VZCZCXRO8833
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0306/01 1271417
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071417Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9839
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1443
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000306 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UN CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  UNFICYP CHIEF POSITIVELY GRADES SECURITY 
 
COUNCIL BRIEFING 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 301 
     ¶B. NAMI CABLES 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 257 
     ¶D. EMBASSY-EUR/SE-USUN EMAIL OF 5/4/09 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Readouts of UN Special Adviser Alexander 
Downer's April 30 briefing of the Security Council and of the 
May 5 meeting of Cypriot leaders Demetris Christofias and 
Mehmet Ali Talat dominated the Ambassador's May 6 tour 
d'horizon with UNFICYP chief Taye-Brook Zerihoun.  The 
Council had welcomed Downer's report on his Good Offices 
mission, Zerihoun reported, which presented a cautiously 
optimistic picture of progress achieved so far in the 
negotiations.  UNFICYP would offer a more detailed accounting 
of the settlement talks in its regular report, whose 
submission had been advanced to mid-May so as not to fall 
during the Turkish UNSC presidency.  While the report would 
cite prior instructions from the Security Council to keep 
UNFICYP's size and structure in line with developments on the 
ground, it would not send a "stronger message" on the mandate 
so as not to alarm Greek Cypriots during this key phase of 
negotiations.  Positive atmospherics and continued 
determination to remain at the table had characterized the 
latest leaders meeting, Zerihoun stated, a welcome 
development in the highly-charged aftermath of the April 28 
Orams verdict from the European Court of Justice.  The 
UNFICYP leader discredited recent claims by the G/C 
negotiator that the proposed opening of the Limnitis Buffer 
Zone crossing was unrelated to a UN-proposed plan that 
envisaged Greek Cypriots providing electricity to the Turkish 
Cypriot military enclave in Kokkina.  Progress on Limnitis 
and other CBMs remained slow in coming, due mainly to G/C 
fears of "upgrading the TRNC."  On a positive note, Turkish 
and Turkish Cypriot military forces have softened 
restrictions on UNFICYP movement in the north.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Secretariat, P-5 Praise Good Offices Effort 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Mention of "cautious optimism" and "slow and steady 
progress" featured in each of Downer's New York briefings, 
Zerihoun offered.  While difficult issues remained, the 
Australian envoy had explained that the Cypriot leaders "were 
up to the task."  He had been careful not to push the 
Secretariat or Security Council for fixed negotiations 
timetables, considering them a distraction to the leaders and 
their constituencies and ultimately counterproductive.  That 
said, Downer had acknowledged that political "milestones" 
existed that would affect both the pace and substance of the 
talks, from the November/December Turkish EU accession review 
to T/C "presidential" elections in April 2010.  Zerihoun 
mentioned that Greek Cypriots continued to balk at 
"asphyxiating timetables," but even they recognized that 
talks could not continue forever. 
 
¶3.  (C) Downer's presentations had gone over well with all 
involved, including the U.S. PermRep, Zerihoun gauged.  While 
Zerihoun approved of the final text, he was frustrated with 
Turkey's attempts to alter its language in the deliberations 
period.  Even after its passage, the GoT PermRep had told him 
Turkey considered the text unbalanced, but had decided to 
support it in order to strengthen Downer's hand in the 
negotiations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Reporting Plan Stipulates Second Good Offices Brief 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Not having cleared the content of his UNSC briefing 
with the sides, Downer had felt compelled to stick with 
generalities, and the Council posed few questions in 
response.  The Good Offices mission would have a second 
chance to inform the international community of its progress 
in the upcoming UNFICYP report.  Zerihoun confirmed the 
report would be delivered to the Secretariat for clearances 
earlier than normal (his assistant later told us he intended 
to transmit the first draft on May 6).  Council consideration 
of the UNFICYP product, as well as deliberations over the 
UNSCR to roll over the mission's mandate, would occur 
on/about May 22 -- during the Russian Council presidency, at 
the behest of both Cyprus and Turkey.  The effective date for 
the roll-over would remain as before, however: June 16. 
 
¶5.  (C) Downer planned to present a follow-up Good Offices 
oral briefing to the Council in September, timing it to 
 
NICOSIA 00000306  002 OF 003 
 
 
coincide with the anniversary of this round of Cyprus 
negotiations (September 3).  Zerihoun hoped that by then, the 
sides would have completed the first pass through the core 
issues, made progress in bridging differences, and generally 
passed a "point of no return" in the process. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Reviewing Mandate and Force Structure a Constant 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador queried whether Downer sought a purely 
technical rollover or wished to send a message with the 
language that the status quo -- including UNFICYP's continued 
presence on the island, in its current guise -- was untenable 
long-term.  Zerihoun reacted somewhat defensively, lending 
credence to rumors that he and Downer differ on this point. 
The UN Secretary General had standing orders, most recently 
codified in a 2005 UNSCR, to review UNFICYP's mandate and 
force structure "in consultation with the parties, and based 
on observations from the field."  That said, Zerihoun 
contended it was dangerous to craft direct links between the 
Good Offices mission observations and the status of the 
peacekeeping force.  The fact that negotiations were 
proceeding apace did not relieve UNFICYP of its three-pillar 
mandate to prevent a recurrence of conflict, return the 
Buffer Zone to productive use, and foster a positive 
environment for settlement discussions.  An abrupt withdrawal 
of the blue helmets conceivably could trigger a collapse in 
all three pillars, he thought.  Further, DPKO planners in New 
York were actually deliberating a possible UNFICYP plus-up in 
the event of a settlement, in hopes of providing stability 
during the key transition period. 
 
¶7.  (C) Greek Cypriots would react negatively to changes in 
UNFICYP's force structure and/or mandate, Zerihoun reckoned. 
They would argue, rightly or wrongly, that the massive 
presence of Turkish troops on the island was the overriding 
reason for UNFICYP's presence; unless the Turks pulled out, 
the UN should stay.  At some future point, Zerihoun could 
envision a drastically-reduced UN presence on Cyprus and/or a 
change to a military observer mission.  In his upcoming 
report to the Council, he intended to parrot language from 
UNSCR 1642 (December 2005) that instructed the Secretary 
General to continue to assess mission requirements and report 
back to the Council with "recommendations as appropriate for 
further adjustments to UNFICYP's mandate, force levels, and 
concept of operations."  Such a tack should not spook the 
G/Cs much, he thought. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
T/C Tempers Cooler in Latest Leaders Meeting 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Zerihoun had yet to receive a complete readout of the 
leaders' May 5 meeting, which, unlike most earlier 
gatherings, occurred without UN staff at the table.  He 
understood the atmosphere in the room was less tense than 
expected, however, and agreed with the Ambassador that T/C 
fury over the April 28 Orams verdict (Refs A, B) was 
diminishing.  As reported in the press, Talat had sought 
Christofias's buy-in for a joint statement assuring that only 
a political settlement (and not a legal one like Orams) could 
resolve the complex property issue comprehensively.  The 
Greek Cypriot leader had refused, citing his own domestic 
audience.  Christofias was cognizant, however, that the 
Orams-related damage done to the T/C side could ricochet 
against Greek Cypriots and the settlement process if it led 
to hard-liner new "TRNC PM" Dervis Eroglu winning the 
"presidency" in 2010.  Christofias also had agreed on May 5 
to a more robust negotiating schedule, at least in the 
short-term.  Before the next leaders meeting (May 14), which 
Zerihoun hoped UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer would 
attend, negotiators George Iacovou and Ozdil Nami would meet 
at least three times to tackle economic issues. 
 
¶9.  (C) Despite the positive atmospherics on May 5, Turkish 
Cypriots continued to display a near-complete lack of trust 
in their G/C counterparts, Zerihoun lamented.  Their fear of 
eventual absorption by the more-numerous G/Cs continued to 
dictate their negotiating positions, which often stipulated a 
need for formal agreements, EU Acquis derogations, or MOUs 
between the communities on various negotiating topics.  If 
anything, the recent Orams verdict and T/Cs' resultant 
heartburn that G/Cs were prepared to challenge elements of 
the solution in international courts would create even deeper 
suspicions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
NICOSIA 00000306  003 OF 003 
 
 
Limnitis Opening and Kokkina Compromise Always Linked 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador next raised the proposed Limnitis 
Buffer Zone crossing, noting incredulously that G/C 
negotiator Iacovou two days earlier had insisted that the 
crossing's opening and a UN-brokered compromise on 
electricity for the Kokkina military enclave were not linked 
(Ref D).  Christofias had offered the electrical hook-up to 
the T/Cs as an unrelated "humanitarian gesture," Iacovou had 
explained, that was currently under debate in the RoC 
National Council (NC).  Zerihoun believed that Christofias 
had accepted the Limnitis-Kokkina arrangement in principle, 
but for domestic political reasons could not allow it to be 
portrayed as quid-pro-quo or another G/C concession.  In the 
UN's eyes, the two had always been linked.  Further, the 
Greek Cypriot leader -- whose political courage Zerihoun 
continued to question -- likely wanted to absolve himself of 
responsibility for the decision by punting it to the NC. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
CBMs Still Stalled, Recognition Issues to Blame 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶11.  (C) Despite a gaudy public announcement three weeks 
earlier, Zerihoun admitted that progress was scant on 
implementation of other confidence-building measures that 
were first envisioned in July/August 2008.  Ambulances had 
not begun to transit the Green Line unencumbered; G/Cs 
ambulance owners were refusing to obtain T/C insurance to 
travel north, and the RoC was insisting that not only 
ambulance drivers but EMTs as well be "true Turkish Cypriots" 
(and not mainland "settlers.")  Zerihoun considered these 
explanations window-dressing, however, with the actual 
hold-up stemming from G/C fears that the RoC could not 
implement CBMs without engaging "official" T/Cs, which they 
considered tantamount to recognizing the "TRNC." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Building Support for Solution Requires Grass Roots Feeding 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Zerihoun next raised a pet project, which he 
admitted remained a work-in-progress:  improving Greek 
Cypriots' perception of Ankara and Turks in general.  G/Cs 
viewed Turkey as the source of all evil in Cyprus, he 
explained; without greater trust between the two peoples, 
long-term success of any settlement looked doomed.  Zerihoun 
sought to establish a type of "Track II" diplomacy on the 
island, perhaps as an offshoot of the bi-communal (T/C and 
G/C) programming the UN and others in the international 
community conducted.  These programs held "psychological 
value," he explained, and had delivered positive results in 
other conflict zones where he had served, such as Rwanda and 
Mozambique.  Acknowledging the Ambassador's concern that 
efforts to bring Turks and G/Cs together should not bypass 
Turkish Cypriots -- a deeply-held T/C fear, since G/Cs openly 
claim their true interlocutor on many elements of the CyProb 
is Ankara -- Zerihoun agreed that the campaign would require 
judicious stewardship so as not to become counter-productive. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Turkish Restrictions on UNFICYP Movement Diminish 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶13.  (C) Turkish Army and Turkish Cypriot Security Forces 
restrictions over UNFICYP movement in the north had become so 
problematic (Ref C) that Zerihoun sought New York's 
assistance, he confided, with the UN Political Undersecretary 
subsequently summoning the Turkish PermRep for discussions; 
news of the meeting had reached the north and had angered 
Turks and T/Cs alike.  T/C negotiator and Talat confidant 
Nami recently had assured Zerihoun that "matters are now 
resolved," and UNFICYP had noticed an improvement in their 
freedom of movement.  Zerihoun worried, however, that the 
local Turkish commander had ordered more lenient treatment 
solely to obtain more favorable mention in the upcoming 
UNFICYP report.  An account would be made of the numerous 
restrictions, the UN diplomat assured, although the report's 
observations section might take note of the recently-improved 
climate. 
Urbancic