VZCZCXRO5429
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0385/01 1001325
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101325Z APR 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6316
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UNOMIG RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: EUSR PIERRE MOREL BRIEFS USUN ON GENEVA 
TALKS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  EUSR for Georgia Pierre Morel told 
Ambassador DiCarlo on April 3 he thought the UN needed a 
"substantial" mandate in Abkhazia, with symmetrical security 
zones on both sides of the administrative boundary of 
Abkhazia. Morel thought Georgia SRSG Verbeke would complete 
his report by April 20 and that it would be issued in New 
York on May 7, with another Geneva round likely to be 
scheduled for May 18.  EUSR for the South Caucasus Peter 
Semneby said he thought the EU Monitoring Mission would also 
be part of a resolution and that the EUMM scope could be 
expanded beyond its core activity of monitoring the August 12 
and September 8 cease-fire agreements. Ambassador DiCarlo 
raised the possibility that the U.S. might favor a UN report 
that would avoid outlining specifics of a security regime in 
order to avoid a contentious negotiation in the Council over 
details.  EU Council Permrep Pedro Serrano thought that such 
an approach should be considered, but that a negotiation with 
Russia over a security regime was unavoidable.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Crisis in 
Georgia Pierre Morel, EUSR for the South Caucasus Peter 
Semneby, and EU Council Permrep Pedro Serrano met with 
Ambassador DiCarlo on April 3 to discuss plans for a new UN 
mandate in Georgia and to brief her on the Geneva talks. 
Morel said he thought a substantial security regime was 
necessary for a UN mandate, including symmetrical security 
zones on both sides of the administrative boundary with 
Abkhazia.  The UN mission would also have to be 
status-neutral, he said.  Semneby said he hoped the next UN 
resolution would also include an explicit reference to the EU 
Monitoring Mission (EUMM), and believed the operative 
references to the August 12 and September 8 cease-fire 
agreements in Resolution 1866 paved the way for such a 
reference. 
 
¶3. (C) Morel said he understood that Georgia SRSG Johan 
Verbeke planned to submit his draft recommendations for a 
future UN presence to New York by April 20, and that the 
report would be published by May 7.  After recent meetings in 
Moscow with DFM Karasin, Morel thought Russia would agree to 
another round of Geneva talks in late May, but would not 
allow a meeting to be held before the UN report had been 
issued.  (Morel mentioned May 18 as a possible date.)  He 
said the next Geneva round would include a discussion of a 
new security regime for both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
Morel said he also wanted to adhere to the "bottom-up" 
strategy for the Geneva talks that focused on discussing 
confidence building measures (CBMs) such as the Joint 
Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.  He planned to 
address additional CBMs, including the normalization of 
crossing points, at the next session. 
 
¶4. (C) Semneby said he thought the EUMM should expand the 
scope of its activities in Georgia, although observation of 
the August 12 and September 8 agreements would continue to be 
its core activity.  Semneby emphasized what he saw as a need 
for the EUMM to "neutralize" the fact that the EU is not 
status neutral.  He said the EU would need to maintain its 
policy of non-recognition of the separatist entities, but at 
the same time find opportunities for limited engagement with 
them. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador DiCarlo described preliminary USG thinking 
in response to a Non-Paper that had been circulated by the UN 
Secretariat on a future security regime and UN presence.  One 
area being discussed was how to tactically approach achieving 
a new mandate, she said.  One tactical option being 
considered would be to recommend to the UN that it not 
include specifics of the security regime in the May 15 SYG's 
report.  Instead, the SYG would outline the necessary 
elements of the UN mandate, leaving the finalization of 
specifics to later discussions between the UN and the 
parties.  EU Permrep Serrano said he thought this 
"theoretical" approach might help to avoid negotiations over 
the content of the SYG's report such as had occurred with 
Russia over the November 2008 UNMIK report.  He acknowledged, 
however, that negotiation over the regime would take place in 
any case, and he wondered if it would be possible to change 
course after so much detailed discussion on the security 
regime had already taken place with Russia. 
 
¶6. (C) DiCarlo also noted the various non-papers floating 
around (U.K., France, Georgia, UN), and said she thought it 
important for the Western allies to be clear about what we 
wanted to achieve and to begin to work off of the same paper 
to avoid confusion.  Semneby agreed that we need to be clear 
among the Western Allies about what are our main interests: 
if we want a solid security regime, he said, then we would 
have to concentrate efforts on achieving one.  Morel agreed 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000385  002 OF 002 
 
 
that the "concentration of political will should be strong" 
in order to achieve a substantial regime.  He commented that 
Russia had successfully blocked progress in Vienna on any 
elements of the OSCE presence that it did not like, though he 
thought it would be harder for Russia to block progress in 
New York.  He noted, however, that both China and Turkey had 
already raised the possibility of another technical rollover. 
 He added that some in the EU were worried that Georgia would 
be used as a bargaining chip in efforts by the U.S. and 
Russia to "reset" relations, which he suggested could impact 
the ability to achieve a substantial mandate. 
Rice