VZCZCXRO9824
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0218 1171317
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271317Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9167
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR FOR DAS JONES & DAS GARBER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SI EUC HR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MESIC ON SLOVENE BORDER 
DISPUTE/REHN PROPOSAL 
 
REF: ZAGREB 00215 
 
Classified By: Robert A. Bradtke, Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) &(d). 
 
¶1.  (c) In a one-on-one with President Mesic this morning 
(April 27), I told President Mesic that the United States was 
following closely the progress of EU Commissioner Rehn's 
efforts to establish a mechanism to arbitrate the 
Croatia-Slovenia border dispute and unblock Croatia's EU 
accession talks.  For the United States, I said, this was not 
just about Croatia, but the future of Southeastern Europe. 
The United States believed that bilateral disagreements 
should not be used to block progress towards Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  The United States, therefore, welcomed the 
progress that had been made in the Rehn talks last week. 
 
¶2.   (C) Noting that only Croatia could decide whether the 
latest Rehn proposal was acceptable and in its interests, I 
gave Mesic my view that the proposal contained important 
elements of international law, as Croatia had insisted, that 
it would lead to the unblocking of Croatia's accession talks, 
and it could prevent the further poisoning of bilateral 
relations between Croatia and Slovenia.  For these reasons, I 
hoped that Croatia would respond quickly and positively to 
the proposal. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Responding, Mesic said that the Rehn proposal was 
still somewhat general, rather than detailed.  However, he 
saw the proposed five person panel, including the option of 
having the President of the ICJ name three jurists, as 
particularly important.  His one concern was the language in 
the proposal about Slovenian "contact with international 
waters."  It was not clear, Mesic said, what this meant. 
 
¶4.  (C)  I commented that there was obviously ambiguity on 
this point, and perhaps from Croatia's perspective a certain 
risk.  However, my assessment was that this ambiguity would 
be important for Slovenia's acceptance of the proposal and if 
Croatia was confident of its position under international 
law, it was a risk worth taking.  I also added that I saw no 
other process, either involving the United States or the EU, 
that could bring a resolution of the border issue.  In a 
brief rejoinder, Mesic said that he was less concerned about 
the point on "contact with international waters" after seeing 
the language of the Rehn proposal stating that the boundary 
line would be drawn in accordance with the principles of 
international law. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Finally, I told Mesic that Croatia needed to be 
careful in any statements it made about the latest Rehn 
proposal.  Portraying it as a victory for Croatia, rather 
than as something in the interests of both countries, could 
make it hard for the Slovene government to accept.  Mesic 
agreed, saying that it would be important to give the Slovene 
government the chance to "save face." 
 
¶6.  (C)  Comment.  Mesic did not say "yes" or "no," and there 
will be further discussion this week within the Croatian 
government about the Rehn proposal.  However, he listened 
closely to my points and can be under no illusion that we see 
any alternative to what Rehn has put on the table.  I expect 
to be able to follow-up with Prime Minister Sanader later 
this week. 
BRADTKE