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FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8083
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/CE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM COE PL
SUBJECT: POLAND'S "TRUTH-TELLER" CANDIDATE FOR COE 
SECRETARY GENERAL 
 
REF: A. STRASBOURG 08 
     ¶B. WARSAW 107 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Dan Sainz for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Poland's candidate for Council of Europe 
(COE) Secretary General has done it all.  Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz has served as prime minister, foreign minister, 
justice minister, and parliamentary speaker; he has also run 
twice for president.  A moderate social democrat, he is one 
of the few leaders who could unify the Polish left and 
challenge the current ascendancy of Poland's center-right 
parties -- a likely factor in Prime Minister Tusk's decision 
to seek his "exile" in Strasbourg.  Cimoszewicz, whose two 
children live in the United States, favors strong 
trans-Atlantic relations, as well as increased engagement 
with Russia and Belarus.  PM Tusk may ultimately be forced to 
choose between Cimoszewicz's COE candidacy and the prospect 
of having a Pole with closer political views -- former Polish 
PM Jerzy Buzek -- as President of the EU Parliament, since 
Poles are unlikely to capture both jobs.  Cimoszewicz, who 
prides himself on being a "truth-teller," is charming in 
private, but often comes across as arrogant and moody in 
public.  END SUMMARY. 
 
WHO IS WLODZIMIERZ CIMOSZEWICZ? 
 
¶2. (U) Poland's candidate for COE Secretary General, 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, is one of Poland's most prominent 
and accomplished politicians.  He has served as prime 
minister (1996-1997), foreign minister (2001-2004), deputy 
prime minister and justice minister (1993-1995), and 
parliamentary speaker (2005).  He ran for president twice 
and, until recently, was considered a leading candidate for 
president in 2010.  Cimoszewicz also served twice in the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.  As Foreign 
Minister, he chaired the COE's Council of Ministers for six 
months. 
 
¶3. (U) Born in 1950 in Warsaw, Cimoszewicz received a Ph.D. 
in legal sciences from Warsaw University in 1978.  He was a 
Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University in 1980-1981. 
Cimoszewicz was a member of the Polish United Workers' Party 
(PZPR) from 1971 until 1990, but did not join its successor 
party, Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP).  In 
1999, he joined SdRP's successor, the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD), stating that he wanted to take the new party 
in a new direction.  Cimoszewicz is still a member of the 
SLD, but has recently distanced himself from the party in the 
wake of growing fragmentation on the Left.  Cimoszewicz was 
first elected to the Sejm (lower house of parliament) in 1989 
and served four successive terms. 
 
¶4. (C) Cimoszewicz has long sought to portray himself as the 
"milder" face of Poland's post-Communist Left, underscoring 
the distance between himself and his controversial, often 
scandal-ridden left-wing colleagues.  He has repeatedly 
expressed disgust with corruption and influence-trading in 
Polish politics.  He actively cultivates an image as a 
statesman, intellectual, and center-left reformer who rises 
above partisan politics.  Cimoszewicz has repeatedly claimed 
to be an independent politician -- one driven to tell the 
truth, no matter how harsh, even to his friends.  Cimoszewicz 
is married and has two adult children who live in the United 
States.  He speaks fluent English. 
 
POLITICAL VIEWS 
 
¶5. (C) Cimoszewicz is an avid proponent of strong 
trans-Atlantic relations, but has also called for recent 
(right-leaning) Polish governments to exercise restraint to 
avoid alienating other EU and NATO members, as well as 
Russia.  Cimoszewicz sharply criticized Poland's decision to 
sign a Missile Defense agreement with the U.S., claiming that 
it paid "too high a political price" in terms of its 
relations with Russia.  Cimoszewicz has advocated increased 
engagement with Russia, stating that the risk of future 
political instability outweighs the dangers of Russian 
authoritarianism.  He favors closer relations with Belarus 
for similar reasons.  As Polish Foreign Minister, Cimoszewicz 
strongly backed Poland's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
 
WIDELY RESPECTED, BUT OFF-PUTTING 
 
¶6. (C) Widely respected, Cimoszewicz is not without his 
quirks.  In one-on-one or small-group settings, Cimoszewicz 
is charming, open, and rational.  In public appearances and 
official meetings, however, Cimoszewicz often comes across as 
 
WARSAW 00000345  002 OF 002 
 
 
stiff, arrogant, and unwilling to compromise.  As prime 
minister in 1997, Cimoszewicz demonstrated little compassion 
for the victims of that year's historic floods, stating 
coldly that those affected should have insured themselves. 
In 2005, Cimoszewicz stepped down as SLD's presidential 
candidate at the last minute after he was wrongly accused of 
lying on his financial statements -- although such 
accusations are routine occurrences in Polish politics. 
Cimoszewicz did more than pull out of the race:  he withdrew 
from political life for two years, retreating to his house in 
the Bialowieza forest near the Belarusian border. 
Cimoszewicz was elected to the Senate (the upper house of 
parliament) in 2007.  As the only senator on the left, he 
does not caucus with other senators and is technically 
considered an independent. 
 
SURPRISING, BUT SAVVY CHOICE 
 
¶7. (C) Prime Minister Tusk's March 5 nomination of 
Cimoszewicz as Poland's candidate for COE Secretary General 
caught many in Poland by surprise, especially SLD and the 
bloc of center-left parties challenging SLD for primacy on 
the left (ref B).  A spokesman for Tusk, who heads the 
center-right Civic Platform (PO), said the nomination proved 
the governing coalition can rise above party politics. 
Government officials said Cimoszewicz's political experience, 
his involvement in two decades of Poland's post-Communist 
transition, and his thorough knowledge of European issues, 
made him the most qualified Polish candidate for the 
position. 
 
¶8. (C) The nomination was criticized by the opposition.  On 
the right, President Kaczynski has refused to support the 
nomination of a former Workers' Party politician.  On the 
left, many feel betrayed.  In the weeks before his 
nomination, Cimoszewicz had been working to convince SLD and 
other center-left parties to forge a common list of 
candidates in June's European Parliament elections.  When SLD 
refused, Cimoszewicz announced he would not be a candidate. 
SLD party leaders allege that Cimoszewicz had been 
negotiating among left-wing parties at the same time he was 
in talks with Tusk on the COE nomination.  Cimoszewicz's 
removal from the fray effectively ensures the left will 
remain divided, at least through June's EP elections.  The 
nomination most likely strikes Cimoszewicz from the short 
list of prominent, untainted left-wing politicians who might 
have posed a threat to Tusk in the 2010 presidential 
elections. 
 
THE DIFFICULT ROAD TO STRASBOURG 
 
¶9. (C) As the center-left nominee of a center-right 
government, Cimoszewicz might eventually emerge as a 
consensus candidate.  His strong pro-U.S. positions are 
tempered by his vocal criticism of Missile Defense and his 
support for increased engagement of Russia.  MFA personnel 
tell us support from Germany and Luxembourg will play a key 
role in advancing Cimoszewicz's candidacy.  In fact, MFA 
Deputy Director of Protocol Janusz Niesyto predicted 
Luxembourg PM Juncker will end up being the kingmaker. 
 
¶10. (C) According to Niesyto, neither Tusk nor FM Sikorski -- 
despite their success in navigating the EU bureaucracy in 
Brussels -- have strong enough personal relationships with 
European leaders to be able to pick up the phone and lobby 
for Cimoszewicz.  Even if they did, the GOP will likely have 
to choose between Cimoszewicz as COE Secretary General and 
former PM Jerzy Buzek, himself a PO member, as EU Parliament 
President.  The chances are slim that a Pole would be elected 
to both positions.  Although having Cimoszewicz at the head 
of the COE for five years would benefit Poland, Tusk might 
prefer to have a Pole affiliated with PO (and with the 
European People's Party, where Tusk is working to build 
Polish influence) at the head of the European Parliament. 
However, Buzek faces his own challenges:  Niesyto 
acknowledged that Buzek's chances may have been hurt by the 
rise of Italian Mario Mauro as a contender for EP President. 
 
¶11. (C) One indication of lukewarm GoP support for 
Cimoszewicz is the decision not to name a prominent "campaign 
manager."  Foreign Minister Sikorski chose former Polish 
Ambassador to NATO Jerzy Nowak to orchestrate his own 
campaign for NATO Secretary General, but the MFA appointed a 
mid-level diplomat from its international relations 
department to run Cimoszewicz's campaign.  According to 
Niesyto, Cimoszewicz has a network of personal friends 
throughout Europe who are lobbying on his behalf. 
ASHE