VZCZCXRO6894
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0502/01 1381238
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181238Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3351
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000502 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR IR KDRG PHUM KU
SUBJECT: KUWAIT CLAIMS TO BUILD TERRORIST REHAB CENTER, 
SEEKS RETURN OF LAST FOUR GTMO DETAINEES 
 
REF: A. 06 KUWAIT 2020 
     ¶B. PARTO 000002 
     ¶C. 06 KUWAIT 4582 
     ¶D. 06 KUWAIT 4429 
     ¶E. 08 KUWAIT 1188 
     ¶F. 08 KUWAIT 0159 
     ¶G. 08 KUWAIT 370 
     ¶H. 08 KUWAIT 0508 
     ¶I. KUWAIT 110 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and 
 d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  GOK interlocutors have advised us a long 
promised rehabilitation center for Islamic extremists -- 
mentioned by Kuwait's Prime Minister during his September 
2008 meeting with Secretary Rice -- has been completed and 
could soon begin operations.  The GOK, under significant 
domestic pressure, continues to pursue the handover of its 
four remaining GTMO detainees notwithstanding its 
embarrassment after one of the eight previously repatriated 
reportedly perpetrated a suicide attack in Mosul last year 
and others evaded surveillance.  Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. 
Mohammed Al Sabah reiterated this desire to the Secretary on 
April 24. On April 29, Ambassador Khaled Mughames, Director 
of MFA's Follow-Up and Coordination Department, assured 
POLCOUNS that the GOK now has the capability to rehabilitate 
extremists who are returned to it, as well as the ability to 
detain and monitor them effectively, notwithstanding previous 
GOK laxity.  While the GOK's assurances are doubtless 
sincere, its actual ability to detain and monitor these 
individuals remains in serious question.  Absent compelling 
evidence, (which the USG has been unable to provide in 
earlier cases) the GOK lacks either the political will or the 
judicial framework to ensure vigorous legal proceedings 
against GTMO detainees, and only a very limited capacity to 
rehabilitate or monitor them.  This cable provides a brief 
overview of detainee-related events over the last several 
years.  Ambassador will pursue this matter with the Interior 
Minister following the May 16 parliamentary elections and 
formation of a new government.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Background:  Calls for Return of Kuwait's GTMO detainees 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Upon learning that twelve Kuwaiti citizens were among 
the enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan by U.S. forces 
in late 2001, Speaker of the Kuwaiti Parliament Jassem 
Al-Khorafi in 2002 called on the U.S. to try the prisoners, 
vowing that Kuwait would support any USG finding on their 
disposition.  In response to domestic pressure, however, the 
GOK and the Kuwaiti press began gradually to call for their 
immediate return or release, especially following the 2003 
launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Growing numbers of 
Kuwaitis expressed frustration that, Kuwait's support for the 
U.S. war effort notwithstanding, the GOK was still not 
entrusted with its own detainees. In 2004, Kuwaitis were 
again vexed when British Guantanamo detainees were released 
while Kuwaiti detainees continued to languish without formal 
charges being filed.  In 2005 and 2006, in response to 
persistent high-level GOK assurances that these men would be 
monitored, tried in Kuwaiti courts, and prevented from 
traveling, the U.S. returned eight of the twelve to Kuwait. 
Subsequently, GOK officials lamented to emboffs the dearth of 
evidence provided by the USG to support effective 
prosecutions (ref A); by March 2007, according to Embassy 
records, all eight were tried and acquitted of all charges by 
Kuwaiti courts and then released.  Contrary to earlier GOK 
assurances these individuals would be prevented from 
traveling outside of Kuwait, several of them were able to do 
so.  In a development that proved embarrassing for the GOK, 
former GTMO detainee Abdullah Al-Ajmi reportedly was involved 
in a subsequent suicide bombing in Mosul (see below). 
Nonetheless, Kuwait's Foreign Minister, noting the 
President's announcement he would close GTMO by the end of 
2009, reiterated to the Secretary April 24 the GOK's request 
that its four remaining GTMO detainees be returned (ref B). 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Background:  Disposition of Kuwaiti GTMO Detainees 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶3. (S) The USG has returned eight of the twelve Kuwaiti 
detainees; Embassy records indicate that the GOK undertook 
the following judicial actions in their cases: 
 
--- In January 2005, the DOD transferred Guantanamo detainee 
Nasser Al-Mutairi (ISN-205) to Kuwait.  The GOK commenced 
 
KUWAIT 00000502  002 OF 004 
 
 
trial proceedings against him in March but released him on 
bail in April 2005.  In June 2005, a court acquitted him of 
all the charges against him.  In November 2005, an appeals 
court overturned Al-Mutairi's acquittal and sentenced him to 
five years in prison.  However, this finding was overturned 
by the Court of Cassation (highest level court in Kuwait) in 
December 2006 and he was acquitted and released (ref C). 
--- In November 2005, the DOD transferred Guantanamo 
detainees Abdullah Al-Ajmi (ISN-220), Abd Al-Aziz Al-Shammeri 
(ISN-217), Mohammed Fnaitel Al-Daihani (ISN-229), Adel Zamel 
(ISN-568), and Sa'ad Al-Azmi (ISN-571). Trials for these 
detainees commenced in March 2006; all five were acquitted by 
a criminal court judge of all charges in July 2006 and then 
released. The Public Prosecutor's office in July 2006 
announced that it would appeal the court's decision to acquit 
but allowed the period for filing an appeal to lapse (ref D). 
 
--- In September 2006, following a direct appeal by the Amir 
to then President Bush at the White House (against the advice 
of his advisor and half-brother Shaykh Misha'al -- Ref E) the 
DOD transferred Guantanamo detainees Omar Rajab Amin 
(ISN-065) and Abdullah Kamel Al-Kandari (ISN-228) to Kuwait. 
A Kuwaiti criminal court acquitted the pair on all charges 
and released them in April 2007.  These acquittals were 
upheld by the Court of Cassation in February 2008 (ref F). 
-- For a detailed chronology of GTMO-related events, please 
visit our GTMO timeline on Embassy's website. 
 
---------------------- 
Status Updates to GOK 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) Despite GOK assurances that the returned detainees 
would be prevented from leaving Kuwait, by March 2007 the USG 
uncovered evidence that Sa'ad Al-Azmi had traveled to Yemen, 
Adel Zamel to Albania, and Abdullah Al-Ajmi to Syria.  In 
January 2008, NEA/ARP updated Kuwaiti Ambassador Shaykh Salem 
Al Sabah on the status of the four Kuwaiti citizens still 
detained at GTMO: 
 
-- Fouad Mahmoud Hasan Al-Rabia (ISN-551), Faiz Mohammed 
Ahmed Al-Kandari (ISN-552) would likely face a Military 
Commission tribunal.  No court date had been set.  (Note: 
Embassy is unaware if a court date has yet been set in this 
case.) 
-- Khalid bin Abdullah Mishal Thamer Al-Hameydani (ISN-213) 
and Fowzi Khalid Abdullah Al-Awdi (ISN-232) would not face 
trial but were not approved for transfer.  (Note: Embassy is 
unaware of any updates in this case.) 
-- In March 2008 a two-person Kuwaiti delegation traveled to 
GTMO, but all four remaining Kuwaiti detainees refused to 
meet with them.  Also during March, Kuwaiti Amir Shaykh Sabah 
raised the issue of the remaining GTMO detainees with 
visiting DHS Secretary Chertoff, assuring him that the GOK 
would ensure they would no longer pose a threat to U.S. 
interests.  Secretary Chertoff responded by noting U.S. 
concerns over possible recidivism and the GOK's ability to 
effectively monitor their activities (ref G). 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Background: Al-Ajmi's Suicide Mission in Mosul 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (S) Strong evidence suggests that former detainee Abdullah 
Al-Ajmi perpetrated a suicide attack in Mosul, Iraq on April 
26, 2008. Interior Minister Shaykh Jaber al-Khaled al-Jaber 
Al Sabah informed Ambassador that Al-Ajmi had sued 
successfully in court for the return of his passport, a fact 
later confirmed by FM Dr. Mohammed.  Dr. Mohammad added that 
the GOK was not planning to send a forensics team to Mosul, 
but hoped the USG would share the results of any forensics 
investigation into the attack.  Dr. Mohammad also asserted 
that, following the Mosul attack, all seven remaining 
returned detainees had surrendered their passports to the GOK 
authorities (ref H).  Subsequently, during his September 18, 
2008 meetings in Washington, Prime Minister Nasser Mohammad 
Al Sabah reiterated Kuwait's desire for its remaining 
detainees to be released, and committed to the creation of a 
rehabilitation center for extremists as a mitigating tool 
against recidivism, and said the Ambassador would be invited 
to tour it. 
 
¶6. (S) Absent any movement on the rehabilitation center, the 
Ambassador in February 2009 called on Interior Minister 
Shaykh Jaber Al Sabah who reiterated his earlier skepticism 
that Kuwait could develop an effective rehabilitation center 
for the remaining four GTMO detainees absent special 
legislation and/or a manifest of strong political will, 
neither of which he thought likely (ref I).  Shaykh Jaber's 
 
KUWAIT 00000502  003 OF 004 
 
 
views reflect those of the Deputy Head of the KNG and close 
advisor and half-brother to the Amir, Shaykh Misha'al (ref 
E). Also during February, S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson 
clarified to Kuwaiti Ambassador Shaykh Salem that the 
President's determination to close GTMO did not imply a 
decrease in security concerns (ref I).  He also stressed that 
the alleged al-Ajmi suicide bombing would complicate the 
release of the remaining four, who were deemed more dangerous 
than the previous eight.  The Ambassador reinforced these 
points separately to FM Dr. Mohammad. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Current GOK plan:  Rehabilitation Center & Surveillance 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Following on the FM's unanticipated April 24 
announcement to the Secretary (ref B) that Kuwait planned to 
place the four remaining detainees in a "clinic" within 
Kuwait's Central Prison, Ambassador Mughames told PolCouns 
April 29 that construction work on Kuwait's rehabilitation 
center -- to occupy a portion of the largely abandoned 
Central Prison -- had recently been completed, that he was 
prepared to facilitate a visit by U.S. officials to the 
center, and that the center would be staffed by moderate 
clerics and trained psychiatrists whose goal would be to 
return the detainees to a "proper" appreciation of moderate 
Islam, with the goal of their eventual return to normal 
society.  The Kuwaiti rehabilitation center, he noted, would 
be modeled after Riyadh's new Center for Care and Counseling. 
 Mughames stressed that, as in the Saudi rehabilitation 
program, families would play a central role in the 
rehabilitation process, encouraging the rehabilitation of the 
detainees in the first instance, and then enfolding them and 
monitoring them (in addition to monitoring and surveillance 
to be conducted by GOK officials) following their eventual 
release. 
 
¶8. (C) According to Mughames, the planned rehabilitation 
center is designed to accommodate other apprehended 
extremists as well, including any returned from Iraq or other 
conflict zones.  Mughames downplayed any legal constraints to 
holding the detainees for the period necessary for their 
rehabilitation.  Evidence against each detainee, he noted, 
would be subject to an exhaustive judicial review and, he 
assessed, GOK embarrassment over the Al-Ajmi suicide bombing 
would sensitize judicial officials to the need to avoid 
premature release of the detainees.  Mughames added that 
passage of a long-anticipated anti-terrorism law would 
facilitate the extremists' detention.   Mughames suggested 
that "after a few years" in the rehabilitation center, the 
former detainees would be released and monitored on a 24-hour 
basis; the GOK, he asserted, could manage all this on its 
own. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (S) The announcement by the GOK that its long-awaited 
rehabilitation center has suddenly come to fruition is 
somewhat surprising, given earlier GOK official observations 
and the continual absence of an anti-terrorism law, which we 
don't foresee being passed any time soon.  Our sense is that 
the GOK has been galvanized by the President's announced 
plans to close Guantanamo by the end of the year and 
resultant domestic pressure on the government to bring "their 
boys" home.  It raises concerns, however, that a hurried GOK 
rehabilitation program might lack the resources necessary to 
effectively detain and/or mitigate the recidivist behavior of 
alleged extremists.  We note, in addition, that Mughames' 
assertions conflict with the opinion expressed by Kuwaiti 
Ambassador to the U.S. Shaykh Salem Al Sabah during a May 
2008 meeting with NEA A/S Welch and S/WCI Ambassador 
Williamson, in which Shaykh Salem said the GOK is technically 
incapable of providing 24-hour surveillance of all former 
detainees. 
 
¶10. (S) Should any or all of the GTMO four be released to GOK 
custody, we assess -- based on GOK proclivities and political 
constraints -- that monitoring and/or detention would be on a 
limited time basis only.  Lacking legislative muscle to 
enforce continued detention, the GOK would likely transfer 
the "GTMO Four" into the custody of their families.  In light 
of the Al-Ajmi incident, the four would likely surrender 
their passports, making travel difficult but not impossible. 
While Mughames (who joined the Foreign Minister's April 24 
dinner for the visiting Secretary) is the GOK's front man on 
the GTMO issue, he has not presented -- in our view -- 
compelling evidence that Kuwait is ready to detain, try, 
 
KUWAIT 00000502  004 OF 004 
 
 
monitor, and effectively control dangerous persons who are 
returned to its custody.  Our understanding, in fact, is that 
the GTMO "talking point" was added at the last minute to the 
FM's briefing papers.  The question will require further 
exploration, in conjunction with the actual inspection of the 
rehabilitation center once it is completed.  Senior GOK 
officials, including the Interior Minister, are declining 
appointments prior to the May 16 parliamentary election and 
subsequent cabinet reshuffle, but Ambassador will follow up 
immediately thereafter.  End comment. 
 
 
********************************************* ********* 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: 
 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it 
********************************************* ********* 
JONES