VZCZCXRO9919
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0435/01 1171424
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271424Z APR 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6425
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000435 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNOMIG UNSC GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: QUAD AMBASSADORS DELIVER NON-PAPER TO 
U/SYG LE ROY 
 
REF: A. DICARLO-BRIMMER EMAIL OF 4/23/2009 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 39134 
     ¶C. USUN 326 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Permreps/Deputy Permreps of the United 
States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Quad) 
delivered Ref A non-paper to U/SYG for Peacekeeping 
Operations Alain Le Roy and SRSG for Georgia Johan Verbeke on 
April 24.  The Ambassadors argued for robust and ambitious 
recommendations that could provide a solid basis for 
negotiations with Russia on a meaningful UN mandate.  Le Roy 
and Verbeke said that they agreed in large part with the 
non-paper's content, but they thought the 15 kilometer 
security and restricted weapons zones were unrealistic. 
Verbeke thought that the August 12 and September 8 cease-fire 
agreements should not be the basis of a new mandate, since 
they were being interpreted differently by the parties. 
Verbeke and Le Roy agreed that a UN new mandate should have a 
new security regime as its basis.  Le Roy and Verbeke did not 
believe it was within their UN mandate to provide 
recommendations on the situation in South Ossetia, but 
allowed that the report would provide a "hook" for the 
Security Council to include South Ossetia within a new 
mandate.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------- 
QUAD Ambassadors Deliver Non-Paper 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassadors DiCarlo (U.S.), Ripert (France), Mattusek 
(Germany) and Parham (U.K.) delivered Ref A Quad-agreed 
Non-Paper to U/SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy 
and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Georgia Johan Verbeke on April 24.  In delivering the 
non-paper, all Ambassadors made the point that the 
Secretary-General's report on Georgia due to be released on 
May 15 needs to provide a solid basis for the Council to 
fashion a strong and meaningful mandate, and therefore the 
SYG should propose an ambitious security regime to include 
symmetrical security zones that apply to all forces. 
Additionally the Ambassadors pointed out that a strong UN 
mandate should be based upon the August 12 and September 8 
cease-fire agreements. 
 
¶3. (C) U/SYG Le Roy said that in general terms, the UN was in 
agreement with the concepts outlined in the Quad non-paper. 
SRSG Verbeke agreed, saying "80-90%" of the Quad draft was 
the UN's "common thinking."  Le Roy said the 
Secretary-General would be hosting an internal meeting to 
discuss the report's recommendations later on April 24.  The 
report would be completed within the following week, edited 
and finalized by May 7, and distributed by May 15.  Verbeke 
added that the report would include only one option, so as to 
provide a strong starting point for the Council's 
deliberations. 
 
-------------- 
Security Zones 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) LeRoy questioned the width of the Quad-proposed 
symmetrical 15 km security zones and 15 km restricted weapons 
zones, saying he could not see a justification for increasing 
the size of the zones beyond what had existed in the prior 
security regime.  According to LeRoy, Russia had argued for 
an asymmetric 0 km zone in Abkhazia, which he thought 
unreasonable, so the SYG would need to propose something in 
between the two options.  Verbeke acknowledged it was a "fair 
ambition" to propose 30 km zones on both sides of the 
cease-fire line, but agreed with LeRoy that it would be a 
non-starter with Russia.  He cautioned that if the UN were to 
propose such a regime, Russia might reject the report 
entirely as biased and one-sided.  In this case, Verbeke 
said, "you will be starting the negotiation with 0 km rather 
than something more reasonable."  He pointed out that the 6 
km security and restricted weapons zones he had included in 
his draft non-paper (Ref C) were based on advice from his 
military advisors as to the required dimensions for a 
separation of forces regime. 
 
¶5. (C) Verbeke suggested one way around the disagreement 
might be for the report to make no recommendation at all as 
to the width of the zones, while otherwise describing their 
purpose and limitations they would impose on forces.  In this 
way, the Council could have a free hand to negotiate the 
width of the zones in consultation with military advisors. 
Ambassador Ripert said that he thought it essential to have a 
clear recommendation in the report about the width of the 
zones, and wondered whether the report might skirt the issue 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000435  002 OF 002 
 
 
of width by referring to dimensions outlined in other 
agreements, such as the former Moscow agreement.  Verbeke 
said he did not think it wise to refer to the Moscow 
Agreement, since all sides had repudiated it.  He pointed out 
that his proposal of 6 km zones had actually been based on 
the 2005 Gali Protocol (see Security Council document 
S/2005/453, paragraph 4).  Verbeke thought a different option 
would be to recommend an additional "transparency zone" 
beyond the security and restricted weapons zones, as had been 
outlined in the UN non-paper.  There would be no limitations 
on forces within these zones, but the parties would be 
required to report on the activities of their forces and 
would be subject to monitoring.  Verbeke pointed out, 
however, that Russia had unequivocally rejected the 
transparency zones in its response to the non-paper.  He said 
he was still considering whether to propose omiting a 
reference in the report to the width of the zones. 
 
------------------------------------ 
August 12 and September 8 Agreements 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C)  Verbeke argued against having the August 12 
cease-fire agreement and September 8 implementing 
clarification serve as the basis of a new mandate.  Russia 
and the West could not agree on what the August 12 and 
September 8 agreements mean today, he said, so "on day one of 
a mandate" its terms would be disputed and "nobody would 
respect it."  He thought a new mandate based on a new 
security regime would be the only way to get a meaningful 
mission respected by all forces.  Verbeke said the report 
would clearly state that relevant Security Council 
resolutions have not been respected by any party since August 
2008, and to the contrary, "infringement has increased." He 
thought it unwise for the Council to adopt a mandate that it 
already knew would be interpreted differently by the parties. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
"Hooks" for South Ossetia, EU 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Verbeke also understood the Quad desire to have a 
"hook" in the report that could serve as a future basis to 
expand the scope of the UN mandate to South Ossetia. 
However, he said (and LeRoy nodded in agreement), the UN 
could not substitute itself for the OSCE in South Ossetia, 
and it was not in the SYG"s existing mandate to report on, or 
make recommendations about, the situation there.  He said the 
"Observations" section of the report would offer a context 
for its recommendations by reviewing the situation in Georgia 
since August 2008, and would make the point that the August 
2008 conflict began in South Ossetia.  Verbeke also 
understood the importance to the EU of a "hook" in the report 
to support continuation of the EU Monitoring Mission, and 
said the report would reference the role of the EUMM. 
Rice