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RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0344/01 1461350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261350Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9892
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1462
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE 0060
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000344 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TU CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  TURKISH "AMBASSADOR" ON LIMNITIS, 
VAROSHA, ERCAN, AND UNFICYP 
 
REF: A. MACRIS-EUR/SE MAY 22 E-MAIL 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 333 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 327 
     ¶D. NICOSIA 300 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) At a May 22 working lunch with the Ambassador, Sakir 
Fakili, the Turkish "Ambassador" to the "TRNC," did not 
respond substantively to the Ambassador's call for a 
compromise to allow the eventual opening of the 
Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point in northwest Cyprus. 
Fakili instead voiced full support for the May 21 demand of 
Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader Mehmet Ali Talat to include 
large-scale T/C troop movements (albeit in civilian clothes) 
as part of "free passage" to the T/C enclave of Kokkina.  The 
requirement that troops could also use Limnitis was 
long-standing and the UN had long been aware, he said.  On 
the Cyprus issue in general, Fakili called for iron-clad 
bizonality and only grudgingly accepted that members of the 
two communities might live side-by-side in the same 
constituent state.  He pressed the Ambassador on the need for 
a "Plan B" (read, an upgrading of the status of the "TRNC") 
if the present UN-brokered process were to collapse.  Fakili 
also sought the withdrawal of UNFICYP or, barring that, an 
overhaul of its mandate.  Domestically, he waxed favorably 
about the nationalist, solution-skeptical National Unity 
Party (UBP) "government" and pointedly noted that Turkey 
would not "play the role of the IMF" to the notoriously 
profligate Turkish Cypriots.  Fakili redirected a request for 
Embassy consular access to the walled-off city of Varosha to 
inspect abandoned AmCit properties, claiming that T/Cs were 
responsible for that decision and the city, not Turkey. 
Responding to the Ambassador's query over a now-stalled 
proposal to allow communication between T/C and G/C air 
traffic controllers to prevent in-air collisions, Fakili's 
economic adviser said a formal "letter of agreement" between 
the sides would be required.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Crossing of Troops Still a Red Line 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Fakili, accompanied by First Counselor Bekir Usyal 
and Second Counselor Levent Eler, discussed with the 
Ambassador recent efforts to reach a compromise on opening 
the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point, a stalled 
confidence-building measure (CBM) and lately the source of 
great discord between the sides.  The Ambassador said that he 
had been surprised by Talat on May 20 insisting on the need 
to transport small amounts of fuel to Kokkina, especially 
after the Greek Cypriots apparently had agreed to most of a 
UN-devised bargain that involved the G/Cs supplying 
electricity to the pocket in lieu of fuel, allowing the 
passage of commodities (save fuel and lethal items), and 
permitting the transit of the relatives of T/C soldiers 
(regardless of whether or not they would otherwise be 
considered RoC citizens). 
 
¶3. (C) Fakili claimed that the G/C offer on electricity had 
not been "confirmed," a line Talat himself had used with the 
Ambassador (Ref B).  He then said that the Turkish Cypriots' 
latest position on Limnitis -- to allow the movement of large 
numbers of T/C soldiers in civilian dress to Kokkina -- was 
actually long-standing, despite  UN Special Adviser Alexander 
Downer and the Greek Cypriots' surprise when Talat tabled it 
at the contentious May 21 leaders' meeting (Ref B).  Fakili 
insisted that "free passage" meant just that, and only 
ammunition, armaments and large amounts of fuel were 
excluded.  Adviser Eler claimed the proposal hailed from 
October 2007.  Fakili argued that there was "no difference 
between troop rotation (the concept that had led RoC 
President Demetris Christofias to blow up at Talat on May 21) 
and soldiers crossing in civilian dress."  The Ambassador 
urged Fakili to have Talat transmit to Downer his exact 
proposal regarding the movement of troops to Kokkina. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
"No mixing" of Turkish and Greek Cypriots 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Fakili told the Ambassador that it was difficult to be 
"overly optimistic" about the overall negotiations, 
especially given the turbulence over Limnitis/Yesilirmak, but 
he was pleased with the efforts of Talat.  On bizonality, a 
key T/C demand, he thought there would be "no residential 
 
NICOSIA 00000344  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
mixing" of Turkish and Greek Cypriots post-solution.  He 
quickly clarified his comments, however, stating that there 
would be "ceilings" that limited G/C settlement in a future 
T/C constituent state.  (Note:  Our pro-solution T/C 
contacts, both in Talat's office and the "TRNC MFA", claim 
that Turkey wants as ethnically pure a T/C constituent state 
as possible, even if this means giving up more territory in 
return.) 
 
--------------------- 
Demand for a "Plan B" 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Fakili emphasized the need for a "Plan B" (read, an 
upgrading of "TRNC's" status) in case the G/Cs rejected a new 
peace plan, as they had done in 2004.  He complained about 
"unfilled promises made to the Turkish Cypriots" during the 
Annan period, and noted that constant G/C demands for the 
abolishment of Turkey's guarantor rights meant that those 
rights needed to be enumerated clearly in any new plan. 
Regarding the possibility of a second G/C NO vote, the 
Ambassador reckoned that, if a plan were to reach a 
referendum, it would be supported by the political leadership 
on both sides, unlike 2004. 
 
--------------------- 
"No need for UNFICYP" 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked Fakili for the Turkish side's 
general impressions of the UN presence on Cyprus.  "There is 
no need for UNFICYP," he assessed flatly, stating it was the 
Turkish military in 1974 that had brought relative security 
to the island.  He was displeased by recent complaints that 
Turkish forces increasingly were limiting UNFICYP movement 
and access in the north, and bothered by the criticism his 
side had received in the Secretary General's most recent 
report (May) to the Security Council.  Fakili leveled a 
number of minor grievances toward the UN contingent:  use of 
official vehicles by UNFICYP personnel in civilian clothes 
for unofficial purposes (Note:  long a UN practice, a 
considered well within the mandate), the continued UN 
transport of humanitarian goods to "wealthy" G/C and Maronite 
enclaved villages, and its "slanted" reporting of buffer zone 
violations.  His real criticism was directed at UNSCR 186 
(1964), which had recognized the Republic of Cyprus -- by 
that point bereft of Turkish Cypriot representation -- as the 
"legitimate" government on the island.  UNFICYP needed to 
operate on the principle of the sides' "political equality" 
on Cyprus, he continued, suggesting that UNSCR 186 might have 
to be "amended" to reflect this reality.  Fakili claimed that 
UNFICYP forces were at best "guests" in the north, since they 
had no status of forces agreement with the Turks.  The 
Ambassador replied that, if Fakili wanted, he would pass on 
to UNFICYP any issues the Turks might have with their 
operation, in an effort to resolve problems speedily. 
 
-------------------- 
"Eroglu Cooperating" 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Fakili said that new UBP "Prime Minister" Dervish 
Eroglu was "cooperating" and was fully aware of Turkey's 
continuing strong support for Talat in the ongoing peace 
process.  He praised the make-up of the new "government," 
including the presence of businessmen as "Ministers" of 
Finance and Public Works, claiming that the markets had 
positively responded to their appointment (Note:  While 
our more candid UBP contacts complain that the present 
"government" consists exclusively of party loyalists, not 
technocrats or experts, we believe they are at least as 
qualified as the poor-performing "ministers" in the previous 
CTP "government."  Ersin Tatar, the "Minister" of Finance, is 
wanted in the UK for his alleged link to the "Polly Peck" 
scandal, however.) 
 
¶8. (C) After economic expert Bekir Usyal had said the Turkish 
Cypriots needed to control expenditures and reform the 
bloated public sector, Fakili sharply clarified that Turkey 
would not "act like the IMF" by setting conditions for its 
aid to the "TRNC."  (Note: if true, the "no conditionality" 
pledge represents a change in policy.  The previous, 
not-AKP-friendly Republic Turkish Party (CTP)-led 
"government" was forced to call early elections after Turkey 
closed the money spigot in the absence of implementation of 
significant "public sector" cuts and other fiscal reform.) 
 
 
NICOSIA 00000344  003 OF 003 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
Claims T/Cs control Access to Varosha 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador urged Fakili to approve Embassy 
consular access, blocked by Turkey since 2005, to a number of 
abandoned, AmCit-owned properties in the fenced off city of 
Varosha.  Fakili claimed unconvincingly that Turkish Cypriots 
controlled access to Varosha, and said that we should appeal 
directly to Talat, since the T/C Security Forces, under 
General Recep, were responsible for ingress and egress. 
(Note: General Recep is a Turkish general.  Under the "TRNC 
Constitution, he and all T/C police and military forces 
report to the Turkish General Staff, not Talat.  Sympathetic 
Turkish Cypriots in the "MFA" have told us they have 
absolutely no control over Varosha, and that decisions over 
access rest with the TGS.  The zone is plastered with 
standard red Turkish militar "KEEP OUT" signs as seen across 
the Turkish mainland.)  The Ambassador responded that we 
would continue to pursue the issue.  He warned that our 
inability to inspect AmCit properties in Varosha might draw 
negative attention from Members of the U.S. Congress who were 
increasingly visiting Cyprus, especially if they had 
property-owning constituents. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Need Letter of Agreement to fix air traffic control problem 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question regarding 
the fate of a scheme to allow direct communication between 
Ercan and Larnaca air traffic control via EuroControl in 
Brussels and Ankara, Uysal said there would be no problem if 
the G/Cs agreed to "direct contact" with Ercan (a G/C 
red-line that had been obviated by the scheme's proposed 
technical routing through Brussels and Ankara.)  Moreover, he 
added that letters of agreement between Ankara, Ercan, and 
Larnaca would have to be signed in Brussels with EuroControl 
to get the project off the ground -- seemingly another 
non-starter for the Greek Cypriot side.  Fakili noted that 
Turkey had fully financed a "Smart Project" at Ercan that, 
when completed in the near future, would not only be more 
advanced than the G/C air traffic control system, but would 
also serve as an emergency back-up for all of Turkish air 
traffic control.  (Note: Turkish sensitivities on control of 
air space post-solution have already been felt during the 
present negotiations.  A contact in Talat's office told us 
that T/C demands for two flight control regions (FIRs) had in 
fact come from Ankara and were non-negotiable.) 
Urbancic