VZCZCXRO7661
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0327/01 1390800
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 190800Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9867
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1448
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE 0057

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TU CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UN'S DOWNER SUGGESTS SUBTLE NUDGING OF 
GREEK CYPRIOTS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 257 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 306 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  "Greek Cypriots (G/Cs) must develop a sense 
that the status quo is over," UN Special Adviser Alexander 
Downer confided to the Ambassador during their May 15 
meeting.  Downer suggested that a low-key discussion on the 
future of UNFICYP might help break the G/Cs of their 
perception that failure in the current round of settlement 
negotiations had no real downside.  Regarding the stalled 
opening of the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point, the UN 
envoy said he had unsuccessfully urged Turkish Cypriot (T/C) 
leader Mehmet Ali Talat to accept a G/C counter-offer 
conceding the main T/C demand (electricity to the Turkish 
Cypriot Kokkina enclave) but refusing a minor one (overland 
supply of a limited amount of fuel).  On the negotiations in 
general, Downer wanted to achieve real progress this summer 
on executive branch governance and power-sharing (a key area 
of disagreement) to give Talat the confidence to show 
flexibility in other chapters.  He welcomed the appointment 
of Ahmet Davutoglu as Turkey's foreign minister and hoped the 
influence of Turkish MFA CyProb hard-liners would wane. 
Downer was equally optimistic regarding the upcoming Swedish 
EU presidency, especially after a "lackluster" Czech term. 
Regarding the other P-5 members, he sought to capitalize on 
perceived Turkish-Russian rapprochement to convince Moscow to 
adopt a less militantly pro-G/C outlook, and planned to visit 
Russia in June.  The UN envoy was noncommittal in response to 
the Ambassador's multiple suggestions that he spend more time 
on-island.  End Summary. 
 
"Greek Cypriots need to be worried" 
 
¶2. (C) Downer voiced concern that unless Greek Cypriots 
understood that failure of the present negotiations carried 
real costs, they would not be inclined to make the necessary 
compromises to ink a deal.  "They need to be worried that 
this is a new game," he said.  The best approach, he said, 
was to begin to voice subtle rumblings regarding the future 
of UNFICYP, with an eye toward possible changes in the 
December renewal.  Downer praised a recent comment to this 
effect by the U.S. PermRep in New York.  He warned, however, 
that such hints must be delivered with the greatest finesse; 
otherwise, the Greek Cypriots "would go feral."  Downer 
revealed that President Demetris Christofias had earlier told 
him that he would not be "blackmailed" by the possibility of 
an UNFICYP non-renewal and would abandon the talks if that 
were to occur.  The Ambassador said that the USG would work 
to support Downer and agreed on the need for a coordinated 
tack with the UK.  The reaction of the Hellenic lobby in 
Washington would have to be figured into this strategy as 
well, he added, concurring that the May renewal was not the 
time actually to draw down the force. 
 
"UNFICYP renewal process fine this time" 
 
¶3. (C) Downer said that his April 30 oral brief to the 
Security Council and the resulting Council Presidential 
Statement (PRST) had been satisfactory, and that the 
just-underway UNFICYP renewal process was proceeding well. 
Aside from "keeping pressure on the Greek Cypriots" regarding 
UNFICYP, he needed no additional USG support in the May 
rollover exercise.  Downer ventured that the language of the 
PRST should be put to use in the rollover resolution, 
especially its references to "expectations of significant 
progress" in the negotiations.  He had discussed the draft 
UNFICYP report with Talat in their May 15 meeting, in which 
he previewed UNFICYP's change of semantics in referring to 
Turkish Cypriots' isolation (from "sense of isolation" 
"feeling of isolation" -- Talat was supportive) and noted 
that the report would mention Turkish hindrance of UNFICYP 
access/activity in the north, while noting improvements in 
recent weeks. 
 
Turkish Cypriots need to strike deal on Limnitis/Yesilirmak 
 
¶4. (C) Downer next mentioned continuing difficulties in 
opening the Limnitis/Yesilirmak buffer zone crossing.  He had 
recommended that Talat drop his continuing demands to send 
small amounts of fuel (for three vehicles) overland to 
Kokkina, especially since Christofias apparently had 
accepted, after much hesitation, the main UN compromise that 
G/Cs run electricity to the T/C military base/enclave in 
Kokkina in exchange for opening the crossing.  Downer 
informed that after the leaders had debated Limnitis at their 
meeting on May 14, the UN urged the "unrelenting" T/C leader 
to "cut his losses" and announce its future opening.  Downer 
sensed that Ankara was behind Talat's hard line on Limnitis; 
he planned to raise the issue in his meetings with Davutoglu 
and the MFA on May 18. (Comment: Embassy officers got the 
same all-or-nothing attitude on fuel to Kokkina from T/C 
negotiator Ozdil Nami at a May 14 meeting.)  Ambassador 
encouraged Downer to pursue that line in his upcoming 
meetings in Ankara May 18-19. 
 
Talat in Reasonable Spirits 
 
¶5. (C) Talat's spirits were "not too bad," Downer gauged, 
somewhat surprising after late April's twin blows: the T/C 
leader's CTP party's electoral defeat on April 19, and the 
European Court of Justice's verdict in the Orams property 
case a week later.  Downer reported that, despite the losses, 
Talat was behaving "reasonably" in the negotiations and was 
repeating his desire to reach the referendum stage by the end 
of 2009 or early 2010.  T/Cs had even agreed to work during 
part of the August vacation period.  While careful not to set 
specific deadlines, Downer hoped that both sides would soon 
finish a first reading of all negotiating chapters and return 
to "governance and power sharing" before the summer break. 
The sides should be able to cover quickly the two outstanding 
topics, "territory" and "security," as the distance between 
their positions could only be bridged in the subsequent "give 
and take" period.  (Note:  G/C sources claim they will also 
insist the leaders tackle another chapter, provisionally 
titled "Migration," dealing primarily with Turkish "settlers" 
on the island.)  Downer said Talat had agreed with his 
observation that T/Cs would be more flexible in negotiating 
other chapters were they first to obtain the political 
equality in the federal government that they so desperately 
sought. 
 
"Don't want to lose time on CBMs" 
 
¶6. (C) Downer claimed he did not want to lose a lot of time 
on 22 already-agreed confidence building measures (CBMs), 
whose full implementation has been stalled largely over G/C 
fears of "upgrading" the north.  He pointedly asked one of 
his aides to investigate the present state of allowing 
ambulances from both sides to cross the Green Line freely, 
which to date has been stymied by a G/C refusal to purchase 
insurance coverage for the north.  (Note: Downer's aide 
reported on May 16 that the insurance issue had been resolved 
and that ambulances should be able to cross in the next day 
or two.) 
 
"Recent events not all bad" 
 
¶7. (C) Downer aimed to capitalize on the recent appointment 
of Ahmet Davutoglu as Turkey's foreign minister and the 
upcoming Swedish EU Presidency in order to move the 
settlement process forward.  He hoped that the arrival of 
Davutoglu, the architect of Turkey's "zero problems with 
neighbors" policy, would result in waning influence on Cyprus 
for hard-line MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan.  (Note: Our 
pro-solution T/C contacts share the same hope.)  Downer 
expected an energetic Swedish EU presidency, especially 
needed after a "do-nothing" Czech one, and hoped to meet FM 
Carl Bildt soon -- although getting to Stockholm was 
"difficult." 
 
Getting Russian on board 
 
¶8. (C) Downer hoped he could utilize a perceived slight shift 
in Russia's Cyprus policy -- thanks to apparent 
Russian-Turkish rapprochement on energy and Armenia -- to 
weaken Moscow's hitherto slavishly pro-G/C stance.  According 
to rumors Downer relayed, Putin supported a more balanced 
Russian approach on Cyprus, while the Foreign Ministry 
continued to argue for traditional pro-Greek Cypriot 
policies.  Downer noted that he planned to visit Moscow in 
late June. 
 
Downer Non-committal about spending more time on island 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador recommended strongly that Downer spend 
more time on the island in order to be able to defuse unseen 
crises.  The U.S. and UK had had to engage in urgent triage 
after the Orams-ECJ crisis, but simply could not fill 
Downer's shoes owing to G/C suspicions over "Anglo-American" 
motives.  The UN envoy praised the Ambassador and British 
High Commissioner Peter Millett for their efforts to calm 
Talat and keep him at the negotiating table in the aftermath 
of Orams.  In parrying the Ambassador's request, however, he 
joked that he already lived "in a wonderful country 
(Australia)."  Downer did regret his absence at the May 14 
leaders' meeting, where Christofias and Talat had battled 
inconclusively over Limnitis.  He would remain in the region 
until June 3, his time on the island punctuated by trips to 
Ankara and Athens, then return to Cyprus after a short 
vacation. 
Urbancic