VZCZCXRO0137
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0333/01 1411434
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211434Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9879
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1454
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000333 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  TALAT IN FOUL MOOD ON LIMNITIS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 327 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 306 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat 
continues to demand the right to transport vehicle fuel to 
the T/C military enclave in Kokkina as quid pro quo for the 
opening of a Buffer Zone (BZ) crossing at Limnitis.  During a 
May 20 meeting with the Ambassador, Talat explained he could 
not domestically sell a "concession" like opening Limnitis -- 
which in his view benefited only Greek Cypriots living in 
isolated Pyrgos village -- without obtaining something in 
return; the UN-brokered compromise which entailed G/Cs 
providing electricity to Kokkina was insufficient.  He 
criticized G/C leader Demetris Christofias for publicizing 
elements of the UN plan, which had made further fine-tuning 
problematic on both sides of the Green Line.  News regarding 
other CBMs was better:  hindrance-free ambulance crossings 
should begin soon, the communities were already staffing a 
communications cell to share information on criminal 
activity, and cultural heritage experts were engaging on a 
bicommunal work plan.  He and Christofias would meet on May 
21 in one of the final meetings on economic matters; 
convergences existed, but significant gaps remained.  Talat 
still clung to hopes that the first and second reads of all 
core negotiating topics would complete by summer's end, 
allowing give-and-take to begin in September.  One day after 
this meeting, however, Talat and Christofias's tete-a-tete on 
Limnitis ended disastrously, leaving the UN and the 
international community brainstorming ways of keeping the 
process on track.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Ambassador Makes Urgent Pitch on Crossing 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) After obtaining a telephonic readout from UN Special 
Adviser Alexander Downer on his May 18-20 visits to Ankara 
and Athens, the Ambassador on May 20 requested an urgent 
meeting with the Turkish Cypriot leader, primarily to discuss 
progress on opening Limnitis.  The two immediately began a 
discussion of the Limnitis crossing -- lately the source of 
discord between the leaders and a worsening negotiating 
environment between the sides.  The Ambassador recounted his 
very first substantive engagement with Talat, which focused 
on Limnitis; Talat had explained that the crossing would only 
benefit Greek Cypriots living near Pyrgos, and to open it and 
not receive a black eye in the process, he needed payback. 
The UN-brokered compromise that involved the G/Cs providing 
electricity to Kokkina, drastically reducing the frequency 
and cost of shipping fuel to the enclave, seemed just the 
political cover that Talat needed, the Ambassador thought. 
On the other hand, delaying the deal by demanding a minimal 
quantity of vehicle fuel (which Talat estimated at 50 gallons 
per week) seemed counter-productive.  Since some form of 
seaborne resupply would continue regardless, mainly for arms 
and ammunition, the fuel could be transported on those 
vessels and easily stored at Kokkina, obviating the need for 
the unacceptable-to-G/Cs ground shipment. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Ambassador also highlighted the positive role on 
Limnitis being played by certain elements of the Church.  The 
Bishop of Kykkos and his allies had been preaching calm to 
the aggravated residents of Pyrgos, for example who were 
threatening actions to close other BZ crossings if their 
demands on Limnitis went unmet.  Continued T/C refusal to 
establish the crossing risked marginalizaling the 
pro-solution Kykkos on the Holy Synod, further buttressing 
rejectionist hard-liners like Archbishop Chrysostomos.  The 
Ambassador emphasized that reaching agreement on Limnitis 
would show decision makers in Washington and the broader 
international community -- many of whom question the sides' 
political will -- that the Cypriot leaders were capable of 
compromise on politically difficult matters.  Last, a deal 
would truly constitute a confidence-building step between the 
sides, sorely needed at this time.  He urged Talat to find a 
way to get to "yes" on Limnitis. 
 
----------------------------- 
Unsure What Future Will Bring 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Talat expressed disappointment that Christofias had 
leaked news of the Limnitis compromise and was now publicly 
rejecting fuel delivery for Kokkina.  Such announcements not 
only boxed in Christofias, but himself as well -- "how can I 
walk back my demand now?" he reasoned.  Talat was unsure what 
results the May 21 leaders meeting would bring on the 
 
NICOSIA 00000333  002 OF 003 
 
 
crossing question.  Both he and Christofias would be talking 
to villagers on opposite sides of the crossing route in 
coming days; Talat dismissed strong signs of support from the 
T/C mukhtar (village elder), saying he only cared about a 
repaved road that came as an eventual by-product to the 
crossing's opening. 
 
¶5.  (C) Perceiving a need to clarify the genesis of the 
Limnitis issue, the Turkish Cypriot leader walked through 
recent developments.  He rebutted a point voiced often by 
Greek Cypriot negotiator George Iacovou:  that T/Cs had 
agreed unconditionally to open Limnitis in exchange for a G/C 
green-light to open Ledra Street.  Rather, Turkish Cypriots 
needed payback for Limnitis, either unfettered access to 
Kokkina or a new road into the bi-communal village of Pyla. 
They had decided on Kokkina after uncovering a reference by a 
former UNSYG that the Pyla road would confer military 
advantage to Turkish Cypriots and thus should be opposed 
under UNFICYP's mandate. 
 
¶6.  (C) Talat next recounted the T/Cs' original demands to 
open the Limnitis crossing.  All T/C relatives, not just 
those whom the G/Cs considered "real" Turkish Cypriots, 
needed access to Kokkina.  Additionally, his side sought the 
right to transport through the crossing all commodities save 
armaments and munitions.  He never thought the Greek Cypriots 
would draw the line on fuel, which he had told Christofias he 
needed because of G/C efforts between 1963 and 1974 to 
"starve out" the Kokkina enclave by interrupting electrical 
supplies.  During the negotiations, Christofias surprisingly 
had conceded on the "settlers" point but refused to budge on 
gas; after the UN tabled the electrical hook-up compromise, 
the G/C leader responded that he needed additional time to 
consider it. 
 
¶7.  (C) Domestic political concerns were making it difficult 
to negotiate on Limnitis, Talat assessed. Families of T/C 
conscripts were demanding immediate access to Kokkina. 
Hard-liners were insisting on "no concessions to G/Cs" and 
would equate a retreat on overland fuel shipments to a major 
defeat.  And the military would see little utility in the 
electrical arrangement if it still had to send fuel by sea to 
the enclave.  In a nutshell, the compromise as prepared was 
not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side. 
 
¶8.  (C) Concluding the call, Talat dismissed the argument 
that Limnitis represented a valuable CBM that would improve 
prospects for progress on core CyProb subjects.  "Look, we 
opened Ledra Street.  Did it help?" he argued, convinced the 
answer was "no."  Increased focus on CBMs would actually 
perpetuate the status quo by making the current arrangement 
more comfortable, "normalizing the non-solution conditions." 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
More Progress on Other CBMs, Though 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Talat brightened on discussing positive movement in 
other confidence-building measures.  A bicommunal advisory 
board tackling cultural heritage preservation was meeting 
regularly and prioritizing possible projects, and the 
heritage working group formed during last summer's 
preparatory phase of negotiations remained active and 
motivated.  On environmental issues, a handful of 
disagreements -- "but none that serious" -- were temporarily 
halting progress, but Talat appeared optimistic they would be 
overcome soon.  Perhaps most promising, law enforcement 
experts from both communities were staffing a crime/criminal 
matters cell and sharing information.  The only hiccup so far 
was a Greek Cypriot demand for Sundays off for souvla and 
backyard barbecues, Talat chuckled. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
G/Cs' Allegedly Slowing Progress on Economy 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) He and Christofias would again discuss economic 
matters on May 21, Talat noted.  The issue was complex, the 
working papers thick, and the staffwork to prepare the 
leaders for meaningful talks voluminous.  Convergence existed 
between the sides' positions, but so did dissonance.  Talat 
was troubled by Greek Cypriot attempts to assign full 
responsibility to the federal government for economic 
relations with the EU and other international bodies, even on 
matters of constituent state competence; the technical teams 
were attempting to develop a compromise. 
 
¶11.  (C) Echoing a complaint voiced earlier by chief T/C 
 
NICOSIA 00000333  003 OF 003 
 
 
negotiator Ozdil Nami, Talat criticized Greek Cypriot 
under-preparedness for the economic discussion.  "They are 
disorganized," he argued, and had moved from positions they 
earlier had tabled during the preparatory phase of 
negotiations (Note:  G/Cs make the same accusations toward 
Turkish Cypriots.  UN participants in the economics-related 
meetings confirm the T/Cs have been able to use G/Cs' lack of 
coordination to shift the agenda.)  Talat claimed the sides 
had agreed last summer to assign development policy to the 
constituent states.  Now, however, Greek Cypriots sought to 
make it a federal competency.  "Perhaps Christofias is 
motivated by his love for Soviet-style 5-year plans," the T/C 
leader laughed.  Concluding the meeting, Talat repeated his 
hope that the first read of the core negotiating topics and a 
second, gaps-bridging phase would be completed by summer's 
end, allowing the leaders to begin horsetrading in September. 
 
--------------------- 
Limnitis Hits the Fan 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Greek Cypriot television interrupted regular 
programming at 1245 hrs local May 21, less than three hours 
after the leaders meeting commenced, to cut to the 
Presidential Palace .  There, an upset Christofias voiced 
great disappointment with Talat, "who was tabling new demands 
for Limnitis's opening every time we meet." (Note:  Downer 
subsequently confirmed to the Ambassador that Talat had 
insisted that T/C military units be permitted to use the 
crossing for troop rotation.)  Follow-on reports from Pyrgos 
showed the G/C mukhtar and village leaders promising more 
dynamic measures, such as the closing of the main BZ crossing 
at Astromeritis, to publicize their plight. 
 
¶13.  (C) Downer telephoned the Ambassador at 1300 hrs with 
news the Christofias-Talat tete-a-tete had been disastrous. 
The Greek Cypriot leader had emerged from the leaders' room 
silent, Downer recounted, but became enraged almost 
immediately over the private Limnitis discussion. 
Christofias calmed slightly, but no substantive discussions 
on the economy chapter took place and the larger meeting 
broke early.  UN staff did manage to schedule another leaders 
meeting in one week, but all involved worried that the recent 
dust-up could prove serious.  At 1600 hrs, the Ambassador and 
UK High Commissioner Peter Millett engaged Downer for a 
more-detailed readout of the day's events meeting and an 
urgent brainstorming session aiming to avoid a slow-down in 
the talks (septel). 
Urbancic