VZCZCXRO8350
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0301/01 1270720
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 070720Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9830
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1438

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000301 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER SHAKEN BY ECJ 
DECISION 
 
REF: A. 08 NICOSIA 985 
     ¶B. MACRIS-NETOS APRIL 28 E-MAIL 
     ¶C. PANICO-FITZPATRICK APRIL 30 E-MAIL 
     ¶D. MONTREAL 128 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  "The European Court of Justice (ECJ) broke 
our hands and legs with the Orams decision," Turkish Cypriot 
leader Mehmet Ali Talat told the Ambassador on May 4.  A 
demoralized Talat complained that the April 28 ECJ ruling 
(Ref B) had strengthened the Greek Cypriot (G/C) negotiating 
position that the original, legal owner has the ultimate 
right to enjoy the property as he chooses.  Talat argued that 
the decision blindly had ignored the need to find a political 
solution at the negotiating table, not in the courts.  He 
feared that Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias would 
now be loath to make concessions on his position on property, 
fearing a backlash from his own populace and fractious 
government.  The T/C leader confided to the Ambassador that 
he was still evaluating his next steps, but warned he could 
not continue with the negotiations "as if nothing had 
happened."  The Ambassador urged Talat to stay engaged, 
adding it would be a huge mistake not to continue with the 
present UN-brokered talks.  He also told Talat that he would 
urge the Greek Cypriots to redouble their efforts to find a 
political, not legal, solution to the property question.  End 
Summary. 
 
"EU threw a bomb in the negotiating room" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In the aftermath of the landmark Orams decision, the 
Ambassador met Talat to gauge the T/C leader's bearing and 
ping him on next steps.  A downbeat Talat allowed that the 
long-feared April 28 ECJ ruling was "very damaging."  Its 
provision effectively allowing thousands of Greek Cypriot 
property owners to seize the non-Cyprus-based assets of EU 
citizens who own property in the north with "TRNC" title 
deeds had strengthened the G/C negotiating position on 
property, which calls for the original owners to use the 
property as they see fit.  The ruling would undermine the 
fundamental Turkish Cypriot (T/C) demand for a mixed property 
regime (return, exchange, and compensation) crucial to 
prevent the numerically smaller Turkish Cypriot community 
from being swamped by a flood of Greek Cypriot returnees. 
Talat also predicted that the UK High Court -- which still 
must issue a decision, based partially on the ECJ input -- 
would ultimately rule in favor of the Greek Cypriot plaintiff 
Apostolides, although he hoped it might postpone the decision. 
 
¶3. (C) The T/C leader expressed anger that EU member states 
showed little concern for the political repercussions the 
case would have on the negotiations.  Further, the ECJ had 
ignored the intervention of the European Commission, which 
had tried to highlight the political fallout to the peace 
process a solely law-based decision might generate.  The EU, 
Talat griped, "had thrown a bomb in the negotiating room." 
He also expressed anger at the British government over the 
process that had led to the Orams verdict -- despite 
high-ranking UK officials, including the High Commissioner in 
Nicosia, having announced that the Cyprus problem could only 
be solved through the present negotiating process. 
 
"ECJ will make Christofias even more intransigent on property" 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The ECJ decision, Talat said, would make Christofias 
"even more intransigent."  He feared the G/C leader would not 
be able to show the flexibility needed to hammer out a 
property regime acceptable to T/Cs, i.e., one that contained 
a mix of return, exchange, and compensation.  Talat said that 
Christofias and his team were already gloating that the 
rights of the original property owner had been vindicated. 
Hereafter, the G/Cs would simply table proposals in line with 
the Orams ruling. 
 
"I can't continue to negotiatie as if nothing has changed." 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Talat told the Ambassador he was still evaluating his 
next steps in light of the ruling, although he repeatedly 
acknowledged that negotiations were the only manner of 
reuniting the divided island.  He bluntly stated he could not 
continue as if nothing had happened, however.   Talat said he 
had spoken by telephone with UNSG Special Adviser Alexander 
Downer, who is away the island until May 18.  Downer had 
expressed sympathy and, according to Talat, understood the 
damage done to the process by Orams.  (Note: T/C lead 
negotiator Ozdil Nami canceled an April 30 meeting with his 
G/C counterpart George Iacovou, claiming that the Turkish 
Cypriots needed to develop a new policy post-Orams.  Talat 
and Christofias did meet on May 5, but instead of discussing 
economic issues as planned, they focused on the repercussions 
of the Orams case and on an overview of the work done so far 
in their talks.  Septel will report Nami's readout of the May 
5 leaders meeting.) 
 
¶6. (C) Turning to domestic politics, Talat said the five 
political parties represented in the T/C "parliament" were 
"suspect" regarding the negotiations.  Right-wing parties 
such as UBP (currently forming a "government") wanted to 
suspend or end the present process entirely.  While the left 
wanted to continue, all had lost faith in the negotiations. 
 
"Keep Moving Forward!" 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged the setback the Turkish 
Cypriots had suffered but underscored the U.S. belief that 
the negotiating process must continue; he urged Talat to 
"keep moving forward."  The Ambassador promised Talat that he 
would deliver the same message to the Greek Cypriots and 
would urge the UN and the UK to do the same.  Talat 
acknowledged the fundamental need for negotiations, but would 
not comment on his immediate strategy. 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador took advantage of the call to press 
Talat on a civil aviation matter that potentially threatens 
the safety of American citizens, raising the International 
Civil Aviation Organization's recent recommendation (Ref D) 
to establish a communications link between Larnaca and Ercan 
Airports' air traffic control centers in hopes of preventing 
cross-chatter and reducing the possibility of mid-air 
collisions.  Talat was skeptical of the compromise plan.  He 
claimed that the proposed routing of communications via 
Eurocontrol and Ankara would effectively imply that northern 
Cyprus was a "province" of Turkey. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  While Talat is clearly demoralized, we do 
not think he will leave the talks given a dearth of other 
positive options (our May 5 meeting with Nami bears this 
out.)  Given that Ankara supports the present round of 
negotiations, Talat likely will take no action more drastic 
than a tactical protest maneuver, largely to calm his own 
public.  We cannot discount the T/C leader's fear, however, 
that the Orams decision has limited Christofias's flexibility 
to deal on property; G/C hard-liners will protest loudly 
against any regime that radically differs from the precedent 
suggested by the ECJ ruling. 
Urbancic