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OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTU #0226/01 1001124
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O 101124Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6198
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 000226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/E MITCHELL, NEA/FO, NEA/IPA, AND NEA/MAG 
STATE ALSO FOR NEA/SCA/EX AND A/OPR/OS - CAMERON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019 
TAGS: OVIP PREL KPAL ASCH OFDP TS
SUBJECT: SCENSETTER FOR VISIT OF SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL TO 
TUNISIA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Senator Mitchell, my team and I look forward to 
working with you during your visit to Tunis.  President Ben 
Ali and Foreign Minister Abdallah are pleased that you have 
included Tunisia on your itinerary and look forward to 
hearing first-hand your assessment of prospects for 
Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab peace.  While Tunisia is 
solidly in the moderate camp on these issues, its influence 
is relatively small within the Arab League.  Regardless, the 
mere fact of your visit for consultations will give the GOT a 
boost.  Meanwhile, from the Embassy's perspective, your visit 
also represents an opportunity to press President Ben Ali to 
stand down on the 9.1 million Tunisian Dinar (approximately 
US $ 6.6 million) tax assessment levied against the American 
Cooperative School in Tunis.  We recommend you stress the 
value of our long-standing and positive ties, as demonstrated 
by your consultations with them.  The GOT leadership needs to 
understand, however, that failure to resolve the ACST issue 
will have serious consequences for bilateral relations.  End 
Summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C) Tunisia styles itself "a country that works".  Ben Ali 
and other Tunisian leaders often contrast their successes 
with the problems elsewhere in the region.  There is much in 
what they say.  While Tunisians grumble privately about 
corruption by the First Lady's family, there is an abiding 
appreciation for Ben Ali's success in steering his country 
clear of the instability and violence that have plagued 
Tunisia's neighbors.  Recent events have underscored this 
accomplishment and the continuing threat: Tunisian security 
forces took down a terror cell in December 2006-January 2007; 
we were reportedly among the group's targets.  In February 
2008, al-Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
kidnapped two Austrian tourists who were in the desert along 
the Tunisian-Algerian border. 
 
¶4. (C) Tunisians also widely recognize, and welcome, the 
country's social successes.  Tunisia is a model for the 
region on women's rights; its 1956 Personal Status Code 
abolished polygamy and required consent for marriage, among 
other protections.  Women today play an important role in the 
public and private sectors. 
 
¶5. (C) There is also real economic progress.  GDP growth has 
averaged five percent over the past decade, and the Tunisian 
people enjoy a relatively high standard of living.  About 80 
percent of Tunisians are considered middle class, and live in 
family-owned homes.  Notwithstanding the progress, 
unemployment remains very high, officially estimated at 14 
percent.  But it is generally acknowledged to be higher in 
certain regions and much higher in the 20-30 age bracket, 
particularly among university graduates.  The average 
Tunisian's purchasing power is under pressure due to world 
commodity price increases.  These strains have manifested 
themselves most acutely through protests and arrests in the 
southern mining basin of Gafsa province.  The GOT responded 
with a very heavy show of force and long jail sentences for 
some demonstration leaders. 
 
¶6. (C) In the political arena, however, progress is barely 
perceptible.  Ben Ali is running for a fifth five-year term 
in Tunisia's next elections, most likely in October, 2009. 
There is no chance the elections will be free or fair. 
Freedom of expression and freedom of association are severely 
constrained, and independent opposition parties are not 
allowed to operate effectively.  Indeed, one authentic 
opposition candidate is no longer eligible to run, due to a 
recent constitutional amendment. 
 
---------------------- 
Tunisia and the Region 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Tunisia has long played a moderating role in the 
region.  Former President Bourguiba set this policy in motion 
with his 1965 speech in Jericho in which he called for a 
two-state compromise to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.  The 
GOT supports Mahmoud Abbas, leadership of the Palestinian 
Authority.  Tunisia rejects the Arab League boycott of 
Israeli goods.  Although it closed its trade mission in Tel 
 
TUNIS 00000226  002 OF 003 
 
 
Aviv and that of the Israelis in Tunis in 2000, the GOT has 
from time to time taken part in quiet discussions with 
Israeli officials.  Foreign Minister Abdallah represented 
Tunisia at the Annapolis conference and has been supportive 
of our efforts to promote Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. 
Tunisia is also home to the irascible PLO Minister for 
External Relations Farrouq Qaddoumi, who stayed behind in 
Tunis when the rest of the PLO returned to the Palestinian 
Territories.  Qaddoumi reportedly promised Yasser Arafat that 
he would remain in exile until the creation of a Palestinian 
State. 
 
¶8. (C) Tunisia is like-minded on Iran, is an ally in the 
fight against terrorism, and has maintained an Embassy in 
Iraq at the Charge level.  Moreover, Tunisia has recently 
signed a debt forgiveness agreement with the GOI on Paris 
Club terms; it is the first Arab country to do so.  However, 
the GOT assiduously avoids getting in front of the Arab 
League consensus on most foreign policy issues.  Moreover, 
when other interests are at stake, the GOT is prone to 
waffle.  It is not clear that the GOT has a guiding principle 
for its foreign policy other than to "get along with 
everyone."  To the extent that GOT leaders speak in 
generalities about their moderate foreign policy stance, we 
remind them that Tunisia's moderation does not help us, 
unless its views are made public and its influence is used 
actively in international fora. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
President Ben Ali and Foreign Minister Abdallah 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶9. (C) President Ben Ali will appreciate being consulted on 
regional issues, especially developments on 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.  He can be expected to 
express concern about the right-leaning government formed by 
Prime Minister Netanyahu.  For domestic political reasons, he 
will express solidarity with the Palestinian people, and he 
will take credit with having done so publicly.  He may also 
underscore GOT concerns about perceived Israeli excesses, 
making the case that only the United States can keep the 
Government of Israel in check.  Having recently participated 
in the Doha Arab League Summit, he may have insights of his 
own to share with you about inter-Arab dynamics.  If Ben Ali 
is "on his game," he will be affable, open and engaged.  Ben 
Ali, who is 72 years old, reportedly has health problems and 
they may affect the quality and tenor of the meeting. 
 
¶10. (C) Foreign Minister Abdelwaheb Abdallah will also play 
an important part in your visit.  Abdallah can be charming in 
meetings, but he rarely departs from standard GOT talking 
points.  He has been known to open his meetings with lengthy 
soliloquies about Tunisia's political, social, and economic 
successes and moderate positions on regional issues.  This is 
the spin that Abdallah himself crafted during his years as 
Presidential Advisor responsible for domestic media control 
and international media spin.  During his almost four-year 
tenure as Foreign Minister, Abdallah has maintained 
significant influence -- if not control -- over the local 
media. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
The American Cooperative School in Tunis 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The Tunisian Ministry of Finance has issued a tax 
decree against the American Cooperative School of Tunis 
(ACST) for alleged arrears in the amount of 9.1 million 
Tunisian Dinars (approximately US $6.6 million).  The decree 
gives ACST until May 23 to pay the arrears, money it does not 
have and cannot borrow.  ACST acknowledges some liability, 
but only for about 1 million Tunisian Dinars.  The Ambassador 
has held several meetings with senior GOT officials and 
delivered a clear message that the GOT's actions may bankrupt 
and force the school to close, which would have serious 
consequences for US-Tunisian relations.  He has taken 
exception to the GOT unilateral action in contravention of 50 
years of practice and diplomatic exchanges.  Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs officials insist the GOT's action is 
"technical" not political. 
 
¶12. (C) The Foreign Ministry has accused Ambassador Godec of 
politicizing the issue by alerting the African Development 
Bank and other Ambassadors of the school's impending closure. 
 We have defended these consultations, pointing out that it 
would have been negligent for the USG to fail to warn the 
school's constituents.  An April 8 letter from Foreign 
Minister Abdallah to Acting A/S Feltman represents the first 
clear evidence that evidence the GOT is finally prepared to 
 
TUNIS 00000226  003 OF 003 
 
 
negotiate with the goal of resolving this matter in a 
mutually agreeable fashion.  Your meeting with President Ben 
Ali represents a critical opportunity to put this issue to 
him directly and to emphasize the importance of the school to 
us. 
 
¶13. (C) The Ambassador has already previewed with senior GOT 
officials that the forced closure of the school would provoke 
a policy review in Washington of our overall relations and 
our bilateral assistance programs.  The majority of our 
assistance is to the military and included some $24 million 
in FY 2008, although it is likely to be much lower this year. 
 The Ambassador has noted that the Congress will have to be 
briefed and may react as well.  Noting the press coverage of 
the closure of the American School in Damascus, he also 
predicted negative international media coverage. 
 
¶14. (C) It will probably be necessary to tailor your message 
on the school as late as the day before your meeting ) there 
have been developments on the issue daily for the past couple 
of weeks.  In general, though, it would be helpful to 
underscore that the MOF's unilateral assessment is contrary 
to 50 years of diplomatic exchanges and practices.  You can 
express appreciation for Abdallah's offer of negotiations, 
but add that the MOF should first rescind the final tax 
decree.  At the start of the new Administration, we should 
urge Ben Ali to focus on how to improve relations, not 
undermine them. 
 
-------------------- 
Bilateral Engagement 
-------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) In brief, while we have enjoyed a long-standing and 
generally positive bilateral relationship with Tunisia, 
difficulties remain.  In many ways, the ACST tax issue is 
symptomatic of the reality that the GOT is slow to engage, 
often unresponsive, and periodically takes counterproductive 
steps.  Underlying some GOT actions is a distrust of our 
motives, and specifically with respect to the promotion of 
democracy and human rights.  In addition, GOT leaders bristle 
at public criticism.  For example, Abdallah convoked the 
Ambassador to express his "disgust" that Tunisia was 
condemned for its treatment of journalists in the May 1, 2008 
White House statement on World Press Freedom. 
 
16.(C) Many of the difficulties are also the result of the 
controls imposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  These 
restrictions limit the Embassy's ability to engage with other 
ministries, and with universities, business organizations and 
even the country's labor union.  While these controls affect 
all Embassies, not just ours, the effect is to limit the 
quality and depth of our relations. 
 
¶17. (C) In our contacts with Tunisian officials, they 
emphasize our strong ties of over 200 years.  But they rarely 
move from the general to the specific.  Your visit is an 
opportunity to consult with the Tunisians on Middle East 
peace but also a chance to make clear that we expect more 
from countries with whom we have close relations.  If there 
are specific steps that the GOT could take with respect to 
Middle East peace, you should press them.  By the same token, 
if Tunisia is prepared to open up and do more on issues of 
concern to the United States, e.g., on the Israeli-Arab 
front, we are prepared to look for ways to deepen our 
relationship. 
 
Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm 
Godec