VZCZCXRO4275
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHDM #0344/01 1341113
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141113Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6359
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7615
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5765
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000344 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, EEB/ESC/TFC 
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT 
COMMERCE FOR BIS/CHRISTINO 
PARIS FOR WALLER 
LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2028 
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD GE SP SY
SUBJECT: MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS:  SYRIA 
WANTS HELP WITH CIVIL AVIATION WAIVERS 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 192 
     ¶B. DAMASCUS 286 
 
Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly, Reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (S/NF)  Summary:  In a lengthy May 7 discussion on 
differing U.S. and Syrian approaches to re-engagement, NEA 
Acting Assistant Secretary Feltman and NSC/NENA Senior 
Director Shapiro explained the routine, technical nature of 
USG's renewal of Executive Order 13338 and agreed to look for 
possible ways to help Syria acquire civil aviation spare 
parts and maintenance services allowed under U.S. sanctions 
law.  The Syrian side led by FM Muallim complained repeatedly 
that the re-certification of E.O. 13338 would send a negative 
political and economic message at a time when Syria had 
clearly demonstrated its desire to establish better relations 
with the U.S.  Muallim acknowledged that lifting sanctions 
was Washington's decision, but he argued Syrians would read 
it as a decision to extend the confrontational policies of 
previous administrations.  Muallim pushed for U.S. assistance 
in convincing French, German, and Spanish aerospace firms 
that the U.S. had no objection to their applying for export 
licenses that would allow them to service Airbus and Dassault 
planes.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) Returning to Damascus two months after their March 
7 visit, NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman and 
NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Dan 
Shapiro met May 7 for four hours with Syrian Foreign Minister 
Walid al-Muallim, Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad, and 
the President Asad's Political and Media Advisor Bouthayna 
Shaaban.  This cable focuses on their discussions on 
sanctions. It should be read with septel reports on general 
views of re-engagement, Iraq, Palestinian reconciliation, 
Syrian-Israeli peace discussions, Iran, and human rights. 
 
--------------------- 
Renewal of E.O. 13338 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Acting A/S Feltman told Muallim he and NSC Senior 
Director Shapiro had sought to schedule their visit the 
previous week to discuss the pending renewal of E.O. 13338 
with the Syrian government directly, not through the media. 
President Asad's travel to Europe had, however, precluded 
this possibility.  The President would be informing Congress 
on his decision to renew E.O. 13338.  Syrian officials were 
transparent about their support of armed Arab "resistance" to 
Israeli occupation, and the U.S. was equally transparent 
about its concerns about Syria's support of Hizballah and 
Hamas.  The Syria Accountability Act was U.S. law, and the 
Executive Branch was required to implement this law.  Feltman 
said he understood this decision would be unwelcome in Syria, 
but the decision was at the heart of issues still dividing 
the two countries.  The decision did not preclude the 
possibility of more flexible interpretations in the future or 
treating civil aviation issues differently. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  Muallim, echoed by Vice FM Miqdad and 
Presidential Advisor Shaaban, argued that the sanctions 
renewal represented a continuation of the previous 
administration's policy and raised doubts about the new 
administration's intention to engage Syria.  Muallim 
acknowledged that the sanctions issue was a Washington 
 
DAMASCUS 00000344  002 OF 003 
 
 
prerogative, but said continuation of sanctions would impede 
establishment of a "normal" bilateral relationship.  European 
firms would react very negatively to the renewal of E.O. 
13338, regardless of the administration's desire to be more 
helpful on civil aviation, Muallim asserted. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  Feltman said he understood the problem.  He 
pointed out that the new administration had articulated a 
broad vision for a new foreign policy approach based on 
principled and sustained engagement. Despite differences with 
Syria over its support of Hizballah and Hamas, the President 
had used a language of respect.  Feltman and Shapiro said 
they had explained during their March 7 meeting that the U.S. 
had no intention of using civil aviation or safety-of-flight 
issues as a political lever.  They had agreed, at Muallim's 
request, to look into Syria's problems with a German firm 
(Lufthansa Techniq) contracted to perform maintenance on 
Syrian Air Airbus engines (ref A).  In addition, the Embassy 
had met April 15 with Vice Minister Miqdad and officials from 
Syrian Air to discuss several other civil aviation issues, 
including Lufthansa Techniq, in greater detail (Ref B).  The 
common problem seemed to be that European firms contracted by 
Syrian Air had not yet applied for the necessary export 
licenses through the U.S. Department of Commerce.  Under U.S. 
regulations, these companies needed to consult Commerce. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF)  Muallim replied that these companies were already 
very reluctant to expose themselves to possible USG legal 
action because of the strict policies of the previous 
administration.  The renewal of E.O. 13338 would make them 
even more reluctant.  Muallim asked several times for U.S. 
assistance in communicating to these firms that the renewal 
of E.O. 13338 did not mean the U.S. government would take an 
unfavorable view of their desire to perform maintenance on 
civilian aircraft allowed under U.S. law.  Feltman and 
Shapiro repeated that U.S. legal procedures required the 
firms themselves to contact the Department of Commerce. 
Since they had a business interest in doing so, it was 
incumbent on them to request Commerce's advice on how to 
proceed.  "They're afraid," replied Muallim, "please help 
us." 
 
----------------------------------------- 
New Case:  Syria's Problems with Dassault 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S/NF)  Muallim explained that, in addition to problems 
already discussed with the U.S., Syria had found it 
impossible to convince the French aerospace firm Dassault to 
seek the necessary licenses to perform maintenance on three 
Syrian-owned Falcon aircraft used by President Asad and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for official travel.  Muallim 
said he had spoken to the French Ambassador in Damascus, who 
confirmed the company's unwillingness to risk possible USG 
actions against it as a consequence of seeking the necessary 
export licenses.  Feltman replied that the Syrian government 
should encourage the French company to contact Commerce. 
Though he could not give a commitment on behalf of Commerce, 
the U.S. would be reasonable in considering legitimate 
safety-of-flight requests.  The Charge added that Dassault 
could request an advisory opinion from Commerce to determine 
the need for an export license.  If Dassault made such a 
request, Commerce could respond quickly. 
 
 
DAMASCUS 00000344  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶8.  (S/NF)  Muallim reviewed ongoing problems with Lufthansa 
Techniq, which currently had possession of two Airbus engines 
belonging to Syrian Air.  The German firm worried that, 
because it had accepted two engines without the necessary 
permission, asking for an export license now might lead to 
legal actions against it.  "They are afraid," explained 
Muallim.  Dassault was also reluctant to make contact with 
Commerce without assurances that doing so would not risk 
punitive USG actions.  Muallim suggested the State Department 
or appropriate U.S. agency might inform these firms of the 
U.S. intent not to take hostile actions against them. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF)  Feltman and Shapiro said they would look at 
possible ways to assist, subject to U.S. laws and 
regulations.  They reminded Muallim that the European firms 
should be aware of President Obama's new approach to foreign 
policy and take that into consideration.  Syrian officials 
should inform these companies not to assume negative answers. 
 
CONNELLY