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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000409 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR USUN/W AND IO/UNP; NSC FOR POWER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019 
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNGA UNSC GE JA BR IN
SUBJECT: UNSC REFORM: P-3 DISCUSS FRENCH-UK INTERMEDIATE 
OPTION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Susan E. Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The UK and France formally raised with the 
United States their "intermediate option" initiative for 
Security Council expansion in an April 16 meeting of P-3 Perm 
Reps and IO Assistant Secretary-equivalents.  Ambassador Rice 
emphasized the Administration's preference to articulate its 
broad principles on Security Council reform, its openness to 
an enlargement, and its decision not to favor one proposal 
over another at this time.  The British and French 
delegations emphasized that they do not yet have a formal 
proposal to share.  Ambassador Rice noted that while the 
intermediate option afforded adaptability in the long-term 
for an evolving international framework, the P-3 would have 
little leverage over the elections to choose the member 
states to occupy the seats.  UK Perm Rep Sawers said that 
eventually a P-5 position on the issue would be needed as the 
African Group would only revisit the Ezulwini Consensus if 
there were momentum towards another proposal.  While the UK 
and French delegations said they were hearing positive 
signals from the Russians and Chinese, USUN believes they are 
closer to our own position than that of the British and 
French.  End summary. 
 
UK and France seek U.S. views on 
intermediate option initiative 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In an April 16 meeting of P-3 Perm Reps and IO 
Assistant Secretary-equivalents, the UK and France formally 
presented us their "intermediate option" which evolved from 
the Sarkozy-Brown summit a year ago.  UK Perm Rep Sawers said 
that the UK and France have been supporters of Security 
Council enlargement greater than the U.S. has been 
historically ready to support.  Sawers said a more modest 
expansion involving a third category of seats has a greater 
chance of success, given the lack of an overwhelming majority 
in favor of additional permanent members.  While the UK and 
France do not have a formal proposal to share on the 
intermediate option, he hoped the new Administration would 
look at the initiative favorably. 
 
U.S. prefers to articulate 
broad principles on reform 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Ambassador Rice emphasized that the new 
Administration has preferred to articulate its broad 
principles of Security Council reform, including that:  the 
Council should reflect the current realities of the 21st 
century, any expansion should not impede the Council's 
efficiency and effectiveness, there should be no change to 
the veto structure, and additional permanent members need to 
be state-specific and chosen based upon their capacity to 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 
security.   She underscored that the United States is open to 
an enlargement but does not plan to voice favor for one 
proposal over another at this time in the negotiating 
process.  Both Ambassador Rice and Assistant Secretary for 
International Organization Affairs Esther Brimmer emphasized 
that the ratification process will be difficult and there may 
only be one opportunity for reform of the Council in the next 
20 years. 
 
¶4.  (C) French Perm Rep Ripert commented that, while the P-3 
may not consider the Council's legitimacy to be at stake, 
others are questioning it, creating a different climate than 
only a few years ago.  IO A/S Brimmer stressed that the P-3 
should be careful in how they frame Council reform questions 
so as to not imply a current lack of legitimacy.  Sawers 
acknowledged that we want to be mindful of how we proceed 
since the Security Council is currently effective and our 
interests are protected.  French Director of UN and 
International Relations Sylvia Berman, however, noted that 
with the ongoing reforms of the international financial 
infrastructure, a lack of progress on Council reform will be 
noted. 
 
Few specifics on actual mechanics 
of intermediate option 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) When pressed on how the intermediate category of 
members would be chosen, neither the French nor the British 
offered clear answers.  Ripert suggested that he thought 
Japan and Brazil would easily win election for intermediate 
seats but was not as positive about Germany beating out Italy 
or India defeating Pakistan, given the strength at the UN of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).  Ambassador 
Rice raised whether we would want Libya, for example, 
currently popular as an African Union leader, on the Council 
for five years in the intermediate category.  She noted that 
the P-3 would have little leverage over these elections. 
Berman suggested that a reform proposal might be structured 
as a package so as not to require elections.  (Comment: USUN 
believes it would be almost impossible to pursue an 
intermediate category without resorting to an electoral 
process, given the Uniting for Consensus bloc's constant 
chorus that elections are needed to ensure accountability. 
End comment.)  All agreed that if the intermediate option was 
ultimately pursued, it could end up becoming permanent and 
not an interim step towards additional permanent seats, so 
all needed to be comfortable with its long-term consequences. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) UK Head of International Institutions Directorate 
Anwar Choudhury asked Ambassador Rice if the U.S. has a 
preference -- additional permanent seats or the intermediate 
option.  Ambassador Rice responded that we remain open-minded 
about an enlargement but had thought of it as a one-off 
update for the 21st century.  She noted that an attractive 
feature of the intermediate option is that it does allow for 
the adaptation of the evolving international framework.  For 
example, if an African state grows in prominence in 20 years, 
it might then have a better claim on a longer-term seat than 
would South Africa in 20 years.   She suggested that a more 
permanent solution with equal flexibility could be more 
attractive. 
 
¶7.  (C) Berman said that it would be helpful to have overall 
U.S. support for the process, but not necessarily for a 
precise solution.  Ripert suggested that Ambassador Rice 
again voice U.S. openness for the idea of an enlargement. 
Ambassador Rice replied that she did convey U.S. openness in 
her February 19 statement and U.S. statements since then have 
reiterated the same theme and have conveyed our parameters 
for reform but she could certainly re-emphasize the point in 
the next round of intergovernmental negotiations.  Sawers 
noted that the UK and France would like to continue to share 
their thoughts privately with the U.S. on the intermediate 
option, as they are developed.  Ambassador Rice agreed but 
stressed that we do not want to weigh in publicly on their 
proposal at this time. 
 
UK/French seek eventual P-5 position 
on proposal to move African Group 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Sawers said that eventually it would be useful to 
have a "P-5 sentiment" on the proposal.  He said that the 
Africans will only deviate away from the Ezulwini Consensus 
if they see "there is momentum toward something else," but 
noted that we should not press them until there was broader 
sentiment in favor of a specific proposal.  Sawers and Ripert 
both noted that their capitals are hearing positive signals 
from the Russians and Chinese about the intermediate option. 
Sawers said he believes Russian Perm Rep Churkin's tone has 
moderated significantly in the last six months.  Choudhury 
commented, "Their positions have evolved."  Ripert said that 
Beijing had called in the French Embassy at the start of 
intergovernmental negotiations to emphasize its support. 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment: USUN does not share the French and British 
assessment of the Russian and Chinese positions.  While the 
Russians and Chinese may be willing to discuss the 
intermediate option and are closely following 
intergovernmental negotiations, we do not think they are 
ready to stand side-by-side with France and the UK and press 
for the intermediate options as the optimal solution.  The 
Russian and Chinese positions are closer to our own (i.e., 
let the membership take the lead for the time being), than 
that of the French and British.  End comment. 
 
 
Rice