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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1515
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RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 1206
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CANBERRA 000474 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR P, EAP 
PACOM FOR POLAD 
NSC FOR JEFF BADER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS CH AS
SUBJECT: READOUT OF AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 
PRE-BRIEF TO CHINA 
 
REF: A. CANBERRA 454 
     ¶B. IIR 6V 814 1105 09 
 
CANBERRA 00000474  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor James F Cole.  Reasons: 1.4 
(a),(b),(c),(d) 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary:  Australian Defence Deputy Secretary 
Michael Pezzullo invited emboffs to hear a readout of 
Beijing's reaction to his April 27 briefing on Australia's 
Defence White Paper in advance of its May 2 public release. 
He said he used the opportunity specifically to disavow 
recent Australian media reports playing up the White Paper's 
focus on China's military modernization, and to stress that 
Australia did not see China as a threat.  The Chinese 
initially appeared quite surprised by the report's references 
to China and reacted cautiously and negatively; however, by 
the second briefing, they had tempered their responses. 
Noting that he had not heard any further reactions from the 
Chinese since April 27, Pezzullo believed that they were 
obviously taking their time to mull over the White Paper, but 
expected to hear further reaction when senior Chinese 
officials visited Canberra in the coming weeks.  Pezzullo's 
account elaborated on details provided in reftels, but 
presented the Chinese as displaying a more nuanced reaction 
than previously reported.  He also summarized reactions from 
the Japanese, Indonesians, and Indians.  End Summary. 
 
---------------- 
Chinese reaction 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) Australian Defence Deputy Secretary and principal 
architect of the Defence White Paper Michael Pezzullo told 
Embassy officials, including the Defense Attache, Political 
Counselor, and Station Chief, that Defence Minister 
Fitzgibbon had instructed him to make a "special effort" to 
brief the United States on his April 27 Beijing trip. 
Pezzullo started the meeting by distributing a written 
summary of what he told the Chinese and their reaction (see 
full text in paragraph 9 below).  He said he used his visit 
specifically to disavow recent media reports playing up the 
White Paper's focus on China military modernization and to 
stress that Australia did not see China as a threat. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Pezzullo briefed the Chinese in three rounds.  He 
first met the Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office 
of the Ministry of National Defense Major General Jia 
Xiaoning; then Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Vice 
Minister He Yafei; and the Deputy Chief of the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department's Lieutenant 
General Ma Xiaotian.  Although the Chinese were well briefed 
on Australian media reports on the White Paper, they appeared 
quite surprised by the information presented by Pezzullo and 
initially reacted cautiously and negatively.  Characterizing 
his meeting with Major General Jia as the "bruiser," Pezzullo 
said a "look of cold fury" washed over Jia's face after 
hearing the references to China.  During each of the 
briefings, the Chinese asked Pezzullo to revise the 
description of the regional security environment.  In 
particular, they were concerned with the paragraph describing 
Qparticular, they were concerned with the paragraph describing 
Chinese military modernization as appearing "potentially to 
be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict 
over Taiwan."  Despite their initial reaction, by the second 
briefing, the Chinese had tempered their response, Pezzullo 
said, characterizing MFA Vice Minister He Yafei as "extremely 
smooth."  The PLA colonel who escorted Pezzullo to his 
outbound flight made one last attempt to have the line on 
contingencies beyond Taiwan removed by trying to appeal to 
Pezzullo's "intellect and sophistication."  Pezzullo said he 
responded firmly that the White Paper would not be changed, 
and that he had not come to negotiate it. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Pezzullo said Australia had not heard any further 
Chinese reactions since April 27 and believed they are taking 
their time to mull over the White Paper, but expected to hear 
 
CANBERRA 00000474  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
further reaction when senior Chinese military officials 
visited Canberra in the coming weeks.  Pezzullo said the real 
test would come when the Chinese deconstructed chapter six, 
on Australia's defense policy and strategic posture, and 
chapter seven, outlining the principal task for the 
Australian Defence Force.  Pezzullo also noted that if 
Australia had used the White Paper to announce plans for the 
joint U.S.-Australia space radar program, the Chinese might 
had paid more attention to the sections on cyber warfare. 
 
----------------- 
Japanese reaction 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) Japan was "shocked" by White Paper's stated 
intentions to double the size of Australia's submarine force 
to twelve submarines and the fiscal implications of the 
commitment, Pezzullo said.  The Defense Vice Minister did a 
"double take" and noted that Japan had only 16 submarines. 
When asked by a more junior officer about the rationale 
behind the increase, Pezzullo said Australia was not 
responding to any threats but attempting to upgrade its 
capacity.  The Japanese, who were briefed one day before 
Pezzullo traveled to China, predicted that Pezzullo would 
have "interesting meetings in Beijing."  Deputy Foreign 
Minister Sasae, who was previously Japan's Six-Party Talks 
negotiator, said while negotiating with China would continue 
to be difficult, he had not given up on China's potential to 
take its role as a responsible stakeholder. 
 
------------------------ 
Other regional reactions 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) The Indonesian said they believed the White 
Paper's objectives, even the long-range, land-attack 
missiles, were consistent with Australia's policy of the last 
30-60 years.  Pezzullo, however, noted that their body 
language suggested they questioned Australia's intentions 
behind its far-reaching expansion. 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) The Indians appeared "pleasantly surprised" that 
Australia made the effort to brief them prior to the White 
Paper's public release, noting it was the first time 
Australia had done so.  They were also surprised by the 
paragraph declaring the Indian Ocean would join the Pacific 
Ocean "in terms of its centrality to Australia's maritime 
strategy and defense planning," and said they looked forward 
to their continued cooperation with Australia.  Pezzullo said 
Prime Minister Rudd was keen to include that paragraph.  The 
Indian Ocean had always been central to Australia's strategic 
planning but had not been highlighted until now.  Australia 
wanted to continue working with India on a range of issues, 
including disaster and humanitarian relief, counterterrorism, 
and anti-piracy. 
 
----------------- 
Domestic reaction 
----------------- 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) Defending the White Paper against domestic 
criticisms on its focus on China and costs for the programs, 
Pezzullo said the government was prudently planning for 
future security.  He noted that the opposition's questions on 
costs and accountability were "managerial rather than 
Qcosts and accountability were "managerial rather than 
strategic disagreements." 
 
-------- 
Comments 
-------- 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Pezzullo's account of the Chinese reaction 
elaborated on details provided in reftels, but presented the 
Chinese as displaying a more nuanced reaction than previously 
reported.  While the Chinese were clearly prepared to press 
 
CANBERRA 00000474  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
hard for changes, for example, neither in the summary handout 
or his oral briefing did Pezzullo refer to any express or 
implied threats.  While he left open the prospect that China 
might express its displeasure by "throttling back" on some 
bilateral activities, he did not mention the denial of the 
ship visits mentioned reftels.  In his readout, Pezzullo made 
clear that top levels of the GOA wanted the account of 
China's reaction to his pre-brief to be conveyed to senior 
USG levels. 
 
Begin Text 
 
SECRET REL AUS/US 
DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITE PAPER VISIT TO CHINA 
 
On 27 April 2009, then Deputy Secretary White Paper Michael 
Pezzullo (DEPSEC WP) briefed senior officers from the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs on the contents of the Defence White Paper ahead of 
its public release.  The briefings were held in three rounds. 
 The first was to the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry 
of National Defence (Major General Jia Xiaoning); the second 
was to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vice Minister He 
Yafei); and, lastly, DEPSEC WP briefed the Deputy Chief of 
the PLA General Staff Department (Lieutenant General Ma 
Xiaotian). 
 
The PLA was, as always, well briefed and well prepared for 
these meetings.  The Chinese appeared genuinely appreciative 
of Australia's gesture in providing a confidential, and 
detailed, advance briefing directly from the White Paper's 
author. 
 
The Australian brief outlined the historical background to 
the White Paper, its key assumptions and conclusions, and 
details of planned defence acquisitions contained in it. 
DEPSEC WP used the opportunity specifically to disavow recent 
media reports playing up China's military modernisation, and 
stressed that we did not see China as a threat. 
 
China's initial response to the briefing was cautious and 
negative.  Its main concern was that the White Paper 
indirectly identified China as a threat and the PLA said it 
wanted Australia to reconsider our description of a more 
challenging regional security environment. 
 
Throughout the visit DEPSEC WP chose to refrain from engaging 
in extensive argument but he made clear that: 
 
- The Chinese White Paper had been reviewed and taken into 
account in the draft text of the Defence White Paper. 
- Based on any objective reading of the document the Chinese 
would see that there was no so called 'China threat' thesis 
built into the 'code' of the Australian White Paper. 
- Australia would not be redrafting passages of the document, 
as sought by the Chinese, particularly the paragraph dealing 
with the structure and pace of China's military modernization 
and referring to Taiwan. 
- We place great importance on strengthening, broadening and 
deepening our bilateral Defence engagement. 
China seemed concerned that readers of the White Paper (other 
countries, Australian and international media, nationalist 
Chinese citizens) will draw from the indirect references to 
China's military growth conclusions about a threat from 
QChina's military growth conclusions about a threat from 
China.  This would undermine China's diplomatic campaign to 
debunk what it calls disparagingly the 'China threat theory'. 
 Despite assurances from interlocutors that China is not 
taking media reports about the White Paper seriously, media 
reaction in Australia to the White Paper will have some 
influence on China's response. 
 
Once the PLA has had time to digest the White Paper more 
fully, it may also have concerns over aspects of the force 
structure that the document envisages for Australia, though 
such concerns are likely to be of a lesser order to its 
 
CANBERRA 00000474  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
annoyance at the 'naming and shaming' aspect.  We would be 
surprised if China allowed concerns over the White Paper to 
impact on the overall bilateral relationship, but it may 
choose to express its displeasure by throttling back 
temporarily on some bilateral defence activities.  To date, 
our Post in Beijing reports that there have been no 
indicators that China will choose this course of action. 
Chinese analysts briefed on the White Paper were not overly 
concerned about references to China and while PLA staff have 
engaged in debate with Post, they have been willing to 
continue ongoing bilateral arrangements. 
 
SECRET REL AUS/US 
 
End text. 
 
CLUNE