VZCZCXRO9167
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0332/01 1401416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201416Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9876
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1451
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000332 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  HARD-LINE HOUSE SPEAKER UNBOWED, 
PESSIMISTIC 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Cypriot House Speaker and DIKO party leader 
Marios Karoyian voiced his desire for closer relations 
between the U.S. and Cypriot legislatures during a May 19 
meeting with the Ambassador.  As such, he felt great 
disappointment when two high-profile Members of Congress 
visited Cyprus earlier this year and did not call on him. 
Changing subjects, Karoyian offered that Cyprus Problem 
settlement talks were not proceeding to his liking, owing 
mainly to Turkish intransigence and unrealistic Turkish 
Cypriot negotiating positions that favored confederation over 
federation.  Greek Cypriots would willingly compromise, he 
added, but not on issues of principle such as the 
functionality of the unified government and the 
inadmissibility of negotiating timetables.  In avoiding 
mention of continuing DIKO support for Christofias, Karoyian 
lent weight to rumors of growing discord within the 
coalition.  He ended the conversation by predicting a 
better-than-most-assume result for his party in the upcoming 
European Parliament elections.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Speaker's Feelings Hurt Over Alleged Congressional Snub 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2.  (C) House Speaker Marios Karoyian in mid-April sent a 
letter to the Ambassador in which he criticized the Embassy 
for not scheduling meetings between him and visiting U.S. 
legislators, such as Senator Richard Durbin (who came in 
February) and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard 
Berman (March).  Rather than replying in kind and risk 
Karoyian leaking our message and framing it negatively, the 
Ambassador on May 19 called on him for a discussion of this 
and other matters.  The Ambassador expressed his continued 
intention to foster dialogue between the Embassy and the 
Cypriot House, as well as his desire to increase contacts 
between the Cypriot legislature and the U.S. House of 
Representatives and Senate.  Such efforts already seemed to 
be succeeding, evidenced by the greater frequency of U.S. 
Congressional visits to the island as compared to prior 
years.  The Cypriot House Foreign Affairs Committee's 
last-second decision to cancel an Embassy-organized 
late-April visit to Washington and New York represented an 
unfortunate development in the effort to build legislative 
bridges, however. 
 
¶3. (C) Karoyian, who Embassy contacts claim had worked to 
kill the House FAC trip for personal reasons, did not take 
the bait and ignored mention of the canceled trip.  Rather, 
he voiced great disappointment and even hurt that U.S. 
legislators had made Cyprus stops without engaging him 
formally.  Whether deliberate or not, the "snubs" had caused 
him image problems, with local media questioning why the two 
Americans had called on opposition figures but not on the 
second-ranking official in the Cypriot government.  The 
Ambassador reminded Karoyian that the Congress is a separate 
and co-equal branch of government.  The Members of Congress 
have tremendous demands on their time, and they had made 
known the agenda they wished to pursue on the island.  It was 
simply impossible to schedule calls on every high-level RoC 
official. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Little Convergence on Issues of Substance 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Karoyian turned next to the Cyprus Problem, 
presenting a predictably pessimistic view on progress 
achieved in the settlement negotiations.  Based on regular 
briefings from President Christofias and chief negotiator 
George Iacovou -- Karoyian emphasized he played no direct 
role in the talks and had no firsthand information, appearing 
troubled by that fact -- the sides had reached convergence 
only on issues of secondary importance.  True, Christofias 
and Turkish Cypriot leaders had completed the first read 
through the governance and power sharing, property, EU 
matters, and most of the economy chapters, but they had left 
the toughest issues unresolved.  The going would get even 
tougher once the talks turned to territory and 
security/guarantees. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
As Usual, Problem is Turkey, Turkey, Turkey 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) In those chapters, Turkey's red lines would grow even 
darker, Karoyian predicted.  Ankara already was negatively 
 
NICOSIA 00000332  002 OF 003 
 
 
influencing the discussions on topics unrelated to its 
interests on the island; in those areas where its equities 
would be directly affected -- withdrawal of its "occupation" 
army, for example, or repatriation of "settlers," Turkey 
would dig in deeper.  "Ankara must determine that it is time 
to settle Cyprus once and for all," Karoyian argued. 
Currently its leaders spouted empty promises of support for a 
bizonal, bicommunal federation on the island, yet tabled 
proposals -- via their Turkish Cypriot proxies -- that aimed 
to create a confederation at best.  Even Talat had admitted 
to Christofias that he was under severe pressure from Ankara 
not to cross Turkish red lines, Karoyian alleged. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Talks Commenced Without Ground Sufficiently Prepared 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Karoyian tread familiar DIKO ground in arguing, 
without using former President Tassos Papadopoulos's exact 
words, that the ground had not been sufficiently prepared to 
commence formal negotiations.  The "Turkish side" did not 
speak the same language as Greek Cypriots, he surmised, nor 
did it share the G/Cs' vision for a unified Cyprus. 
Political equality, for example, meant to the T/Cs equal 
numerical representation in federal structures, an outcome no 
G/C could accept.  Karoyian related that one week earlier, he 
had traveled to Bratislava to commemorate the 20th 
anniversary of bi-communal Cypriot political party 
gatherings, an initiative of the then-Czechoslovakian 
government (and now carried out by the local Slovak mission). 
 There, Turkish Cypriot leaders such as Ferdi Soyer (CTP) and 
Serdar Denktash (DP) espoused their goal of crafting a weak 
federal government and strong constituent states -- 
"essentially a confederation," Karoyian reckoned.  Cyprus was 
too small to be divided in that way. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Ready to Compromise, but Not on Issues of Principle 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Greek Cypriots recognized they would not achieve all 
they sought in the negotiations, Karoyian assured. 
Compromises could be made, but not on issues of principle. 
Any solution must be functional, for example, and not lead to 
deadlocks (Note:  "functional" is G/C code for governance 
free from special majorities and other, ethnic-based decision 
models).  Timetables over negotiations must be avoided at all 
costs, Karoyian continued, with the pace of negotiations 
being dictated by the "quality" of Turkish Cypriot proposals 
and their acceptance of "common language" as defined by 
Security Council resolutions and international law. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Ambassador:  Some Positions Turkey's, Most Turkish Cypriot 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador rebutted Karoyian's hard-line, 
anti-Turkey message and put forward a more optimistic picture 
of CyProb developments.  Ankara did not appear to be 
dictating positions to Talat on issues such as 
governance/power sharing and property that primarily 
concerned Turkish Cypriots' relations with Greek Cypriots. 
Clearly the T/Cs approached governance from a different angle 
than G/Cs, still harboring fears of Greek domination.  Were 
they to obtain stronger powers for the constituent states, 
they likely would back off on their demands for near-equal 
representation in the federal government.  These appeared to 
be uniquel T/C concerns, the Ambassador observed, not Turkish 
ones. 
 
¶9.  (C) When the talks turned to territory and security, 
Ankara would play a greater role, owing to its status as a 
guarantor power.  At that point, the U.S. would be willing to 
utilize its contacts and influence in Turkey in furtherance 
of a settlement, he assured.  The task at hand, however, was 
for the Cypriot leaders first to find convergence on the 
"domestic" CyProb issues.  Here again, the U.S. would be 
willing to lend its good offices to help bridge gaps, were 
the sides to seek our support.  The progress the leaders had 
achieved so far, and their still-excellent personal rapport 
-- should not be discounted, the Ambassador noted. 
 
--------------------------------- 
EP Elections:  Expects 2004 Redux 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Karoyian last mentioned his DIKO party's prospects 
in the June 6 European Parliamentary (EP) elections. 
 
NICOSIA 00000332  003 OF 003 
 
 
Cyprus's six seats likely would fall to Communist AKEL (two), 
right-wing DISY (two), DIKO and EDEK.  Recent polling that 
would be published imminently showed DIKO garnering 16-17 
percent, a repeat of its performance in 2004 (Note:  most 
Embassy contacts predict a much lower DIKO haul, although 
still enough to win an EP seat).  Such a performance 
satisfied party leadership, Karoyian added, especially 
considering the internal bickering and power struggles lately 
plaguing the party. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) On CyProb substance, Karoyian emitted a familiar G/C 
complaint:  were only the Turks to loosen Talat's leash, 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots -- "one people," after 
all -- could quickly do a deal.  His Turkey bashing and 
insistence the G/C side make no more "concessions" likely 
will spike further in the two weeks before EP elections in 
hopes of energizing the nationalist DIKO base.  Of greater 
interest was what Karoyian did not say in the meeting.  With 
rumors flying over growing discord amongst DIKO factions and 
the coalition parties, not once did he assure the Ambassador 
that DIKO would remain with Christofias.  Further, his 
clarification that the party did not take active part in the 
talks and instead submitted proposals in a formal fashion 
hinted at growing distance from Christofias and his inner 
circle. 
Urbancic