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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0423/01 1132225
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 232225Z APR 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 4560
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6402
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000423 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UNOMIG RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: AMBASSADOR RICE'S MEETING WITH GEORGIAN 
FOREIGN MINISTER VASHADZE 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 670 
     ¶B. USUN 326 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Georgian Foreign Minister Vashadze outlined 
for Ambassadors Rice and DiCarlo the elements Georgia would 
like to see in a new UN mandate.  He acknowledged that the 
eventual mandate would be something less robust that the 
Georgian proposed elements, but suggested that it was 
important to start with a "maximalist" position.  Ambassador 
Rice encouraged the Foreign Minister to be clear with the 
United States on tradeoffs that Georgia would be willing to 
make in the negotiations in order to keep a UN mission on the 
ground. Vashadze admitted that UNOMIG currently has minimal 
utility as a security presence, but that it was important 
both symbolically and as a cornerstone for the other 
international actors. He did not want to consider whether he 
would need to make a tradeoff on the name of the mission in 
order to keep it, but suggested that Tbilisi would not accept 
such a compromise.  The Foreign Minister also confirmed that 
Georgia would not file a brief with the International Court 
of Justice related to Kosovo's declaration of independence. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze and Permrep 
Alexander Lomaia discussed Georgian preferences for a new UN 
mandate in Georgia with Ambassadors Rice and DiCarlo on April 
¶16. At the outset of the meeting, Vashadze acknowledged that 
the Georgian Non-Paper (Ref A) outlining their desired 
elements for a UN mission in Georgia was a "wish list", and 
that he realized a new mandate would not contain all of the 
elements in the Non-Paper.  "The more we ask for, the more we 
get", he said, and so he believed it was important to start 
with a maximalist position with the expectation that Russia 
would adopt a similar approach.  He asked Ambassador Rice to 
"champion" the Georgian paper in New York. 
 
¶3. (C) Vashadze said that the top priority for Georgia in a 
resolution would be a clear reference to Georgia's 
territorial integrity, or as a fallback, mention of all other 
resolutions on Georgia, including Resolution 1808.  Another 
important element for Georgia would be a strong monitoring 
mission within defined security zones.  Vashadze said the 6 
km zones outlined in the UN Non-Paper (Ref B) were 
insufficient, and instead should be at least as expansive as 
the current zones, but would ideally be more expansive in 
some places.  Executive policing is important in 
ethnic-Georgia populated areas in Abkhazia due to human 
rights concerns, though he acknowledged it would be hard to 
get Russian agreement for this.  On territorial integrity, 
Vashadze said that keeping the same name for UNOMIG was very 
important to Georgia, as well as keeping one mission on both 
sides of the administrative boundary and keeping the debate 
under the agenda item, "The Situation in Georgia". Georgia 
would not want the representatives of the de facto 
authorities invited to New York either formally or for an 
informal, "Arria-style" meeting.  An invitation to New York 
would be a blow to Geneva and a reward to the separatists for 
blocking progress in the Geneva talks.  Russia, he said, 
"wants to move everything to New York, where Georgia does not 
have any say."  He added that he thought Russia did not like 
the Geneva talks because of the presence of the U.S. as a 
co-equal participant, which he thought was "humiliating" to 
Russia. 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Rice told Vashadze that the U.S. was 
approaching the upcoming negotiations with a commitment to 
preserve Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, not 
only in the written documents, but in practice.  She 
reinforced that as a friend of Georgia, she would be frank 
and straightforward with her assessment of the situation in 
New York.  Russia's veto in the Security Council, Rice said, 
gives Russia leverage in the negotiations.  She thought it 
unlikely that a more robust mission could be achieved without 
making a tradeoff on some of the issues that Vashadze had 
mentioned.  Rice reminded the Foreign Minister a tradeoff on 
an Arria-format meeting had not been necessary in February, 
but only because that mandate was essentially a technical 
rollover.  In order for the U.S. to negotiate with Russia on 
a new mandate, Rice said she would need to know where Georgia 
sees the tradeoffs.  Ambassador DiCarlo reinforced that we 
would have to consider tradeoffs on the name of the mission 
and a reference to territorial integrity in the resolution, 
if the goal was to keep a UNOMIG on the ground. 
 
¶5. (C) In response, Vashadze said that UNOMIG, in and of 
itself, "adds nothing to conflict resolution and Georgian 
security."  He would be "perfectly happy," he said if the 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000423  002 OF 002 
 
 
mandate were to be extended with the language on territorial 
integrity, a reference to the Geneva talks and to the August 
12 and September 8 cease-fire agreements, and if the name of 
the mission were to remain, "UNOMIG".  He believed UNOMIG was 
important "as the corner stone of the international 
presence," and because a change to the presence would send a 
signal about a change in status.  Even if UNOMIG were not to 
remain on the ground, he believed the EU could remain. 
Vashadze said he had received assurances from the Foreign 
Ministers of Spain, Poland and the Baltic states that they 
would support keeping the EU Monitoring Mission on the 
ground.  As for whether he would want to make a tradeoff on 
the name in order to keep a UN presence, Vashadze said, 
"Let's wait until we get there," adding that he could 
envision the parliament or the public accepting that tradeoff. 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Rice noted that she understood Secretary 
Clinton and the Foreign Minister had discussed during their 
April 15 meeting whether Georgia would file a brief with the 
International Court of Justice in favor of Serbia's position 
on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence.  The 
Foreign Minister said that subsequent to his conversation 
with the Secretary, he had directed the Foreign Ministry not 
to file a brief in the ICJ case.  Ambassador Rice thanked him 
for this decision. 
Rice