VZCZCXRO0705
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #1146 1310231
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 110231Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6971
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7013
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9650
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1612
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5470
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1590
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 6535
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS BANGKOK 001146 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PGOV PINR PREL ASR TH
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT 
NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
 
REF: SECSTATE 21815 
 
¶1. (U) Please see requests for further information in paras 2 
and 3. 
 
GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a joint demarche on May 5 with the embassies of 
Australia, Japan, and Russia, we delivered reftel talking 
points on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(GICNT) to Cherdkiat Attakor, Director of the Peace, Security 
and Disarmament Division of the MFA,s Department of 
International Organizations.  Cherdkiat said Thailand 
supports endorsing the GICNT in principle and affirmed that 
Thailand had been approached in 2006 regarding joining the 
initiative.  He said the MFA has hosted several interagency 
meetings to consider the GICNT, and all the relevant agencies 
believe Thailand has the capacity to join and to contribute. 
Cherdkiat said he foresees endorsing the initiative in the 
future, but the RTG is having a problem deciding on the 
appropriate focal point in the government for the GICNT.  The 
GICNT cuts across several functional areas in the Thai 
bureaucracy and they need to decide which agency will be the 
lead.  He asked if we could share the POC,s for all the 
current GI participating nations so they could see how other 
countries had decided to handle the issue. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Cherdkiat also requested clarification on the role 
of the Implementation and Assessments Group, and reporting 
requirements.  Referring to the Terms of Reference for 
Implementation and Assessment, the last two bullets, he said, 
seem to imply there may be some reporting requirement.  He 
asked for clarification of these bullets and whether it would 
mean the RTG would be required to report progress on 
implementation to some executive body, such as the 
Implementation and Assessments Group.  Within this context, 
he wanted more information on the role of the Implementation 
and Assessments Group. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Cherdkiat said he had just returned from a 
Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Cuba where he discussed the 
GICNT with his Vietnamese counterpart.  He said they 
discussed the GICNT in the context of ASEAN and whether it 
would be possible for all the ASEAN nations to endorse the 
initiative.  He said Vietnam was supportive of this idea.  He 
clarified to us that other ASEAN nations joining was not a 
condition for Thailand to join, but rather an idea to pursue. 
 He said a decision by Thailand to endorse the GICNT would be 
independent of whether he chose to pursue the ASEAN idea.  He 
reiterated that Thailand supported GICNT in principle, but 
needed to work out internal bureaucratic issues.  (Comment: 
Our exchange on the GICNT was positive, and we believe our 
Thai interlocutors would like to endorse the statement of 
principles, but bureaucratic obstacles could prove 
significant.  End Comment.) 
 
TREATY ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) In closing, Cherdkiat brought-up the Bangkok Treaty 
on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (the Bangkok 
Treaty).  He said China has expressed interest in the treaty, 
and asked if China,s interest affected our view of it.  We 
responded, along with the Australians and Japanese, that we 
were not prepared to discuss the Bangkok Treaty, but we would 
relay his question to our respective capitals.  The Russians 
responded that they supported the idea of a nuclear 
weapons-free SEA, but would only join the Bangkok Treaty if 
all the nuclear weapons states joined at the same time. 
JOHN