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INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 000931 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM CH HK MC
SUBJECT: TWO GOVERNING TEAMS IN HONG KONG? 
 
REF: (A) HONG KONG 793 (B) HONG KONG 605 (C) HONG 
     KONG 129 
 
Classified By: Consul General Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Central Government Liaison Office 
(CGLO) Research Department Chief Cao Erbao's January 2008 
Party School journal article describing "two governing teams" 
in Hong Kong has recently surfaced to rekindle alarm bells 
here about "one country, two systems."  The uproar may have 
more to do with inaccurate reporting and a desire by the 
pan-democrats to drum up participation for the July 1 march. 
We do not see a link with the reported "ten-point agreement" 
between the CGLO and the Hong Kong government (ref B); Cao 
does not even mention a role for Hong Kong delegates to 
national bodies.  Whatever the facts, however, Hong Kong 
politics are now predicated on the belief that, since 2003, 
the Mainland has sought to expand its control of Hong Kong, 
allegedly on a model already achieved in Macau.  Expressions 
of this kind of concern are not new, but they are growing 
louder which will prove a challenge to the government on 
July 1 and then later as Hong Kong considers its ext stage 
of democratic reforms this fall.  Whil polling data suggest 
the general public believe "one country, two systems" is 
working well, thepublic also clearly values a strong 
pan-democratc presence in LegCo as an advocate for 
emocratic reforms.  End summary and comment. 
 
--------------------- 
Cao Erbao: Old oil... 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) As the news cycle on the rumored ten-point agreement 
between the Hong Kong government and Central Government 
Liaison Office (CGLO) was coming to an end (ref B), a 
previously-ignored essay in the journal of the Central Party 
School became the new cause celebre.  CGLO Research 
Department Chief Cao Erbao, writing in "Study Times" in 
January 2008, described the existence of "two governing 
teams" in Hong Kong.  The first is the Special Administrative 
Region Government (HKSARG), which "exercises the high degree 
of autonomy according to the Basic Law, by authority 
delegated by the Central Authorities."  The second is the 
"team of cadres of Central and Mainland Authorities carrying 
out Hong Kong's work, which includes departments of the 
Central Government and their external organs with 
responsibilities in Hong Kong affairs or specializing on Hong 
Kong work; departments of the Central government responsible 
for other national affairs and relevant policies; and cadres 
in the Government and CCP Committees of provinces, cities and 
districts closely related to the Hong Kong SAR, who handle 
matters involving Hong Kong."  These organs -- the Hong Kong 
and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO) in Beijing; and the CGLO, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative office, and 
People's Liberation Army garrison in Hong Kong -- have 
existed since the handover. 
 
¶3. (C) Read in isolation, Cao's essay simply describes the 
status quo, in accordance with the Basic Law.  His conception 
of "two governing teams" starts as an explanation of the 
change in Hong Kong since the handover.  In Cao's mind, the 
Hong Kong Government under the UK was part of the British 
Government, whereas after the handover, the HKSARG and the 
Central Government organs involved in Hong Kong are 
administratively distinct.  Cao explains the division of 
responsibilities between the HKSARG (administering Hong Kong 
under the Basic Law) and the Central People's Government 
(SAR-central government relations, foreign affairs and 
defense, and interpreting the Basic Law), and does not 
propose any new powers for Beijing.  The second team, Cao 
explains, "does not interfere with (bu ganyu) the affairs 
within the autonomy of the SAR." 
 
¶4. (C) The article passed unnoticed but for a lone report in 
Sing Tao shortly after its publication.  However, with the 
ten-point agreement filling headlines with concerns about the 
breakdown of one country, two systems, an Apple Daily news 
article and a South China Morning Post column by activist 
Christine Loh brought Cao's article back to light.  Both 
these pieces fueled what became a public outcry with 
propositions that were either erroneous or at best 
extrapolations.  Apple Daily's article erroneously reported 
that Cao was proposing "setting up another governing group" 
(Cao proposes no such thing; he sees the second team as in 
existence since the handover).  Loh, meanwhile, linked Cao's 
conception of a "second governing team" to the discussion of 
an increased role for Hong Kong's National People's Congress 
(NPC) deputies and Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) delegates in Hong Kong affairs, which was 
part of the rumored ten-point agreement (Cao never mentions 
either). 
 
HONG KONG 00000931  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
---------------------------- 
...Poured on a Growing Flame 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Whatever Cao said or intended to say in his essay, its 
implications -- distorted, as noted above -- have added to a 
growing sense of alarm at the perceived erosion of Hong 
Kong's autonomy through encroachment by the Central 
Government.  Our contacts uniformly cite the July 1, 2003 
march, which saw 500,000 Hong Kong people take to the 
streets, as the watershed moment which convinced the Mainland 
it must take a more active role in Hong Kong to protect its 
equities.  They allege Beijing has attempted to interference 
in Hong Kong's autonomy by: 
 
--  Bankrolling parties like the Democratic Alliance for the 
Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) to provide constituent services 
and to use election day polling data to direct supporters to 
particular electoral slates; 
 
--  Bussing Mainland-based Hong Kong citizens back to Hong 
Kong to vote.  Some contacts allege Beijing used these voters 
to propel the nominally independent Priscilla Leung to a 
Legislative Council (LegCo) seat in 2008; 
 
--  Brokering a deal by which Heung Yee Kuk Chairman Lau 
Wong-fat chose not to contest the District Councils 
Functional Constituency seat (clearing the way for the DAB's 
Ip Kwok-him) in return for a seat on the Executive Council 
(ref A); 
 
--  Establishing the ten-point agreement mentioned above, 
which grants Hong Kong's NPC deputies and CPPCC delegates a 
more active role in Hong Kong affairs, the CGLO more say in 
HKSARG government and advisory body appointments, and the 
HKSARG the ability to propose nominees for the CPPCC.  The 
government, most recently Chief Executive Donald Tsang 
during a LegCo question-and-answer session May 14, and 
Beijing have steadfastly denied the existence of this deal; 
and most recently, 
 
--  Ordering the HKSARG to prevent Diaoyu Islands activists 
from using a fishing vessel to visit the disputed territory, 
on the pretext that the craft are not appropriate for 
carrying passengers.  Local activists, including 
pan-democratic leaders, allege the CGLO wanted to avoid 
harming newly-improved Sino-Japanese relations.  Some 
activists report the CGLO even offered funds to allow the 
activists to depart from Taiwan rather than Hong Kong. 
 
¶6. (C) The most active critic of Cao's article is Ching 
Cheong, a Hong Kong journalist for Singapore's Straits Times 
formerly imprisoned on the Mainland under highly questionable 
charges of espionage.  Ching has written commentaries and 
spoken at several fora regarding the Cao article, regarding 
it as a violation of Basic Law Article 22 ("No department of 
the Central People's Government...may interfere in the 
affairs which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
administers on its own in accordance with this Law.") 
Pan-democratic leaders including Martin Lee told the 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission the 
article is another indicator of a growing encroachment on 
Hong Kong by the CGLO.  Lee contended the government was 
trying to conceal the fact that the HKSARG has become a 
puppet administration.  Civic Party Vice Chair Alan Leong, 
however, felt the government welcomed the pan-democrats' 
raising questions that might cause the CGLO to hesitate, 
because the HKSARG does not wish to be merely a puppet 
government.  Former LegCo member and NPC delegate Allen Lee 
argued in a Ming Pao column that Cao was acting under 
instructions, and his article represents an attempt to bring 
out into the open what CGLO has been doing under the table 
for some time.  If there really are two ruling teams, Lee 
argues, then the HKSARG is a puppet administration, because 
the bottom line is that the Tsang administration is not the 
one calling the shots. 
 
¶7. (C) More centrist observers have been less definitive, and 
some have even suggested that putting the CGLO's much-debated 
covert activities into the public domain would at least make 
CGLO's role transparent.  Neither Chinese University 
Professor Ma Ngok nor SynergyNet scholar Ray Yep ascribed 
much importance to the article itself.  Ma believes that the 
central government lacks the expertise to run Hong Kong on a 
day-to-day basis, and the question is where it will draw the 
line in taking an active role.  Yep argued that Beijing would 
prefer to exercise its influence through proxies, but remains 
nervous that this indirect method is not working.  Yep sees 
Beijing as unhappy with CE Tsang's preference for career 
civil servants in his cabinet rather than Beijing's people. 
 
HONG KONG 00000931  003 OF 003 
 
 
In that regard, the NPC deputies and CPPCC delegates are more 
reliably pro-Beijing, and Yep thus sees a Beijing motive for 
the alleged ten-point agreement expanding their role.  At a 
recent Civic Party (CP) forum on the Cao article, CP member 
Paul Zimmerman suggested it might be better for Hong Kong to 
have CGLO's currently ambiguous role made transparent, 
although he was not clear about why CGLO would admit it was 
doing anything other than performing its normal functions 
now.  Yep agreed with Zimmerman to the extent that right now 
there are many people claiming to represent Beijing, and it 
might be good to define "who else" has that power besides the 
CGLO and HKMAO.  Even Allen Lee argues the Communist Party 
should be allowed to register in Hong Kong openly and to 
contest elections on an equal basis with other parties. 
 
¶8. (C) The "official" answer from the pro-Beijing camp has 
largely centered on describing Cao as a relatively junior 
official and his essay as a think piece done as "homework" 
for his course at the Central Party School.  Basic Law 
Committee member Lau Nai-keung wrote in his South China 
Morning Post column that Cao had described nothing more than 
the existing institutional arrangements between the HKSARG 
and the central government, and accused the pan-democrats of 
trying to make an innocuous article into a political issue. 
Central Policy Unit (CPU - the HKSARG's in-house think-tank) 
Senior Researcher Shiu Sin-por conceded that that, since 
2003, there has been a general change by the central 
government from a selective to "somewhat proactive" approach 
towards Hong Kong.  That said, Shiu also believes the article 
was Cao's "homework," and that he probably didn't expect 
anyone in Hong Kong would read the article.  Like 
SynergyNet's Yep, Shiu seemed to think that Beijing would 
prefer to use proxies, describing a body of "about a 
thousand" Hong Kong people who serve on provincial-level 
People's Political Consultative Councils whom Beijing might 
enlist in "united front" work.  Since these people are Hong 
Kong citizens, Shiu sees no conflict with the Basic Law. 
 
-------------------- 
The Macau Connection 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) In arguing that the central government seeks to 
increase its level of control over Hong Kong, a number of 
observers have suggested that Beijing has already established 
such a parallel governing structure in Macau.  This argument 
holds that Beijing was initially content to allow the 
relatively successful Edmund Ho run Macau on his own. 
However, the Ao Man-long corruption scandal shattered 
Beijing's faith in Ho, and the central government has since 
taken a more active role in Macau's governance.  At a forum 
convened by the Civic Party, Willy Wo-lop Lam contended that 
there is already a team of cadres operating openly in Macau 
in parallel to the Macau SAR government.  (Comment:  We will 
report Macau observers' views on this issue septel; in 
general they do not believe the Mainland is directly 
administering Macau.  End comment.) 
 
----------------------- 
Comment: Chasing Ghosts 
----------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Whatever the elusive objective truth, the Hong Kong 
body politic has accepted the notion that Beijing is 
concerned by what it sees transpiring in Hong Kong and is 
increasing the quantity and quality of its intervention.  We 
see three factors as indicative of the public's response. 
First, observers predicted that Beijing's setting a timeline 
for universal suffrage would remove the democracy issue from 
the 2008 LegCo campaign, resulting in the pan-democrats 
losing seats to a pro-Beijing camp that delivered better 
grass-roots constituent services.  However, the only seats 
the pan-democrats lost in 2008 were those for which they 
either gave up or ran an unpopular incumbent.  This suggests 
that the general public still supports politicians willing to 
push for democratic development and challenge the 
establishment.  On the other hand, Hong Kong University 
Public Opinion Project polling data from April 23 (several 
days after the Cao article broke as a story) shows popular 
confidence in "one country, two systems" at 72.9 percent, 
which is in the upper half of the ten-point range shown in 
the last few years.  The third, less precise indicator will 
be the banners under which people take to the streets on July 
¶1.  With the exception of a vocal Falun Gong contingent, July 
1 marchers tend to avoid openly criticizing the Mainland 
government.  Should that change this year, it would be a 
significant development. 
DONOVAN