VZCZCXRO3415
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHOR #0372 1331401
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131401Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5759
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0401
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0216
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0422

C O N F I D E N T I A L GABORONE 000372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/S, AF/E 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL PHUM SADC MA BC
SUBJECT: SADC: "DRIVE-BY DEMARCHE" DELIVERED 
 
REF: A. GABORONE 371 
     ¶B. STATE 45783 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen J. Nolan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: After a solid week of calls and letters to 
the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone requesting a meeting with 
the SADC Executive Secretary, Ambassador Nolan was fortunate 
to make a rare sighting of the elusive Dr. Tomaz Salomao May 
13 at a meeting and luncheon for resident Chiefs of Mission 
hosted by the Nigerian High Commission.  (Salomao only 
returned Monday May 11 from his latest travels.)  Though 
Salomao arrived late and slipped out of the event before 
lunch was served, Ambassador Nolan managed to buttonhole 
Salomao and deliver the demarche.  As the meeting concluded 
and the diplomats retired to an adjoining room for lunch, the 
Ambassador engaged Salomao as he was leaving, and with a copy 
of a non-paper in hand, he managed to deliver a "drive-by 
demarche" to him in the parking lot.  He briefed Salomao 
regarding the USG's concerns about the need for 
internationally supervised elections in 2009 and discouraged 
unhelpful talk about use of the SADC Brigade in Madagascar 
(Ref B).  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Dr. Salomao made no substantive response to the 
demarche and did not provide any new information regarding 
SADC's views on an election timeline for Madagascar.  He did 
however indicate that SADC needs to be "pragmatic" in 
resolving the Madagascar situation.  The Ambassador told 
Salomao that he would still like to have an office call with 
him soon to follow up on Madagascar and other pending 
business, and the Executive Secretary agreed in principle 
with this idea, but suggested no concrete time for such a 
meeting. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador also spoke briefly with the Mozambican 
High Commissioner about Madagascar and SADC's actions to 
resolve the political crisis there.  The High Commissioner 
said that it is important that SADC align its policy more 
closely with that of the African Union and do all it can to 
promote dialog in Madagascar.  He also indicated that SADC 
has informally told Ravalomanana that use of the SADC Brigade 
is out of the question.  He reiterated the sentiment of 
Botswana's Foreign Minister (Ref A) that Ravalomanana is "out 
of touch" and said that Mozambique supports new elections in 
Madagascar "the sooner, the better." 
 
¶4. (C) Comment: Obtaining meetings at SADC, whether with 
technical experts and department heads or the Executive 
Secretary is often a frustrating and time-consuming process. 
SADC officials travel frequently, do not return 
calls/letters/emails, and seem incapable of sharing 
information with or delegating actions to their subordinates. 
 For instance, Embassy officers (FO, POLE, and OSC) have been 
unable to pry any response or information out of SADC in 
response to the January 2009 Presidential Declaration on 
security cooperation with SADC.  Though several hundred 
people work at the Secretariat headquarters less than a mile 
from our Embassy, it generally feels like no one is home at 
SADC.  Various GOB officials have privately made the same 
complaint to us -- though Botswana is a member state and 
hosts the Secretariat, the GOB frequently feels ignored or 
stonewalled by Secretariat staff, which they regard as 
ineffectual anyway.  Despite these hurdles, we will redouble 
our efforts to engage the Secretariat on this and other 
important issues.  We would also recommend, however, that any 
urgent peace and security issues be brought to the attention 
of all regional SADC capitals, especially those of the Organ 
Troika, to assure that USG messages reach the real decision 
makers in timely fashion.  End Comment. 
NOLAN