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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001295 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OREP PTER NARC PHUM KDEM AF
SUBJECT: CODEL CARPER - WELCOME TO AFGHANISTAN 
 
¶1. (SBU) Senators: We warmly welcome your visit to Afghanistan 
 
¶2. (SBU) The government and the public here have welcomed the 
United States' new strategic purpose to defeat al Qaeda and 
its supporters and to prevent their return to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  To accomplish this, President Obama's strategy 
rests on three operational lines: strengthening security, 
building governance capacity at both the national and local 
levels, and developing the economy.  To meet these 
challenges, we are expanding the U.S. military presence (both 
to protect the Afghan people and to train Afghan security 
forces to assume that full burden in future), and the number 
of U.S. civilians working in a range of disciplines, at both 
the national and sub-national levels.  The most immediate 
political objective, which we share with the Afghans and our 
Coalition partners, is to ensure the legitimacy and success 
of the August 20 presidential and provincial council 
elections. 
 
Elections 
--------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The August elections influence nearly everything 
political here.  Presidential candidate registration closed 
May 8, and at least 44 candidates turned in completed 
registration forms.  President Karzai appears to hold a 
significant advantage over his nearest competitors: 
ex-Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, ex-Finance Minister 
Ashraf Ghani, and Deputy Speaker of the Lower House Mirwais 
Yaseni.  In the end, only those three of the half-dozen 
rumored top-tier challengers registered, alongside relatively 
obscure running mates, signaling a lack of broad-based 
support for their campaigns among Afghanistan's political 
powerbrokers.  Other registered candidates of note include 
two women who are as obscure nationally as the other 
candidates.  Karzai is confident that he will win 
re-election. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Sensing the popular mood, both Karzai and opposition 
candidates alike claim to welcome international support for a 
level playing field and free and transparent elections.  The 
Independent Election Commission (IEC), with strong 
international backing and technical support from UNDP, has 
worked to even the odds somewhat and foster at least 
theoretical opportunity for real competition.  The IEC 
resisted Karzai's ploys to advance the election date to 
Spring 2009, which would have cut off the opposition's 
nascent attempts at organization.  It issued a decree in May, 
spelling out government officials' duty of impartiality.  A 
key part of its mission is to ensure that government media 
provide equal access to candidates.  The IEC will fund some 
$2 million in private air time for candidates - money that 
comes from our $40 million contribution to the $224 million 
election budget.  We are stepping up our own voter education 
work with women, youth, media, and other civil society 
groups, adding an extra $700,000 in State Department 
democracy program funding in May.  We and others in the 
international community are pressing the government to issue 
its own Hatch Act-like regulations, and urging it to finalize 
a media law strengthening protections for freedom of 
expression, including in political campaigns. 
 
Complex Security Situation 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Afghan people and their government regard 
civilian casualties resulting from coalition operations as 
the most sensitive security issue.  You will arrive during a 
joint Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and Coalition 
investigation, examining events surrounding a complex series 
of Taliban attacks on civilians, ANSF and Coalition forces in 
Farah province.  The joint investigation team has confirmed 
that some number of civilians were killed in the course of 
the fighting, but has been unable to determine with certainty 
which of those casualties were Taliban fighters and which 
were non-combatants.  The even more volatile issue is the 
question of how many civilian casualties were the result of 
Coalition air strikes and how many were purposely killed by 
the Taliban.  The challenge of how to balance security 
operations and non-combatant protection continues.  ISAF 
Commander General McKiernan directed in December substantial 
changes to coalition tactics, techniques and procedures to 
minimize civilian casualties. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Afghanistan will remain short of security personnel 
for at least several years.  There are about 80,000 Afghan 
army, about 87,000 Afghan police, and about 58,000 
international military personnel to maintain security.  The 
Afghan army is growing by more than 2,500 personnel per month 
and should reach 134,000 in 2011.  U.S forces are expected to 
top 68,000 in 2010; there are approximately 32,000 non-U.S. 
international forces in Afghanistan.  We are working with 
 
KABUL 00001295  002 OF 004 
 
 
Interior Minister Atmar to accelerate police reform and 
training, reduce corruption, and create vetted, specialized 
police units. 
 
Developing Governance Abilities 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Karzai's state and government suffer from inability 
to deliver essential services, compounded by endemic 
corruption, poverty, criminality, insurgency and ethno-tribal 
politics, all exacerbated by three decades of war and misrule 
since the Russian invasion of 1979.  Electoral dynamics are 
further complicating the problem, leading Karzai to make 
expedient decisions on one hand, but also to appoint 
top-flight leaders like Minister Atmar to deliver police 
services.  Nonetheless, rapid transformation is underway in 
Afghanistan and there is much to work with.  Atmar is only 
one among a solid group of impressively capable and clean 
technocratic leaders.  What the state and civil society lack 
in broad institutional capacity is offset by the striking 
dedication, energy and patriotism of many Afghans, including 
many who have returned from comfortable lives abroad to 
rebuild their country.  The energy and ambition of Afghan 
youth are particularly striking at the burgeoning university 
campuses 
 
¶8. (U) In order to accelerate improved responsiveness in 
Afghan institutions and local capacity, our new strategy 
requires an increase in the U.S. civilian presence alongside 
the increases in U.S. military personnel.  New positions in 
Afghanistan under consideration in the FY-08 supplemental 
request from all agencies would total 421.  There are many 
more positions with separate funding mechanisms.  Of the 421, 
we will fill 56 by July 2009, 49 in the field and 7 in Kabul. 
 The remaining 365, split between 224 in the field and 141 in 
Kabul, will arrive between August 2009 and March 2010, phased 
in coordination with arrival of military units and 
establishment of safer operating environments.  The hires 
will comprise the following offices and agencies: various 
State Department and USAID elements, Department of Justice 
(DOJ) prosecutors and the FBI (Legal Attache), Department of 
Treasury, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department 
of Transportation (DOT), Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Health and 
Human Services (HHS/CDC), and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on building capacity; 
creating a merit-based, professional bureaucracy; and 
delivering services to the public.  Strong ministries include 
Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, Education, Finance, 
Communications, Rural Development, and Counternarcotics. 
Interior and Agriculture stand out among ministries due to 
strong leadership.  We work closely with those entities, but 
also work effectively with the other ministries, although 
mixed agendas or a legacy of weakness slow progress.  For 
instance, the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice 
suffer from the acute lack of qualified professionals, a 
legal system that combines elements of Sharia, tribal, and 
Western law, and a lack of national consensus on the way 
forward. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts 
are aimed at strengthening local government at all levels, 
through Brigade Task Forces, PRTs, and (with the upcoming 
civilian increase) District Support Teams.  We work equally 
with traditional leadership structures and those who gained 
power through force or wealth during the days of conflict, 
but have proven themselves ready to cooperate with 
constitutional government and rule of law.  Lack of local 
consensus, traditionally weak connections between the capital 
and provinces, long-standing rivalries, distrust among 
communities, and the presence of insurgent or criminal 
spoilers complicate our task.  The goal is to support and 
help develop responsive, reliable leadership in local 
communities, bound to the capital in a reciprocal way. 
 
Little Momentum on Taliban reconciliation 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) Reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent 
leaders is controversial here.  Many welcome the possibility 
of reduced violence and instability, while others (mainly 
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear 
an intra-Pashtun deal could come at the expense of their 
interests.  So far, all government reconciliation efforts 
have been premised on respect for the constitution, which has 
allowed us to support these initiatives.  Although the Fall 
2008 Saudi attempt to begin talks generated much interest, 
there has been little concrete progress in that or any other 
initiative.  Karzai credits Egypt's Sheikh al-Azhar with a 
substantial helpful role, and hopes for further support from 
 
KABUL 00001295  003 OF 004 
 
 
al-Azhar for the reconciliation process.  U.S. policy on the 
issues is as stated by President Obama on March 27: "There 
will be no peace without reconciliation among former 
enemies... That's why we will work with local leaders, the 
Afghan government, and international partners to have a 
reconciliation process in every province." 
 
Economy 
--------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Recovery in agricultural production, following 
severe drought in 2008, is expected to boost real economic 
growth to about nine percent in 2009-10.  The Central Bank is 
well-led.  Inflation is virtually flat, and the Afghan 
currency is stable.  The pre-election period is not conducive 
to implementing economic reforms to support private sector 
development.  That said, relatively young, dynamic and 
reformist ministers of Finance, Commerce and Agriculture are 
taking positive steps to improve the business climate. 
Afghanistan's key economic challenge is to establish 
conditions for self-sustaining growth and strengthen fiscal 
sustainability so that it can reduce dependence on foreign 
aid over time.  It remains one of the poorest countries in 
the world and far from meeting this goal. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In our economic assistance programs, the U.S. is 
gradually channeling more aid through the Afghan government, 
and urging other donors to do the same, while ensuring proper 
transparency and accountability.  Our motto is: "Afghan 
leadership, Afghan capacity, Afghan sustainability."  The 
U.S. is also placing renewed emphasis in its assistance 
programs supporting agriculture, both as a basis for 
sustainable growth and to create licit economic alternatives 
to the insurgency and poppy cultivation.  U.S. assistance 
will focus on agriculture programs that create jobs, develop 
roads and water systems supporting farm production and trade, 
and expand farm credit opportunities.  We are also 
encouraging greater Af-Pak cooperation, for example to enable 
transshipment of Afghan agricultural exports across Pakistan 
to the massive Indian market. 
 
Human Rights Work Ahead 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU)  Civil society activists and the Ministry of 
Women's Affairs drafted a progressive domestic violence bill, 
currently under review by the Ministry of Justice.  More 
generally, a thin but outspoken stratum of Afghan society 
increasingly is giving voice to a desire for positive 
political reform and social change -- reflecting the outlooks 
of an extremely young demographic in this conservative 
society.  Nonetheless, other aspects of Afghanistan's human 
rights record remain poor, including violence and 
discrimination against women, lack of due process and weak 
rule of law, and intimidation restricting the exercise of 
free speech.  In the face of powerful conservative religious 
and tribal patriarchal traditions, the Afghan government has 
shown a lack of sustained will to press forward a systematic 
campaign to promote and protect human rights, particularly 
women's rights. 
 
¶15. (SBU) We, and others, are tracking two high profile cases 
involving freedom of religious expression.  In October 2008, 
the Afghan Supreme Court upheld a local court's conviction 
and 20-year prison sentence for student Sayed Pervez 
Kambakhsh, for distributing an article over the internet 
about women's rights that allegedly defamed Islam.  The 
international community is pushing for a presidential pardon, 
and we would ask you to do the same privately with Karzai. 
Also, Ghows Zalmai and Mullah Qari Mushtaq are challenging 
their 20-year sentences, handed down by a Kabul Appeals Court 
in February, for publishing and distributing a Dari 
translation of the Koran that did not include the original 
Arabic text - an act considered sacrilegious by extremely 
doctrinaire Muslims. 
 
¶16. (SBU) In March President Karzai signed a Shia Family Law 
with provisions that would violate women's constitutional 
guarantee to equal rights.  Pressure from the USG, the 
international community, and Afghan human rights activists 
has blocked its enactment, pending a constitutional review by 
the Ministry of Justice.  We continue to raise our concerns 
with the law and our expectation of a transparent review 
process inclusive of women and civil society. 
 
Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶17. (SBU) The narcotics challenge continues in the south, 
where seven provinces now account for 98 percent of the 
country's opium, and narcotics trafficking and the insurgency 
have become mutually sustaining.  To support the Government 
 
KABUL 00001295  004 OF 004 
 
 
of Afghanistan and local people in confronting it, we have 
organized a civilian-military Combined Joint Inter-Agency 
Task Force (CJIATF) with U.K. and Canadian participation. 
CJIATF has begun comprehensive counter-narcotics planning for 
2009-2010 combining the full range of civilian and military 
resources.  We are now increasing our focus on boosting licit 
agriculture, improving local governance, and increasing 
interdiction of drug traffickers to disrupt the link between 
narcotics trafficking and the insurgency.  We will continue 
poppy eradication efforts, but will shift emphasis and 
resources more towards the former objectives. 
 
¶18. (SBU) There is some promising news.  Poppy cultivation 
dropped by 19 percent in 2008, the first reduction since 
¶2005.  Just as notably, poppy-free provinces grew from 13 to 
18, or more than half of all provinces.  Governors in three 
formerly major poppy cultivating provinces - Badakhshan, 
Balkh, and Nangarhar - have succeeded in eliminating or 
nearly eliminating poppy cultivation. Poppy cultivation has 
died away by itself in other parts of the north and east of 
the country.  This year, Helmand Governor Gulabuddin Mangal, 
whose province produces more than half of Afghanistan's opium 
poppy, conducted a comprehensive multi-season campaign 
against poppy cultivation in a 100-square mile area of 
central Helmand.  Mangal's campaign combined public 
information, agricultural assistance, and law enforcement, 
including eradication by Afghan police with force protection 
from the Afghan army.  The UN Office for Drugs and Crime 
believes poppy cultivation has dropped substantially in 
Helmand and predicts more poppy-free provinces in other parts 
of the country. 
 
International Community and Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Relations between the government and the 
international community are uneven.  The UN presence is 
strong; SRSG Kai Eide plays a key coordination role, but 
suffers from insufficient budgetary and personnel commitment 
from New York.  International support is holding as 
demonstrated at recent conferences, including the March 31 
Hague Conference where more than 80 countries and 
international organizations reaffirmed their long-term 
commitment to Afghanistan and the April 2009 JCMB where 
donors committed to providing funding for an almost 5,000 
member increase in the Kabul police force in time for August 
elections. 
 
EIKENBERRY