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Viewing cable 09DILI125, SNAPSHOT OF U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS WITH TIMOR-LESTE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DILI125 2009-05-13 08:10 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO2931
PP RUEHDT
DE RUEHDT #0125/01 1330810
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 130810Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4385
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RULSJGA/USCG HQ WASHDC
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 1047
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1279
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0942
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0109
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1119
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1005
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3911
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DILI 000125 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PMIN PGOV MARR TT
SUBJECT: SNAPSHOT OF U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS WITH TIMOR-LESTE 
 
Summary 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
1.  (SBU)  Six months after a thorough November 2008 assessment 
by the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marines and U.S. Coast Guard designed to 
determine the desirability and feasibility of future U.S. 
military and security commitments in Timor-Leste, our engagement 
continues to strengthen steadily.  The fundamental objective of 
our interaction is a stable Timor-Leste better able to provide 
for its own defense and capable of contributing positively to 
regional security.   Our efforts have had two focal points. 
First, we have sought to increase our engagement with the key 
security institutions, notably the military, police and civilian 
institutions such as the Dili port authority, to raise their 
technical, leadership and organizational capabilities.   Second, 
we have sought to engage the civilian authorities, including the 
government, the national parliament, and Timorese civil society 
to reform and complete the legal infrastructure governing the 
security sector.  In all instances, we have sought to follow the 
lead of the Timorese and secure full local ownership for reform, 
and work in close coordination with Timor-Leste's other 
international partners, especially our allies Australia, 
Portugal and Japan, and the United Nations.  Support from the 
U.S. Pacific Command has been critical to the progress achieved 
over the past eighteen months, and institutions such as the U.S. 
Coast Guard, the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies and 
the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies have 
proven to be invaluable partners.  The following provides a 
brief snapshot of pending U.S. activities in support of the 
development of Timor-Leste's security sector.  It also discusses 
recent changes in Timorese priorities, including the creation of 
a national maritime authority to coordinate maritime security 
policy and programs, and suggests how we might best support 
them.  End summary. 
 
 
 
U.S. Marines 
 
----------------- 
 
 
 
2.  (SBU)  Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, Commander, U.S. 
Marine Forces Pacific, was the latest senior U.S. Marine 
commander to visit Dili.  His April 2-3 stopover included 
meetings with the Prime Minister, Chief of Timor-Leste's Defense 
Force and the Secretary of State for Defense.  LtGen Stalder 
received a full briefing from the commander of the Timorese 
training base on plans to bring in some 600 new recruits in 2009 
(see Dili 123).  He participated in in-depth planning 
discussions with the Commander of the Australian-led 
International Stabilization Force (ISF) and traveled with the 
ISF Commander to visit one of their forward operating bases in 
Baucau, Timor-Leste's second largest town. 
 
 
 
3.  (SBU)  Near term activities foreseen for Timor-Leste by the 
U.S. Marines include a major deployment by the Eleventh Marine 
Expeditionary Unit later in 2009.  It will provide opportunities 
for extensive training interaction with the Timorese military; 
civilian, engineering or medical action programs; and joint 
interoperability exercises with the ISF.  While in Timor-Leste, 
LtGen Stalder extended to the Timorese military leadership an 
invitation to visit U.S. Marine training facilities in the U.S. 
to receive an in-depth orientation on U.S. basic and advanced 
military training methods.  We hope to realize that opportunity 
soon.  A Timorese offer, first extended by the Chief of the 
Defense Force, Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak, to Admiral Keating in 
November 2008, to jointly develop military training areas in 
Timor-Leste for use by U.S. troops remains on the table. 
 
 
 
U.S. Navy 
 
------------- 
 
 
 
DILI 00000125  002 OF 005 
 
 
 
4.  (SBU)  As of April 25, 2009, a unit of twenty five Seabees 
from the U.S. Navy's Construction Battalion Forty became fully 
operational in Dili.  Since the Seabees advance team first 
arrived in Dili in February 2009, the unit's leadership has been 
focused on establishing its operational and logistical 
capabilities in Timor-Leste, in addition to securing adequate 
work and housing facilities for the unit.  The introduction to 
Timor-Leste of the Seabees represents a tripling of the number 
of official Americans working and residing in Timor-Leste. 
Embassy Dili is proud to have them here as partners in the 
effort to speed Timor-Leste's stable development.  The unit in 
the short term will focus on repairing Timorese schools.  As 
future deployments arrive, we would support their mandate being 
expanded to include the rehabilitation of  health clinics, youth 
centers and perhaps police stations.  We will also encourage 
future engagement with the Seabees by engineers from 
Timor-Leste's military, and perhaps the addition of a civilian 
engineering apprenticeship program. 
 
 
 
5.  (SBU)  February 2009 saw the travel to Timor-Leste of 
Seventh Fleet Commander Vice Admiral John M. Bird and the USS 
Lassen (see Dili 34).  The Government of Timor-Leste warmly 
welcomed their visits and Secretary of State for Defense Pinto, 
during meetings at USPACOM in March 2009, urged further visits 
to Timor-Leste by U.S. warships.  Embassy Dili is ready and 
eager to support additional and regular U.S. Navy ship visits in 
2009 and beyond. 
 
 
 
6.  (SBU)  One of the Government of Timor-Leste's highest 
priorities has been to improve its maritime security 
capabilities.  Towards this objective, the Timorese government 
has frequently asked for U.S. assistance, including for a legal 
advisor to assist Secretary of State for Defense Pinto in 
maritime security policy formulation and implementation, or to 
facilitate better coordination of donor support of Timorese 
naval or coast guard capabilities.  More recently, Secretary 
Pinto has secured the support of Prime Minister Gusmao to create 
an interagency National Maritime Authority (NMA) to better 
coordinate Timorese maritime security policy and programs over 
its maritime domain and seaports.  The NMA would bring together 
all relevant agencies, including the military, police, port 
authority, immigration and customs, to develop a national 
maritime strategy and the organization of an integrated maritime 
administration.  The Timorese government cites both the creation 
of the NMA and the drafting of a national maritime strategy as 
2009 priorities.  During his meetings at USPACOM in March 2009, 
Secretary Pinto requested U.S. assistance specifically towards 
the creation of the NMA and, in particular, for a legal advisor 
to support him directly in this effort. 
 
 
 
U.S. Coast Guard 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
7.  (SBU)  Since 2007, U.S. Coast Guard Mobile Training Teams 
have held four two-week seminars in Timor-Leste on port security 
leadership, with Timorese attendees from the Defense Force, 
National Police, the port authority, customs and other agencies. 
 Following the November 2008 assessment, the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG) was quick to reaffirm its commitment to assisting 
Timor-Leste by dispatching an officer to participate in a 
December 2008 Timorese organized seminar on security sector 
reform.  In March 2009, Defense Secretary Pinto  met Rear 
Admiral Manson Brown, USCG Fourteenth District Commander in 
Honolulu.  Secretary Pinto appreciated past USCG training 
programs towards improving port security, welcomed future 
assistance in this area, and invited USCG cutters to visit 
Timor-Leste.  Pinto also shared his government's intention to 
create a NMA and asked RADM Brown for USCG support in its 
creation.  Given that the NMA's ambit will encompass maritime 
law enforcement, search and rescue, and port security, U.S. 
Coast Guard support in its creation would be received very 
positively by the Timorese, and could help ensure and determine 
that its mission is coherent and realistic. 
 
DILI 00000125  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
 
 
National Security Policy Development 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
 
8.  (SBU)  Following the successful September 2008 workshop 
hosted by the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) 
to facilitate the development of Timor-Leste's first national 
security policy, work in Dili towards completion of the strategy 
paused while the government completed the draft of a national 
security law, worked on filling other gaps in law and regulation 
governing the police and military, and negotiated a framework 
agreement between the government and the UN on transfer of 
police command authority.  The Timorese government, however, 
recently identified completion of the national security policy 
by September 2009 as a national priority.  Towards this 
objective, representatives of the offices of the President and 
Secretary of State for Security contacted Embassy Dili on May 6 
with a request that the U.S. facilitate a second workshop in 
Dili in mid-June 2009 in order to conduct a final, broad-based 
local consultation with civic society and other key groups. 
Submission of a completed policy to the Council of Ministers 
would follow by September 2009.  Given our, and especially the 
APCSS's, past investment in the development of a national 
security policy for Timor-Leste, and the trust and confidence 
that the U.S. and APCSS consequently generated across the 
Timorese leadership, Embassy Dili strongly encourages and is 
eager to support APCSS participation in the June 2009 workshop. 
 
 
 
9.  (SBU)  The APCSS also invited Timor-Leste to be one of five 
Asian countries to join an October 2009 seminar on security 
sector development.  We are working with the prime minister to 
identify appropriate Timorese leaders to join the seminar. 
Embassy Dili is also in contact with the Defense Institute of 
International Legal Studies (DIILS) to follow up its landmark 
July 2008 survey of the legal infrastructure governing 
Timor-Leste's security sector. 
 
 
 
Medical and Humanitarian Mission 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
10.  (SBU)  The U.S. Air Force will deploy "Pacific Angel," its 
airborne medical unit, to Timor-Leste in July 2009.  Embassy 
Dili warmly welcomes and will provide full support to Pacific 
Angel, which will also deploy to Nusa Tenggara Timur (West 
Timor) in Indonesia.   Given the east-west Timor focus of the 
mission, we believe there is potential to give it a trilateral 
Indonesia-Timor-Leste-U.S. flavor, underline the U.S. commitment 
to both countries and boost Pacific Angel's public profile in 
both Timor-Leste and Indonesia.  For example, a remote medical 
clinic could be placed on an Indonesian-Timor-Leste border 
location with a ribbon-cutting event attended by leaders from 
Timor-Leste and Indonesia, as well as military representatives 
from all three countries.  Unfortunately, time does not permit 
securing the necessary Indonesian military support for such a 
deployment in 2009.  With an eye towards future deployments of 
Pacific Angel in Timor-Leste and Indonesia, we will pursue a 
trilateral approach perhaps in FY-2010 with the U.S. Air Force, 
Embassy Jakarta and U.S. Consulate General Surabaya. 
 
 
 
Timor-Leste's security sector priorities 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
 
11.  (SBU)  The Timorese security sector leadership, either 
civilian or military, has suggested the following for future 
U.S.-Timor-Leste cooperation. 
 
 
DILI 00000125  004 OF 005 
 
 
 
 
Legal advice and support: in the past year, we have received 
repeated requests from the Timorese for a legal advisor to serve 
alternatively with the National Parliament's commission for 
security affairs; with the Chief of Defense, Brigadier Ruak; 
and, most persistently, with Secretary of State for Defense 
Pinto.  Given Secretary Pinto's goal of soon leading the 
creation of a national maritime authority, an undertaking that 
could greatly enhance the government's ability to coordinate its 
management of security programs for the country's maritime 
domain and its ports, and lead to a more coherent approach 
towards developing Timor-Leste's maritime security capabilities, 
we should respond to Pinto's request for a legal advisor as a 
priority. 
 
 
 
National security policy development:  As discussed above and 
previously, the investment the U.S. made in hosting the 
September 2008 APCSS workshop earned us tremendous credibility 
and confidence among the Timorese leadership.  As the Timorese 
government prepares a second and final seminar in Dili to secure 
full stakeholder support for their national security policy, our 
leadership and technical contribution is again being sought. 
Embassy Dili endorses APCSS participation and is eager to 
support. 
 
 
 
Bilateral mil-mil MOU: The Prime Minister, Chief of Defense and 
Secretary of State for Defense have all requested that a 
bilateral memorandum of understanding be drafted to memorialize 
and provide structure to the growing U.S.-Timor-Leste military 
relationship.   Timor-Leste has an active MOU in place with 
Portugal and is negotiating one with Australia, New Zealand and 
others.  The Timorese government identified completion of a MOU 
with the United States as a priority for 2009.  We do not 
envision this to be a complex or lengthy document; rather a 
"plain vanilla" undertaking that would underline mutual 
aspirations for future bilateral cooperation and establish a 
framework for regular consultations.  Embassy Dili encourages 
the early drafting of an MOU, perhaps by legal staff at USPACOM, 
and sharing a draft with the Timorese as soon as possible. 
(Note: A basic Status of Forces Agreement covering short-term 
U.S. military deployments in Timor-Leste was signed in 2002.) 
 
 
 
Training facilities:  Both Timor-Leste's CHOD and its Prime 
Minister have offered to U.S. commanders the joint development 
of training areas in the country.  During LtGen Stalder's recent 
visit, he had the opportunity together with the ISF commander to 
visit some of the more remote areas of Timor-Leste that might be 
suitable for such development. 
 
 
 
Human capital development:  The PM and CHOD also have requested 
additional slots for Timorese soldiers in U.S. military training 
programs.  Our experience is that there is no more effective way 
to mold a Timorese soldier and prepare him for greater 
responsibilities than to expose him to extensive military 
training in the United States.  Embassy Dili is working to 
increase IMET resources to boost the availability of training 
slots.  A major constraint remains, however, the weak average 
English language proficiency within the Timorese military. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------------- 
 
 
 
12.  (SBU)  The above focuses on our military engagement, but 
the U.S. has also been increasing its investment in 
strengthening the National Police (PNTL).  The Naval Criminal 
Investigation Service (NCIS) concluded a two week first 
responder police training program in Dili on May 8 that was 
exceptionally well received by PNTL commanders.   A second NCIS 
course is planned for later in 2009.  The FBI and JIATF-West are 
 
DILI 00000125  005 OF 005 
 
 
exploring the development of a long term investigation and 
intelligence training program that would be targeted at the 
professionalization of the police, the Prosecutor General's 
office and other law enforcement agencies.  A Department of 
Justice Regional Legal Advisor will soon arrive in Timor-Leste 
on permanent assignment to Embassy Dili to further shape and 
focus U.S. assistance to both the justice and police sectors. 
 
 
 
13.  (SBU)  Embassy Dili encourages and is ready to support the 
further deepening of U.S. military engagement toward the 
objective of improving Timor-Leste's stability and security, 
including the professionalization of the Timorese military.  As 
Timor-Leste's government turns its focus to completing its 
national security policy and developing a national maritime 
authority and strategy, timely and focused U.S. support to these 
efforts could make a profound positive impact.  We also support 
the completion of a bilateral MOU as an expression of U.S. 
longer term commitment to Timor-Leste's stability and security. 
KLEMM