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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001101 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PHUM KJUS KDEM ASEC MOPS TH
SUBJECT: CROWD CONTROL DURING RECENT PROTESTS IN THAILAND 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 983 (BRIEFING DIP CORPS) 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 974 (BANGKOK CALM) 
     ¶C. HOTR IIR 6 895 0221 09 (PROTESTS END) 
     ¶D. HOTR IIR 6 895 0216 09 (PROTESTS AT PATTAYA) 
     ¶E. BANGKOK 951 (SHIFT TO PATTAYA) 
     ¶F. 06 BANGKOK 7501 (POLICE REFORM) 
 
BANGKOK 00001101  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) The Thai Army, rather than the police, played the 
leading role in quelling angry demonstrations in Bangkok 
April 12-14.  The Thai government's decision to rely on the 
Army may have stemmed from several factors, including the 
political views of leading Army and police officers, as well 
as lack of confidence the police would take the actions 
necessary to restore order on the streets.  The failure of 
police officials to prevent demonstrators in Pattaya from 
disrupting the ASEAN Summit April 11 may reflect poor 
planning or capabilities or a lack of will, but restrictive 
rules of engagement imposed by the Prime Minister likely 
exacerbated those factors; military units (navy and army) had 
also deployed in Pattaya and ultimately proved no more 
effective than the police. 
 
¶2. (C) We assess that the Thai police have a reasonable 
capability for crowd control.  The military appears 
interested in expanding its crowd control capabilities, and 
at least one senior officer believed the Army's capabilities 
improved thanks to the U.S.-funded Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI) training.  It is unclear whether the police 
(or, if again involved, the Army) will in the future be more 
effective in containing protests; actions taken by security 
forces against political protestors will likely continue to 
reflect a combination of the rules of engagement dictated by 
civilian policymakers and the security forces' motivation, 
skills, and equipment.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
AFTER PATTAYA, ABHISIT TURNED TO THE ARMY 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) On April 10-11, thousands of anti-government United 
Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) "redshirt" 
protestors converged on the seaside town of Pattaya, where 
Thailand was hosting a Summit meeting of East Asian leaders 
(ref E).  Despite forewarning in the form of public 
statements from UDD leaders expressing a desire to disrupt 
the Summit, both police and military officials at the site 
were unable or unwilling to maintain order.  Demonstrators 
blocked key roads and entered a hotel complex housing 
visiting dignitaries, ultimately forcing the Summit's 
cancellation and leading to a severe loss of face for Prime 
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his administration.  An 
Australian diplomat on site in Pattaya preparing to support 
the participation of the Australian PM told us that she took 
a photo of the Pattaya police chief strolling arm in arm with 
redshirt demonstrators the morning of April 11; the police 
chief was subsequently transferred to an inactive post. 
(Note: When the UDD protestors pushed through military lines, 
the government had not yet declared a state of emergency in 
Pattaya, and the soldiers were under extremely strict rules 
of engagement.  End Note.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) When the UDD then resumed demonstrations in Bangkok, 
Abhisit used existing provisions of Thai law to declare a 
state of emergency in Bangkok and surrounding provinces on 
April 12.  Abhisit issued a directive that appointed Deputy 
Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, a civilian politician, as 
both the "Authorizing Supervising Official" and as the "Chief 
Official" for "resolving the emergency situation."  Abhisit 
gave Suthep "the powers to resolve the severe emergency 
situation in accordance with the Emergency Decree on Public 
Administration in Emergency Situation" and to "(c)ommand and 
instruct relevant government agencies and officials..." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Abhisit's directive also stated that "Police 
officers of the National Police Bureau, military officers and 
civil servants... shall be competent officials under the 
(Emergency Decree)..."  (Note: In this context "competent 
 
BANGKOK 00001101  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
officials" is a technical term meaning persons empowered by 
the Prime Minister to perform actions under the Emergency 
Decree.)  Furthermore, "In cases where it becomes 
necessary... military officials shall assist in the operation 
(to restore order)." 
 
WHY NOT THE POLICE? 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) When former PMs Samak and Somchai declared similar 
states of emergencies in Bangkok in late 2008 in response to 
People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protests which occupied 
Government House starting in August and shut down Bangkok's 
airports in November, they chose alternate authorizing 
officials; Samak named the Army Commander, and Somchai named 
the Police Chief.  In both cases, neither authorizing 
official moved to use force to clear the PAD crowds, in part 
citing the lack of a PM's order for them to do so. 
 
¶7. (C) It remains unclear to us precisely how the RTG under 
DPM Suthep's direction divided crowd control responsibilities 
in Bangkok between the Army and the police April 12-14, but 
the Army clearly served as the lead agency for dispersing and 
containing crowds, while the police also remained involved. 
Speaking publicly on April 17, Abhisit explained his 
preference, referring vaguely to "some difficulties" which 
had occurred in 2008.  Among the reasons why we believe 
Abhisit sought to give the Army the leading role: 
 
- POLITICAL LOYALTIES: Both soldiers and police officials 
swear their oath of allegiance to the King, but in the 
current highly polarized environment, the Army has appeared 
staunchly supportive of the monarchy, while many Thais 
perceive the police as sympathetic toward former Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a former police officer.  As 
noted in ref F, during his time in office, Thaksin had 
increased the influence of the police, sometimes at the 
Army's expense.  After Army leaders carried out the 2006 coup 
d'etat, the pro-military administration, as one of its many 
initiatives, made an unsuccessful attempt to carry out a 
wide-ranging restructuring of Thailand's police force that 
would have diminished the institution markedly.  We observed 
some low-ranking police officers enthusiastically 
participating in UDD protests. 
 
- RISK AVERSION: The impact on the police of the public 
backlash following the October 7, 2008 clash between the 
police and PAD protestors should not be underestimated, in 
terms of plummeting morale and risk aversion in politicized 
situations.  The PAD trumpeted the clash, in which dozens 
were injured, as a national trauma.  There was widespread 
sympathy, including from Queen Sirikit, for a female 
protestor who died from the injuries she sustained.  Several 
separate investigations ensued, though none have reached 
conclusion. 
 
- CAPABILITIES: In the aforementioned October 7 
confrontation, the police units involved demonstrated that 
they were not trained very well.  For example, at least one 
police officer fired a tear gas canister directly into the 
assembled PAD supporters, rather than aiming above the crowd. 
 The police also seemed to have poor quality equipment; some 
critics alleged the Chinese-made tear gas canisters contained 
small amounts of explosives which detonated with lethal 
force.  Abhisit remarked to the diplomatic corps on April 16 
that, had the police been in charge of dispersing UDD 
protestors, they likely would have caused more harm to 
protestors than soldiers did (ref A). 
 
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT KEY 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The growing issue of "risk aversion" cited affects not 
only the police, but also civilian officials.  We believe it 
important to recognize that PM Abhisit and his subordinates 
imposed stringent rules of engagement during the recent 
protests.  Written statements provided by the MFA to the 
diplomatic community noted: 
 
- In an April 13 televised address, Abhisit "stressed that 
the most important guideline he had given to government 
 
BANGKOK 00001101  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
officials responsible for resolving the situation was that 
the measures... shall not cause any deaths....  (T)he 
government will carry out measures based on non-violence..." 
 
- In an April 13 televised appearance, Chief of the Defense 
Forces General Songkitti Jaggabatara announced that, in the 
restoration of order, "(n)o weapons will be used, except for 
self-defence, and measures will be imposed only when 
necessary and for a period required to resolve the 
situation....  Security officers are strictly instructed to 
use weapons in two manners only: first, live bullets are to 
be used as warning shots by shooting into the sky, and 
second, blank bullets will be used in cases where protesters 
advance upon security officers." 
 
- In an April 19 televised address, Abhisit "reaffirmed that 
the policy guideline he gave to security officers involved in 
the operations to restore peace and order was for them to 
exercise utmost restraint and avoid any use of force." 
 
¶9. (C) Given the extraordinarily politicized environment and 
the strict rules of engagement, we believe that the most 
recent police attempts to contain UDD demonstrators did not 
reflect the full extent of police capabilities.  While a DAO 
officer observed that the police offered minimal resistance 
to protestors in Pattaya, military units from the navy and 
army, under strict rules of engagement, as noted in para two, 
above, also were present at the Summit site and similarly 
failed to impede protestors (ref D). 
 
POLICE AT THE EMBASSY - JOB DONE WELL 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) RSO has been satisfied with the police's crowd 
control actions at the Embassy (on the rare occasions when it 
is required), as well as with other police efforts to protect 
our mission.  During a recent demonstration in front of the 
entrance to the Chancery, several hundred protestors were 
contained but permitted to exercise their right to 
demonstrate regarding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.  The 
police ensured they had barriers and sufficient officers to 
send a clear signal of control.  The RSO section has 
exceptional relations with Special Branch police, the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Police, the police SWAT operation (which has 
received USG training), and each individual police precinct 
that has a connection to any of our people or residences. 
 
¶11. (C) Recently, in light of the ongoing political crisis, 
RSO requested the Diplomatic Security bureau's Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance (ATA) program consider offering training on crowd 
control.  ATA does not currently offer such a course, and RSO 
is seeking to devise a course in-house, seeking input from 
various U.S. police organizations which have dealt with this 
problem and from other foreign missions.  (So far, the RSO 
has only had operational, technical and philosophical 
discussions with the police on crowd control.) 
 
ARMY CROWD CONTROL CAPABILITIES 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Many observers -- including even a UDD co-leader (ref 
B) -- believe that the Army acted with appropriate restraint 
and discipline when containing and dispersing UDD protests. 
(Ref C reports a DAO officer's observations.)  The troops 
involved were infantry soldiers from the First Army Area. 
DAO personnel have in the past observed Thai soldiers 
training for crowd control with appropriate gear, such as 
shields, batons, and water cannon trucks.  Not surprisingly, 
however, the Army appears to lack the equipment for troops to 
handle large crowds engaged in simultaneous demonstrations at 
multiple sites.  Nevertheless, DAO observed during the recent 
Bangkok demonstrations that the Army's forceful presence, 
including the visible deployment of light infantry weaponry 
(such as vehicle-mounted machine guns), had an intimidating 
effect that likely made protestors less willing to confront 
the troops than they might have been to confront police. 
 
¶13. (C) Lieutenant General Surapong Suwana-adth, Director of 
Joint Intelligence at the Royal Thai Armed Forces 
Headquarters, told the Defense Attache Corps after the recent 
demonstrations that the Army, in its crowd control actions, 
 
BANGKOK 00001101  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
benefited from Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 
training it had received.  Surapong told us this training had 
proven very useful, allowing the Army to engage protestors in 
a disciplined manner, and the Army intended to pursue further 
such training.  (Note: We understand that GPOI training does 
not specifically aim to prepare troops for the role they 
played in the recent Bangkok disturbances, but some GPOI 
training entails checkpoint control, and control over crowds 
in a military mission environment using normal military 
equipment such as flak vests and weapons, rather than 
specialized crowd control gear.  End Note.) 
 
¶14. (C) A British Embassy officer told us recently that Chief 
of Defense Forces GEN Songkitti intended to travel to the UK 
in the near future and would discuss a potential purchase of 
riot control equipment.  (The British Embassy officer was 
unsure whether his government would look favorably on such a 
potential sale.) 
JOHN