VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0342/01 1461331
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261331Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9889
INFO RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0018
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5472
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1459

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  COMPROMISE POSSIBLE ON LIMNITIS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 333 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 327 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer on May 
25 secured buy-in from Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators 
George Iacovou and Ozdil Nami on a compromise plan to allow 
the Limnitis/Yesilirmak Buffer Zone crossing to open. 
Iacovou and Nami must now "sell" the plan to Demetris 
Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, with Downer hoping to 
announce the measure after the leaders' May 28 meeting. 
Constructive ambiguity dominates the four-point agreement, 
aiming to bridge the sides' opposing positions on use of 
Limnitis by Turkish Cypriot military and their family 
members.  For it to work, Talat and Christofias must 
coordinate their messages to respective media and 
hard-liners.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Downer on Memorial Day (May 25) urgently sought a 
meeting with the Ambassador and UK High Commissioner Peter 
Millett.  He told the envoys that Iacovou and Nami, meeting 
(with their teams) that morning ostensibly to discuss 
economic issues, instead had peeled off to tackle Limnitis, a 
contentious confidence-building measure which a week ago had 
caused public acrimony between the leaders (reftels).  Downer 
opened the Iacovou-Nami meeting with an admonition:  the 
sides' positions were divergent and well-known, and unless 
one or both reconsidered, the matter had reached a dead-end 
that would damage perceptions that a wider Cyprus settlement 
could be reached.  He suggested they move on to substantive 
issues. 
 
¶3.  (C) Instead, Iacovou and Nami began to discuss the 
crossing -- though only after the always-pendantic G/C 
negotiator lectured 30 minutes on the genesis of the Limnitis 
impasse.  Downer believed that Talat may have felt pressure 
to act not from the Turkish Army, but rather from T/C 
municipal leaders in the Limnitis area who contend that the 
crossing would economically revitalize their region. 
Regardless of the reasons, Nami engaged seriously in 90 
minutes of give-and-take, after which the sides agreed on an 
ad referndum four-point agreement to present to their 
respective leaders.  According to the compromise (verbatim, 
and please protect), 
 
-- Limnitis crossing will be opened under normal rules. 
 
-- The G/Cs will connect the enclave of Kokkina to the Cyprus 
Electrical Authority grid. 
 
-- A bus will be authorized to travel several times a week 
from the T/C checkpoint at Limnitis to the Kokkina enclave 
and back at predetermined times.  The bus will be under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of UNFICYP from the T/C checkpoint to 
the enclave at Kokkina and back. 
 
-- UNFICYP will inspect and supervise the transport of 
foodstuffs and other civilian supplies from Limnitis to 
Kokkina. 
 
¶4.  (C) Downer acknowledged that the framework agreement 
depended on constructive ambiguity.  Passing line-by-line 
through the text, he interpreted "Limnitis crossing will be 
opened under normal rules" to mean all Turkish Cypriots, 
including T/C military in civilian clothes and their 
"settler" family members, could transit.  Point 2 was 
straightforward and technically feasible and should be 
accepted by both sides.  Point 3 had received significant 
attention from Iacovou and Nami, primarily over who would 
enjoy ridership privileges and how they might be accounted; 
Nami was adamant, for example, that the "TRNC" could not 
discriminate between its T/C- and mainland Turkish-origin 
"citizens."  With Downer's mediation, they eventually agreed 
not to stipulate formally any ridership criteria and to 
perform a simple passenger count (to ensure the same number 
disembarked who embarked).  Point 4 had been attached to meet 
G/C concerns that shipment of agricultural products and 
foodstuffs through Limnitis to Kokkina not range far from  EU 
Green Line Regulation norms in force at the other crossings. 
 
¶5.  (C) Turning to the source of the latest Limnitis hiccup 
-- Talat's position that Turkish Cypriots be allowed to 
transport small quantities of vehicle fuel to Kokkina even 
after the electrical hook-up is complete -- Downer winked 
that the Turkish Cypriot vehicles using the crossing might 
carry "a jerry can or two of gas... for the tractor of the 
shepherd still living in Kokkina."  He thought Christofias 
likely could accept the ambiguity of the agreement, but was 
less sure of Talat's reactions.  The ball was now with Nami 
and Iacovou to convince their leaders to accept it; Downer 
hoped Christofias and Talat would announce the measure after 
their upcoming meeting on May 28.  UKHC Millett mentioned 
that Foreign Secretary David Miliband would be arriving in 
Ankara shortly for consultations and asked Downer if his boss 
should raise the compromise.  The UN envoy responded 
positively but suggested an indirect approach, saying only 
that Limnitis was delaying progress on key substantive issues 
and the parties should make great efforts to resolve it. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  Downer emphasized rightly that this deal is 
tentative at best and asked that we ensure that details 
remain strictly within U.S. and UK channels.  Successfully 
bridging the sides' divergent positions on Limnitis requires 
both to accept a broadly-written, ambiguous compromise text, 
and even with Downer's interpretation, this represents real 
compromise by both sides.  In the UN envoy's short briefing, 
however, he did not give the impression that he or his staff 
had considered fully the reactions to the deal of the media 
and hard-line camps in both the G/C and T/C communities.  For 
example, Greek Cypriot nationalists last week protested 
loudly against Talat's latest "demands" that fuel and 
"Turkish settlers" be allowed to cross Limnitis to Kokkina. 
When they ping Christofias again, will the 
not-always-courageous President deploy his constructively 
ambiguous points, or will he counter that he would never 
accept such demands -- likely spurring an equally firm 
response from Talat and possibly scuttling the deal?  Serious 
efforts by the Good Offices mission to convince G/Cs and T/Cs 
to coordinate their responses will be imperative.  The 
Embassy will work with Downer and his team toward that end. 
Urbancic