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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6399
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000870 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR U/S BURNS, OSD FOR U/S FLOURNOY, DSCA FOR ADM. 
WIERINGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL MASS IN
SUBJECT: END USE MONITORING:  FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE TEXT 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 438 
     ¶B. 08 NEW DELHI 3265 
 
NEW DELHI 00000870  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter Burleigh.  Reasons: 1.4 (B and D 
). 
 
¶1.  (U)  This is an action request.  See para 7. 
 
¶2.  (C)  During the last several weeks, GOI officials have 
indicated a stronger interest in settling outstanding issues 
involving End Use Monitoring (EUM) language to be used in 
Letters of Agreement for defense sales.  We see an 
opportunity to discuss an acceptable text in a follow-on 
meeting after the May 11-12 Senior Technology Security Group 
meeting in Washington.  The goal would be to tee up a text 
that the GOI could review and approve immediately following 
the formation of a new Indian government in late-May/early 
June. 
 
New Indian Push for a Solution 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Following Under Secretary Flournoy's March 27 
letter to Indian Foreign Secretary Menon inviting a GOI 
proposal to resolve this long-standing issue, Ministry of 
Defense Joint Secretary Nagaraj contacted ODC to discuss 
specific USG objections to the Indian EUM text of February 
¶12.  In an April 2 letter, Nagaraj attempted to clarify 
outstanding issues.  Specifically, she asked for confirmation 
that the USG's chief concern was to ensure the GOI made 
available transferred defense articles in addition to 
inventory and accountability records to allow for joint 
security verification.  She asked the USG to confirm that 
(EEUM aside) such joint security verification would be 
required "only" in the event of the USG receiving credible 
reports of unauthorized use.  Finally, she asked whether 
language in the February 12 Indian draft text regarding 
verification of unauthorized use was acceptable if such 
verification included the U.S. requirement of access to the 
defense articles themselves. 
 
¶4.  (C)  In late April, we heard from a credible source that 
Foreign Minister Mukherjee, angered at the constant cost 
overruns and delays associated with the purchase from the 
Russians of the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, had 
instructed Foreign Secretary Menon to resolve the EUM issue 
as soon as a new Indian government was in place.  (See Ref. A 
on India and the Admiral Gorshkov purchase).  In an April 29 
meeting, MEA Americas Joint Secretary Gaitri Kumar underlined 
the GOI's interest in resolving this issue expeditiously. 
 
What Are the Issues for the Indians? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  There appear to be two key GOI concerns with EUM. 
First and foremost, the GOI has been unwilling to guarantee 
access to transferred defense articles.  Instead, GOI drafts 
have provided for "joint consultations for joint security 
verification of the transferred defense articles and related 
security and custody procedures."  Earlier Indian drafts 
discussed access only to records and inventory.  GOI wariness 
about access to defense articles was couched in concerns that 
the U.S. would insist on access to defense articles at 
sensitive military installations such as the Siachen glacier, 
which is not accessible to non-Indian military forces.  The 
April 2, 2009 letter from MOD Joint Secretary Nagaraj 
indicates for the first time a potential willingness to 
provide access to transferred defense articles in cases where 
the USG proposes to verify "credible reports that such 
articles have been used for other than authorized purposes." 
 
 
¶6. (SBU)  Secondly, the GOI objects to limiting the use of 
transferred defense articles to: "(a) internal security, 
civic action, legitimate self defense, preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and of the 
means of delivering such weapons, or (b) other operations of 
the Armed Forces of India as jointly agreed to in writing by 
the U.S. Government and the Government of India."  GOI 
officials from time to time have raised questions about 
whether the use of equipment in cases like "OPERATION 
CACTUS," the 1988 GOI intervention to disrupt a coup in the 
Maldives, would be allowed under the U.S. text.  The GOI has 
opposed the specific list of possible uses out of concern 
that actual use by GOI military forces would fall outside one 
of the definitions of acceptable use.  At the same time, 
Foreign Secretary Menon as acknowledged that a broad 
 
NEW DELHI 00000870  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
interpretation of "self defense" could reduce the practical 
effect of this requirement.  (Ref. B).  One potential 
resolution could be to use text from the bilateral 1951 
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that allows for the 
"Government of India to maintain its internal security, its 
legitimate self-defense or permit it to participate in the 
defense of the area of which it is a part." 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Joint Secretary Nagaraj will be attending the May 
11-12 Senior Technology Security Group meeting in Washington 
and has indicated a willingness to stay on for informal EUM 
discussions.  While she would not be empowered to agree to a 
text (such a text would have to be approved by the Cabinet 
Committee on Security), we recommend that an invitation for 
an informal discussion on EUM text be extended.  The goal 
would be to produce an ad ref text that could be approved by 
the new government. 
 
BURLEIGH