VZCZCXRO6991
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1385/01 1470953
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK DUE TO NUMEROUS SVC
R 270953Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3216
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0049
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0083
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0792

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP KTIA KLSO CWC IZ
SUBJECT: GOI SLOWLY MAKING PROGRESS IN WMD NONPROLIFERATION 
AWARENESS 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 286 
 
BAGHDAD 00001385  001.5 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Michael H. 
Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Government of Iraq (GOI) is slowly making 
progress in building support among its various ministries for 
the complex tasks the GOI faces in order to fulfill its 
international obligations in the field of WMD 
nonproliferation.  The Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate 
(INMD) and the Crisis Action Cell (CAC) over the past two 
months have hosted a series of workshops to begin 
coordinating the roles and responsibilities of various 
ministries related to chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (CBRN) activities , both regarding their obligations 
under normal circumstances and in the event of a WMD-related 
crisis.  Participants agreed on the need to conduct 
government-wide strategic planning, develop regulatory 
structures and coordinate their programs in order to remove 
Chapter VII UN Security Council restrictions, develop 
advanced civilian industries, and prevent sensitive materials 
from falling into the wrong hands.  The Minister of Science 
and Technology has formally requested U.S. assistance for 
training with regard to GOI obligations related to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which the Department is 
responding by planning future training opportunities for 
Iraq.  Post will continue to engage with these various GOI 
entities, seeking to encourage and build on the emerging 
avenues of cooperation that can help achieve Iraq's remaining 
WMD nonproliferation obligations.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Building Support for WMD Nonproliferation 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Representatives from Iraq's national authority for 
nonproliferation treaties and key national security officials 
are slowly making progress in building support for WMD 
nonproliferation among its many ministries and authorities 
that have programs and responsibilities related to chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) activities. 
These officials collectively recognize the necessity of 
developing complex national policies, regulations and 
coordination systems in order to fulfill Iraq's international 
obligations in the field of WMD nonproliferation. 
 
¶3. (C) The INMD, the GOI's national authority responsible for 
the implementation of WMD nonproliferation treaties and 
conventions, has championed this issue for the past several 
years but found it difficult to obtain support and 
cooperation from disparate ministries consumed by other 
priorities.  The INMD's efforts appear to be slowly gaining 
ground, however, achieving Iraq's accession to the CWC in 
January through engagement with the Council of 
Representatives (COR) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and in subsequent months fulfilling initial CWC declaration 
requirements. 
 
¶4. (C) A senior official responsible for the CAC under the 
Iraqi National Security Council Secretariat has also taken an 
interest facilitating government-wide WMD nonproliferation 
efforts and over the past month has sponsored a series of 
workshops and exercises aimed at building awareness among 
government ministries for the work the GOI needs to 
accomplish in this area. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Q-------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Government-Wide Workshops Focus on Complexity of Tasks 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5. (C) On April 22, the CAC hosted Iraq's first WMD emergency 
response tabletop exercise at the Prime Minister's National 
Operations Center.  Representatives from the Iraqi Ministries 
of Defense, Interior, Science and Technology, Health, Energy, 
Environment, Industry, Trade, and others discussed their 
roles and potential responses to a notional chemical spill in 
Baghdad and a radiological explosion in Karbala.  The 
exercise followed up on an initial gathering in late March 
where these ministries provided briefs on their 
clearly-limited existing capabilities to respond to a 
WMD-related incident.  Both events were prepared and 
conducted with substantial assistance from MNF-I and Embassy 
officials. 
 
¶6. (C) Despite some confusion over how to run through the 
 
BAGHDAD 00001385  002.6 OF 003 
 
 
exercise itself, what GOI authority would exercise overall 
command and control, and how much time for deliberation a 
real crisis would afford, the participants found the exercise 
useful and generally agreed on key lessons learned.  Multiple 
ministry officials stressed the need for strategic planning, 
crisis management procedures and coordination mechanisms 
ahead of a crisis in order to mitigate the confusion and 
manage the complexity of response that a hazardous incident 
requires.  The officials expressed support for continued 
meetings to begin such planning efforts. 
 
¶7. (C) On April 29, the CAC and INMD hosted an informational 
workshop on Iraq's obligations under nonproliferation 
treaties, conventions and laws.  Mohammed Jawad Al-Sharaa, 
INMD Director General, briefed senior representatives from 
the same set of ministries on Iraq's laws and the 
international agreements, to which Iraq is party, related to 
WMD nonproliferation.  The heads of the chemical, biological 
and nuclear sections of the INMD then briefed on each of 
their fields, including specific commitments, obligations and 
benefits of participation in the CWC, Biological Weapons 
Convention, and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 
respectively.  Iraq is now party to all three.  Participants 
appeared engaged, taking notes and asking questions 
reflecting understanding of the importance and complexity of 
the tasks they face. 
 
¶8. (C) Customs, Trade and Electricity representatives 
inquired about their specific responsibilities, expressing 
concern about how complex and resource-intensive they might 
prove.  Al-Sharaa explained that the key objective is 
thorough documentation and monitoring of various technologies 
and materials in Iraq to ensure they do not end up in the 
wrong hands, rather than expecting the ministries to store 
and move materials themselves, or to block their movement and 
use in Iraq.  The officials all stressed that Iraq needs to 
be able to import, export and utilize modern technology and 
industrial materials in order to develop a range of 
industries, for economic development as well as for societal 
needs like medical services.  They also acknowledged the 
relevance of remaining security threats in Iraq and the need 
to prevent terrorists from gaining access to sensitive 
materials. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Draft Nonproliferation Legislation 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) During his April 29 briefing, Al-Sharaa mentioned the 
comprehensive draft legislation on nonproliferation that the 
INMD has prepared for approval by the COR.  This draft 
legislation defines the responsibilities of key ministries 
involved in nonproliferation and is accompanied by detailed 
instructions for the implementation of Iraq's 
nonproliferation obligations.  It also grants the INMD the 
status of an independent national authority, rather than a 
directorate of the Ministry of Science and Technology, which 
would empower it to exercise coordination and oversight of 
other ministries' nonproliferation-related activities. 
Al-Sharaa reiterated on April 29 what he has told EmbOffs in 
the past, that he expects it to take up to a year to get the 
legislation through the COR.  He briefed the legislation at a 
meeting of the Deputy National Security Council in February 
Qmeeting of the Deputy National Security Council in February 
and has expressed the hope that the recent inter-ministerial 
workshops will also help build awareness and support for the 
legislation.  Al-Sharaa told us May 14 that the draft 
legislation had been rejected by the Council of Ministers 
because the Minister of Justice believed the INMD was 
"putting too many restrictions on the GOI."  Continued 
engagement with concerned ministries will emphasize the need 
for WMD nonproliferation legislation in line with the GOI's 
international obligations and to assist the GOI to come out 
from under UN Chapter VII resolutions. 
 
¶10. (C) In response to a request from the U.S. delegation to 
the 56th Session of the Executive Council of the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at the Hague 
(Reftel), Minister of Science and Technology Raid Fahmi 
forwarded an official request for USG assistance to 
Ambassador Hill in "carrying out our future obligations 
related to the CWC" on April 29.  The Department has received 
the request and is in the process of planning future training 
assistance to Iraq in this field, in coordination with the 
Department of Defense. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00001385  003.4 OF 003 
 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) As the GOI seeks to normalize its role in the 
international community, it is increasingly paying attention 
to the requirements and restrictions imposed by the 
international community on its activities, including in the 
field of nonproliferation.  The desire to end Chapter VII 
restrictions stems not only from the central leadership 
seeking sovereignty and international legitimacy, but is a 
desire shared increasingly by the government's technocrats 
for practical reasons as they seek to develop Iraqi 
industries and services in advanced and sensitive areas. 
 
¶12. (C) Fulfilling Iraq's nonproliferation obligations will 
require complex government-wide efforts, including the 
establishment of regulatory structures, import/export 
controls, and safeguards for a variety of technologies, 
materials and activities used in multiple sectors.  The 
expansion of parties within Iraq who recognize the relevance 
of WMD nonproliferation to their activities and are willing 
to coordinate their efforts for practical benefits increases 
the chances of fulfilling these requirements.  The greater 
the number of parties within the GOI that understand the 
importance of WMD nonproliferation and that are willing to 
coordinate their efforts increases the chances of fulfilling 
these requirements.  GOI technocrats, as opposed to political 
leaders, are probably best suited to take the practical steps 
needed to fulfill Iraqi's nonproliferation obligations and 
achieve the termination of Chapter VII resolutions that the 
political leaders demand.  Post will continue to engage with 
these various GOI entities, seeking to encourage and build on 
the emerging avenues of cooperation that can help achieve 
Iraq's remaining WMD nonproliferation obligations. 
HILL