VZCZCXRO8783
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0305/01 1271238
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071238Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9836
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1440
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE AND IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS TALKS AND THE ORAMS CASE: CRISIS 
AVERTED,TALKS TO INTENSIFY 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 257 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 301 
 
Classified By: AMB F URBANCIC FOR REASON 1.5 B AND D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. On May 5, the first meeting between the Greek 
Cypriot(GC) and Turkish Cypriot(TC) leaders since the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) made known its decision in 
the Orams property case went well, according to Turkish 
Cypriot (TC) lead negotiator Ozdil Nami. TC Leader Talat 
stood up to domestic pressure to walk away from the talks, 
but settlement skeptisism in the north continues grow. The 
TCs are pushing for the talks to conclude by end-2009 and 
proposed a timetable Republic of Cyprus (RoC) President 
Christofias says he can meet, if his TC counterparts are 
"more flexible." Talat and Christofias agreed to have their 
negotiators meet more frequently to generate the increased 
momentum called for in the April 30 UNSC presidential 
statement. The talks were close to melt down prior to the May 
5 Leaders meeting.  If they had fallen apart, the only actor 
in a position to save them would have been UNSA Alexander 
Downer - currently in Australia until on/about May 18.  There 
will be more bumps on the road in these talks.  Unless Downer 
is present here much more time at least in June-July and from 
September until the end, we believe: 
 
1) It will be very difficult to finish the talks by years' 
end; and 
 
2)  Some bump down the road could quash the talks irreparably 
while Downer is away. 
 
End Summary. 
 
¶3. (C) A surprisingly upbeat Ozdil Nami told the DCM on May 5 
that a meeting earlier in the day between the leaders and 
their chief negotiators "went well" and that "the (Orams) 
crisis is avoided for now." The Leaders' meeting was unusual 
as no UN representative was present - just the leaders, their 
chief negotiators and Christofias' interpreter (his 
son-in-law to be).  Nami said the leaders evaluated the Orams 
decision and conducted an overview of the negotiations.  The 
problem now was less the substance of the discussions than 
public opinion in the wake of Orams- sagging in the TC 
Community and gloating among the GCs.  While Talat could not 
get Christofias to make a joint statement on the need to 
settle property issues at the negotiating table rather than 
through individual lawsuits (not wanting to "dilute" the ECJ 
judgment), Nami believed Christofias did promise to make his 
own statement to that effect. (Christofias told the press on 
May 5 that the Orams decision "confirms the correctness of 
the GC position" but also said that property issues will 
continue to be discussed at the negotiations.) 
 
Need to Manage Public Opinion, On Both Sides 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C ) Talat asked Christofias to stop publicly claiming 
Orams as a victory vindicating GC views on property, given 
the growing settlement skepticism among the TC public (most 
recently reflected by the hardline UBP victory in April 19 
"parliamentary" elections).  This was unhelpful, Nami said. 
The TCs basically agreed with the GCs on individual ownership 
rights (and had a functioning mechanism- the "property 
commission" - that had already restituted land to several 
GCs).  The ECJ ruling is not about that, he said. It is about 
the EU's right to have an RoC court ruling applied in the UK 
- which is consistent with EU regulations.  The TCs told 
Christofias their problem is not the ECJ ruling.  It was the 
impact on public opinion.  TCs are losing confidence in the 
talks and do not trust that the GCs are making a good faith 
effort at the negotiating table because they see GCs going 
around the process via the courts.  This was undermining the 
talks.  Christofias agreed that court cases and lawsuits were 
not the way to move forward and responded that the ECJ 
decision actually makes his life more difficult as well, as 
GC hardliners will even more closely question any concessions 
he makes to the TC side, GC expectations about the final 
shape of a settlement may now be even more unrealistic, Nami 
said. 
 
Talks to "Intensify" 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Nami reported that Christofias and Iacovou agreed to 
TC pleas to "intensify" the rate of the talks in order to 
re-establish momentum. Nami and Iacovou will meet May 6 and 
three times the following week, and Nami hopes this means 
that the leaders will also meet more frequently (the next 
leaders meeting is scheduled for May 14). Talat told 
Christofias his target is to finish a first reading of all 
the issues by early June, review progress and narrow 
differences through July, take August off, then start the 
give and take in September with completion and referenda by 
December, and that he wanted to agree on a framework to meet 
that timeline. Christofias rejected any framework but agreed 
to increase momentum and said this schedule was achievable 
"if you (the TCs) show flexibility." Nami noted that 
Christofias did not seem well prepared for the meeting (he 
appeared not to have studied or been briefed on some 
technical aspects of working level talks that required his 
support  - which he was reluctant to give - resulting in 
taking the leaders' time going over the technical details). 
Nami said it was clearly not just flexibility by both sides 
that was needed, but also a greater GC willingness and 
commitment to do the hard work, including their own internal 
preparation for such meetings, needed to bring things 
together. 
 
Downer Needs to be Here 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Nami said the TCs used the April 30 United Nations 
Security Council Presidential Statement (PRST) to support 
their call for an "increase in the momentum of the 
negotiations." That reference to the PRST language apparently 
infuriated Christofias who railed against "foreign 
interference", apparently naming certain individuals-which 
ones Nami didn't say- and insisting he didn't care what 
outsiders, say, do or want.  Nami also told us he believed 
that Downer needed to spend more time on island, and ideally 
be resident here, to prod the parties along, and that he had 
told Downer so when they spoke on May 4.  "His presence 
helps" Nami told us emphatically. 
 
Eroglu On Side, So Far 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (C ) When asked about newly-elected "TRNC Prime Minister" 
Dervis Eroglu's desire to have a representative in the 
settlement negotiations, Nami said Talat had told Eroglu that 
he, Talat, was and would remain in charge of the talks for 
the TCs.  There is a system for briefing the "government" 
leadership on the talks, Nami explained,  and it would be 
used for Eroglu's benefit as it had been for his predecessor. 
 Eroglu is apparently willing to go along with this for now. 
The briefing on the May 5 session will be something of a test 
case.  Nami knows well and likes the new "foreign minister" 
(Huseyn Ozgurgun), whom he pointed out the Embassy had sent 
to the U.S. on a Visitors Program, and expected to work well 
with him.  He said he hoped Ozgurgun's appointment was a sign 
that Eroglu did not want to be disruptive to the talks. 
 
¶8. (C ) Nami said that Talat greatly appreciated the good 
will shown by the US in the invitation to meet Secretary 
Clinton. Nami suggested that more progress could be made and 
TC attitudes towards the talks improve if the P-5 "took a 
more unified approach." He also suggested that early 
discussion of a donor's conference to fund the cost of a 
settlement would help make a positive outcome a more 
realistic prospect to TCs. He recommended "turn up the heat" 
on the GCs by telling Christofias that while there may be no 
time table, there was a clear trend.  Without a solution, 
Talat would be replaced as leader next April by a hardliner 
(probably Eroglu), and the talks would end.  He urged us to 
use the "very helpful, excellent language" from the April 30 
UNSC PRST to stress that we expect "decisive progress in the 
near future" and for the talks to conclude this year. 
 
Christofias Refuses to Acknowledge "Progress" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Nami remains frustrated by Christofias' slow and 
careful approach, and his unwillingness to say positive 
things about the talks in public.  For example, Nami related 
with exasperation that Christofias refused to use the word 
"progress" in the statements worked on May 5.  The TCs had 
wanted to note the "good progress" of the talks, but 
Christofias would only agree to "work done".  Talat replied 
"you are the president, you should be more forceful!" 
Christofias then told Talat "I have my problems.  Respect my 
situation."  Nami also objected to the GC side's continuing 
tactics of preventing visiting dignitaries from meeting with 
Talat in his office, attacking Turkey (Nami said it is silly 
for the GCs to blame Turkey for inability to agree on 
arrangements for electing the federal executive or on 
property.  "All Turkey cares about are security and 
guarantees," and those issues have not been touched yet), and 
inhibiting the EU assistance program. Nami said that the 
Orams decision had been a heavy blow from which it took the 
TCs a couple of days to recover.  Talat now agrees that talks 
must proceed. "The problem is" said Nami, "we don't know how 
many more blows like this we can absorb." 
 
¶10. (C) Comment: The Orams decision pushed the Cyprus talks 
to the brink of a crisis, with Talat already smarting from 
rejection in local polls and now under pressure from the 
newly elected UBP leadership to leave the talks.  Strong 
support from the U.S., the UK and Downer helped keep him at 
the table.  However, the TCs are badly battered and Talat, 
while still personally popular, is losing TC public support 
for the negotiations as GCs continue to claim EU has 
vindicated their position on property. Nami believes that we 
and the rest of the P-5 should usethe April 30 UNSC PRST to 
"challenge the leaders to move faster" and start talking 
about "concrete targets" as a means of"turning up the heat on 
both sides" without pushing the GC Cypriot hot button of 
"asphyxiating timetables." 
 
¶11. (C) Comment continued:  Most importantly, UN Special 
Advisor Downer needs to spend more time on the island. His 
presence during this crisis could have lowered the pressure 
on Talat, provided a neutral voice the media could turn to 
for comment and reassured TC public opinion.   There needs to 
be a neutral party both sides can turn to at critical moments 
who can take decisive corrective action, and there is no one 
else who can fill that role in Cyprus. Ambassador Urbancic 
will raise these issues with Downer when the SYGSA returns 
tot he island.  End Comment and ACTION REQUEST. 
 
 
Urbancic