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PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1226/01 1331021
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131021Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8885
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0049

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001226 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OREP PTER NARC PHUM KDEM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL LEAHY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Embassy Kabul warmly welcomes your visit. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The government and the public here have welcomed the 
Administration's new strategy, agreeing on the merit and 
priority of refocusing on defeating al Qaeda to prevent it, 
and like-minded local and regional groups, from returning to 
Afghanistan.  President Obama's decision to send 21,000 
additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan, including 4,000 to 
train Afghan army and police personnel is one essential 
component of this effort.  Building governance capacity of 
Afghan officials at both the national and local levels is 
another essential component of our new strategy, and we are 
expanding the U.S. civilian presence to meet the challenge. 
Finally, we are working with Afghans and international 
partners to ensure the success of the August 20 presidential 
and provincial council election. 
 
 
Elections 
--------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The August elections influence nearly everything 
political here.  Presidential candidate registration closed 
May 8, with at least 44 candidates turning in completed 
registration forms.  President Karzai appears to hold a 
significant advantage over his nearest competitors.  In the 
end, only three of the half-dozen rumored top-tier 
challengers registered, and two of those signed up alongside 
relatively obscure running mates, signaling a lack of 
broad-based support for their campaigns among Afghanistan's 
political powerbrokers.  The other registered candidates 
include two women, communist-era figures, and parliamentary 
backbenchers.  Karzai is confident that he will win 
re-election. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Opposition candidates are urging and welcoming 
international support for a level playing field and free and 
transparent elections.  The Independent Election Commission 
(IEC), with our backing and technical support from UNDP, has 
worked to even the odds and foster competition.  The IEC 
resisted Karzai's ploys to advance the election date to 
spring 2009, which would have cut off the opposition's 
nascent attempts at organization.  It issued a decree in May, 
spelling out government officials' duty of impartiality.  A 
key part of its mission is to ensure that government media 
provide equal access to candidates.  The IEC will fund some 
$2 million in private air time for candidates - money that 
comes from our $40 million contribution to the $224 million 
election budget.  We are stepping up our own voter education 
work with women, youth, media, and other civil society 
groups, adding an extra $700,000 in State Department 
democracy program funding in May.  We and others in the 
international community are pressing the government to issue 
its own Hatch Act-like regulations, and urging it to finalize 
a media law strengthening protections for freedom of 
expression, including in political campaigns. 
 
 
Complex Security Situation 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Civilian casualties from coalition operations are 
the most sensitive security issue between the coalition and 
the government, and increasingly with the Afghan people 
themselves.  You will arrive during a joint Afghan National 
Security Force and Coalition investigation, examining events 
surrounding a complex series of Taliban attacks on civilians, 
ANSF and coalition forces in Farah province.  The joint 
investigation team has confirmed that a number of civilians 
were killed in the course of the fighting, but has been 
unable to determine with certainty which of those casualties 
were Taliban fighters and which were non-combatants.  The 
even more volatile issue is the question of how many civilian 
casualties were the result of the coalition air strikes and 
how many were purposely killed by the Taliban.  The challenge 
of how to balance security operations and non-combatant 
protection continues.  ISAF Commander General McKiernan 
directed in December substantial changes to coalition 
tactics, techniques and procedures to minimize civilian 
casualties. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Afghanistan will remain short of security personnel 
for the foreseeable future.  There are about 75,000 Afghan 
army, 87,000 Afghan police, and about 58,000 international 
military personnel to maintain security.  The Afghan army is 
growing by more than 2,500 personnel per month and should 
reach 134,000 in 2011.  U.S forces are expected to top 68,000 
in 2010; there are approximately 32,000 non-U.S. 
international forces in Afghanistan.  We are working with 
Interior Minister Atmar to accelerate police reform and 
training, reduce corruption, and create vetted, specialized 
 
KABUL 00001226  002 OF 004 
 
 
police units. 
 
Developing Governance Abilities 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Karzai struggles to balance between institutional 
and traditional informal governance, in an environment of 
poverty, social exhaustion, illicit power centers arising 
from decades of political breakdown, governmental incapacity, 
criminality, and insurgency.  Electoral dynamics are further 
complicating the problem, leading Karzai to make expedient 
decisions on one hand, but also to appoint top-flight leaders 
like Minister Atmar to deliver police services. 
 
¶8. (U) In order to accelerate improved responsiveness in 
Afghan institutions and local capacity, our new strategy 
calls for an increase in the U.S. civilian presence alongside 
the increases in U.S. military personnel.  New positions in 
Afghanistan under consideration in the FY-08 supplemental 
request from all agencies would total 421.  There are many 
more positions with separate funding mechanisms.  Of the 421, 
we will fill 56 by July 2009, 49 in the field and 7 in Kabul. 
 The remaining 365, split between 224 in the field and 141 in 
Kabul, will arrive between August 2009 and March 2009, phased 
in coordination with arrival of military units and 
establishment of safe operating environment.  The hires will 
comprise the following offices and agencies: various State 
Department and USAID elements, Department of Justice (DOJ) 
prosecutors and the FBI (Legal Attache), Department of 
Treasury, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department 
of Transportation (DOT), Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Health and 
Human Services (HHS/CDC), and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on building capacity; 
creating a merit-based, professional bureaucracy; and 
delivering services to the public.  Strong ministries include 
Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, Education, Finance, 
Communications, Rural Development, and Counternarcotics. 
Interior and Agriculture stand out among ministries due to 
strong leadership.  We work closely with those entities, but 
also work effectively with the other ministries, although 
mixed agendas or a legacy of weakness slow progress.  For 
instance, the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice 
suffer from the acute lack of qualified professionals, a 
legal system that combines elements of Sharia, tribal, and 
Western law, and a lack of national consensus on the way 
forward. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts 
are aimed at strengthening local government at all levels, 
through Brigade Task Forces, PRTs, and (with the upcoming 
civilian increase) District Support Teams.  We work equally 
with traditional leadership structures and those who gained 
power through force or wealth during the days of conflict, 
but have proven themselves ready to cooperate with 
constitutional government and rule of law.  Lack of local 
consensus, traditionally weak connections between the capital 
and provinces, long-standing rivalries, distrust among 
communities, and the presence of insurgent or criminal 
spoilers complicate our task.  The goal is to support and 
help develop responsive, reliable leadership in local 
communities, bound to the capital in a reciprocal way. 
 
Little Momentum on Taliban reconciliation 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) Reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent 
leaders is controversial here.  Many welcome the possibility 
of reduced violence and instability, while others (mainly 
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear a 
Pashtun deal could come at the expense of their interests. 
So far, all government reconciliation efforts have been 
premised on respect for the constitution, which has allowed 
us to support these initiatives.  Although the Fall 2008 
Saudi attempt to begin talks generated much interest, there 
has been little concrete progress in that or any other 
initiative.  Karzai credits Egypt's Sheikh al-Azhar with a 
substantial helpful role, and hopes for further support from 
al-Azhar for the reconciliation process.  U.S. policy on the 
issues is as stated by President Obama on March 27: "There 
will also be no peace without reconciliation among former 
enemies... That's why we will work with local leaders, the 
Afghan government, and international partners to have a 
reconciliation process in every province." 
 
Economy 
--------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Recovery in agricultural production, following 
 
KABUL 00001226  003 OF 004 
 
 
severe drought in 2008, is expected to boost real economic 
growth to about nine percent in 2009-10.  The Central Bank is 
well-led.  Inflation is virtually flat, and the Afghan 
currency is stable.  The pre-election period is not conducive 
to implementing economic reforms to support private sector 
development.  That said, relatively young, dynamic and 
reformist ministers of Finance, Commerce and Agriculture are 
taking positive steps to improve the business climate. 
Afghanistan's key economic challenge is to establish 
conditions for self-sustaining growth and strengthen fiscal 
sustainability so that it can reduce dependence on foreign 
aid over time.  It remains one of the poorest countries in 
the world and far from meeting this goal. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In our economic assistance programs, the U.S. is 
gradually channeling more aid through the Afghan government, 
and urging other donors to do the same, while ensuring proper 
transparency and accountability.  Our motto is: "Afghan 
leadership, Afghan capacity, Afghan sustainability."  The 
U.S. is also placing renewed emphasis in its assistance 
programs supporting Afghan agriculture, both as a basis for 
sustainable growth and to create licit economic alternatives 
to the insurgency and poppy cultivation.  U.S. assistance 
will focus on agriculture programs that create jobs, develop 
roads and water systems supporting farm production and trade, 
and expand farm credit opportunities.  We are also 
encouraging greater Af-Pak cooperation, for example to enable 
transshipment of Afghan agricultural exports across Pakistan 
to the massive Indian market. 
 
Human Rights Work Ahead 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU)  Aspects of Afghanistan's human rights record 
remain poor, including violence and discrimination against 
women, lack of due process and a weak rule of law, and 
intimidation restricting the exercise of free speech.   The 
Afghan government has shown a lack of will to actively 
promote and protect human rights, particularly freedom of 
expression and women's rights. 
 
¶15. (SBU) We, and others, are tracking two high profile 
freedom of expression cases.  In October 2008 the Afghan 
Supreme Court upheld a local court's conviction and 20-year 
prison sentence for student Sayed Pervez Kambakhsh, 
purportedly for distributing an article over the Internet 
about women's rights that defamed Islam.  The international 
community is pushing for a presidential pardon, and we would 
ask you to do the same privately with Karzai.  Also, Ghows 
Zalmai and Mullah Qari Mushtaq are challenging their 20-year 
sentences, handed down by a Kabul Appeals Court in February, 
for publishing and distributing a Dari translation of the 
Koran that did not include the original Arabic text. 
 
¶16. (SBU) In March President Karzai signed a Shia Family Law 
with provisions violating women's constitutional guarantee to 
equal rights.  Pressure from the USG, the international 
community, and Afghan human rights activists has blocked its 
enactment, pending a constitutional review.  The Ministry of 
Justice is charged with this review, which we are closely 
monitoring.  The Embassy continues to raise our concerns with 
the law and our expectation of a transparent review process 
inclusive of women and civil society.  On a more positive 
note, civil society and the Ministry of Women's Affairs 
drafted a progressive domestic violence bill, currently under 
review by the Ministry of Justice. 
 
Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶17. (SBU) The narcotics challenge continues in the south, 
where seven provinces now account for 98 percent of the 
country's opium, and narcotics trafficking and the insurgency 
have become mutually sustaining.  In the coming year, U.S. 
counter-narcotics efforts will increase focus on boosting 
licit agriculture, improving local governance, and increasing 
interdiction of drug traffickers to disrupt the link between 
narcotics trafficking and the insurgency.  We will continue 
poppy eradication efforts, but we will shift emphasis and 
resources more towards the former objectives.  The ISAF-led 
Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force has begun 
comprehensive counter-narcotics planning for 2009-2010 
combining the full range of civilian and military resources. 
 
¶18. (SBU) There is some promising news.  Poppy cultivation 
dropped by 19 percent in 2008, the first reduction since 
¶2005.  Just as notably, poppy-free provinces grew from 13 to 
18, or more than half of all provinces.  Governors in three 
formerly major poppy cultivating provinces - Badakhshan, 
Balkh, and Nangarhar - have succeeded in eliminating or 
nearly eliminating poppy cultivation. Poppy cultivation has 
 
KABUL 00001226  004 OF 004 
 
 
died away by itself in other parts of the north and east of 
the country.  This year, Helmand Governor Gulabuddin Mangal, 
whose province by itself produces more than half of 
Afghanistan's opium poppy, conducted a comprehensive 
multi-season campaign against poppy cultivation in a 
100-square mile area of central Helmand.  Mangal's campaign 
combined public information, agricultural assistance, and law 
enforcement, including eradication by Afghan police with 
force protection from the Afghan army.  The UN Office for 
Drugs and Crime believes poppy cultivation has dropped 
substantially in Helmand and predicts more 
poppy-free provinces in other parts of the country. 
 
International Community and Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Relations between the government and the 
international community are uneven.  The UN presence is 
strong; SRSG Kai Eide plays a key coordination role, but 
suffers from insufficient budgetary and personnel commitment 
from New York.  International support is holding as 
demonstrated at recent conferences, including the March 31 
Hague Conference where more than 80 countries and 
international organizations reaffirmed their long-term 
commitment to Afghanistan and the April 2009 JCMB where 
donors committed to providing funding for an almost 5,000 
member increase in the Kabul police force in time for August 
elections. 
EIKENBERRY