior (responsible for the impementation of any 
electiions), 
 
--  A general anesty to provide HCE members freedom from 
prosection for actions leading to and subsequent to the cup 
as well as the release of FNDD political leadrs and dropping 
of criminal charges. 
 
¶3.  (C) uld Maouloud told Gadio, ssomewhat to his surprise, 
that the FNDD saw the plan as a basis for discusion.  Ould 
Maouloud stressed that the FNDD did no want the Senegalese 
to work on shuttle diplomac to reach an agreed text, but to 
facilitate a fae-to-face political dialoggue between the 
three goups identified by the International Contact Group 
for Mauritania -- those supporting President Abdalahi, Ahmed 
ould Daddah's RFD, and General Aziz.  Gadio said he could 
work with that and suggeste  he could be back to start 
facilitating that diaoogue within a week.  Subsequently, 
Gadio phoned u ld Maouloud indicating General Aziz was now 
putting up obstacles so he was not sure how soon a dialggue 
could begin. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ould Maouloud said h  did not get heavily into the 
substance of the Senegalese points but had said that the FNDD 
obviously could not sign off on a "special status" for 
Abdallahi without knowing what that status was.  He had also 
told Gadio that, in addition to defining the role for the 
elected president, there would also have to be agreement on 
the role of the military since, if not defined, the security 
forces would be free to manipulate the system.  He suggestedt hat the dissolutio 
n of the BASEP Presidential Protection 
Battalion would be a condition the FNDD wolld demand in any 
future dialogue. 
 
¶5.  (C) Oul  Maouloud told DCM he had greater confidence in 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000327  002 OF 003 
 
 
Gadio who had profusely apologized for the Senegalese 
credentialling of the new, Aziz-appointed, Mauritanian 
Ambassador to Senegal (Gadio claimed it was an error made by 
the Presidency protocol that had not been cleared through 
him).  Ould Maouloud added that the FNDD still has little 
confidence in President Wade who he saw as having "a personal 
relationship with the General."  That distrust was the main 
reason the FNDD wanted to limit the Senegalese role to that 
of a facilitator for face-to-face Mauritanian talks rather 
than that of a mediator. 
 
¶6.  (C) Getting down to mechanics, Ould Maouloud suggested he 
would prefer that any dialogue be held in Mauritania although 
either Dakar or Addis Ababa would be acceptable.  He saw a 
role for Wade, the AU's Ping, and the UN SRSG for West Africa 
Djinnit in opening the dialogue and, if successful, 
co-signing the agreement as guarantors.  He wanted other 
Contact Group members as well as the U.S. involved, but was 
unsure in what way.  Now that Aziz has been elected President 
of the political party with the parliamentary majority, he 
said he had no objection to him being directly involved in 
the dialogue.  In fact, he noted that Gadio had not suggested 
"Interim President" Ba M'Bare or military junta interim 
leader General Ghazwany as partners in the dialogue.  When 
asked why, Gadio reportedly replied, "they will agree to 
anything Aziz agrees to."  Ould Maouloud again said he saw 
Prime Minister Waghaf as presenting the President but, when 
asked how Waghef was faring in prison, said they would have 
to see if he was mentally and physically up to that task 
since prison conditions are getting tougher with the advent 
of summer.  Significantly, Ould Maouloud said that Waghef's 
release was not a "precondition" for talks but rather "an 
action that would improve the chances of a successful 
dialogue." 
 
Keeping Ould Daddah In The Fold 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Ould Maouloud said Aziz is still doing everything he 
can to pull RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah away from his 
tenuous alliance with the FNDD -- with some effect.  Ould 
Daddah has started arguing with the FNDD that perhaps it 
would be better to participate in delayed elections if there 
were enough guarantees of transparency.  Ould Maouloud and 
the others had argued back that, unless the political 
influence of the military is removed, there can be no chance 
of credible elections.  Ould Maouloud said, "The last time 
there had also been guaranties of transparency within the 
system, but Aziz -- as head of the BASEP -- just told 
everyone 'I'm the real power and this is how you will vote.'" 
 (Comment: In this comment, Ould Maouloud supports the 
argument that Abdallahi was "installed" by the military -- as 
well as most of the Parliament.  This may reflect his 
thinking as well as that of most of the FNDD leadership who, 
nonetheless, defend the principle of the elected president 
more than the personality.  End Comment).  Ould Maouloud saw 
Ould Daddah as susceptible to being seduced into thinking the 
regime's electoral agenda could actually offer him a chance 
to be elected.  Ould Maouloud cited this uncertainty about 
Ould Daddah as yet another reason he wanted face-to-face 
discussions instead of a shuttle mediation.  Ould Maouloud 
thought Ould Daddah would be constrained from making side 
deals if all the parties were sitting around the table.  Even 
if there is deception on Ould Daddah's part, the FNDD would 
insist on a deal acceptable to all three parties. 
 
¶8.  (C) Ould Maouloud also noted the FNDD and the RFD have 
different views about the importance of the June 6 elections. 
 For the FNDD, Maouloud said, "Our main goal is to get the 
elections canceled but, if we fail in that, we just have to 
be sure they aren't generally recognized.  If Aziz' elections 
take place June 6, it won't be the end of the world for us 
since, if they aren't seen as credible, they won't change 
Aziz status."  Ould Maouloud saw the RFD as seeing the 
elections as far more critical and said Ould Daddah is 
prepared to shift towards a more violent opposition strategy 
to stop them.  Ould Daddah, according to the FNDD leader, 
sees the June 6 elections as potentially locking in Aziz' 
long-term reign. 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000327  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
Keeping the Coalition Together 
------------------------------ 
 
9  (C) Ould Maouloud bemoaned the poor judgment of some of 
his allies at a period where coalition unity is vital.  While 
Ould Daddah's criticism of the FNDD for accepting "illegal" 
U.S. assistance though NDI has been denied by Ould Daddah, 
the "Foreign Minister" noted, "he said what he said" which 
gave the regime ample ammunition to highlight divisions among 
the anti-coup front.  Similarly, recent criticism by Jemil 
Mansour of the Islamic Tawasoul party concerning an FNDD 
statement that had spoken well of the United States had been 
smoothed over but had offered another messaging opportunity 
for pro-coup forces. Ould Maouloud said that Mansour had been 
unable to attend the meeting where the statement had been 
discussed but had sent a deputy.  He suggested Mansour was 
uncomfortable praising the United States even though Ould 
Maouloud told him, "All we said was that the U.S. has been 
strong and consistent in its message and we wish other 
countries would follow suit." 
BOULWARE