VZCZCXRO2970
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTU #0223/01 0981949
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081949Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6188
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0231

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 000223 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO - HUDSON; NEA/MAG; NEA/SCA/EX; 
STATE ALSO FOR A/OPR/OS - CAMERON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019 
TAGS: ASCH OFDP PREL TS
SUBJECT: GOT OFFERS NEGOTIATIONS ON AMERICAN SCHOOL, BUT 
SLAPS AMBASSADOR'S WRIST FOR "POLITICIZING" THE ISSUE 
 
REF: TUNIS 217 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (S/NF) In back-to-back meetings at the Foreign Ministry 
today the Ambassador was given a letter from Foreign Minister 
Abdallah to NEA AA/S Feltman offering negotiations to resolve 
the American Cooperative School in Tunis (ACST) tax issue. 
The letter emphasized that the GOT wants to maintain friendly 
relations with the United States and views the school tax 
issue as a technical, fiscal matter.  The Ambassador welcomed 
this opening and the prospect of negotiations, but asked the 
MOF to rescind the final tax decree to prevent the school's 
closure.  His Tunisian interlocutors were dismissive about 
the looming May 23 deadline for payment, saying, "No one 
wants to close the school."  On his way back to the Embassy, 
the Ambassador was asked to return to the Ministry.  The 
Minister's Special Assistant, Mohamed Lessir, who had been in 
the first meeting, reprimanded the Ambassador for having 
politicized the issue by contacting several third parties, 
including the African Development Bank and European 
Ambassadors.  Lessir also took issue that GRPO had raised the 
ACST matter with its security contacts.  The Ambassador 
firmly rejected the assertion that it was the United States 
that had politicized the issue.  He explained that his 
contacts with key stakeholders were only natural, given the 
schools impending forced closure.  The content of these 
meetings represents the first clear indication that the GOT 
is ready to negotiate.  We should take them up on their 
offer, and quickly.  We have forwarded to NEA/MAG a draft 
text for Acting A/S Feltman.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
FM Response to AA/S Feltman Letter 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief of Staff Mahmoud 
Khemiri summoned the Ambassador for the second day in a row 
to discuss the ACST issue.  Once again accompanied by Special 
Assistant to the Minister and Director General for Europe 
Mohamed Lessir, as well as Elyes Kasri, Director General for 
the Americas and Asia, Khemiri presented a letter from 
Foreign Minister Abdallah to AA/S Feltman, responding to AA/S 
Feltman's April 6 letter to Appointed Ambassador Mansour in 
Washington.  The text of the original Arabic letter, along 
with Embassy's unofficial translation, have been emailed to 
NEA/MAG.  The FM's letter : 
 
-- emphasized the over 200 years of friendly relations the 
United States and Tunisia have enjoyed and noted that the GOT 
is keen on that friendship continuing; 
 
-- argued that the tax matter faced by ACST is a fiscal and 
"purely technical" issue with no political aspect, and noted 
surprise that AA/S Feltman's letter alluded to possible 
impacts on bilateral relations, which "cannot be impacted by 
these technical issues"; 
 
-- expressed the readiness of the GOT to receive fiscal and 
legal experts from the United States as soon as possible for 
discussions with Tunisian fiscal authorities about the ACST 
issue; and 
 
-- confirmed that the GOT is ready for dialogue to search for 
a solution concerning the fiscal status of the school and the 
lease contract in the framework of an agreement that 
clarifies the rights and duties of all parties. 
 
--------------- 
Let's Negotiate 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador thanked the Chief of Staff for the 
response, noting that he would transmit it to Washington.  He 
reiterated that the United States stands ready to take part 
in negotiations with the GOT to resolve the issue.  He 
emphasized, however, that such negotiations should take place 
in the context of discussions to clarify the school's status, 
and with an appreciation of 50 years of diplomatic exchanges 
and practice regarding the school.  In addition, the Finance 
Ministry should, as a preliminary step, rescind its 
unilateral final tax decree.  All of these issues could be 
 
TUNIS 00000223  002 OF 003 
 
 
taken up -- and resolved amicably -- in the context of 
bilateral negations. 
 
-------------- 
What Deadline? 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Lessir asked whether ACST planned to exercise its 
right to sue the GOT.  The Ambassador demurred, noting that 
the school is still weighing its options.  The Ambassador 
reiterated though, that ACST will not be able to come up with 
even the approximately 4 million Tunisian Dinars that the MOF 
has said is not subject to deferment in the case of a legal 
suit.  Lessir was dismissive about the looming deadline, 
noting that there are "several weeks" before May 23.  The 
Ambassador pointed out that the GOT would have the legal 
authority to padlock the property and seize any valuables in 
the case of non-payment beginning on May 23. 
 
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Take II 
------- 
 
¶5. (S/NF)   As the Ambassador was on his way back to the 
Embassy, he received an urgent phone call to return to the 
Ministry for a meeting with the Foreign Minister.  As it 
turned out, the second meeting was with Lessir, who was 
clearly performing on instruction from the Minister.  Lessir, 
adopting a very serious tone, said that information had "come 
to the Ministry's attention" suggesting that the Ambassador 
had been in contact with the African Development Bank, other 
Ambassadors, and parents of ACST schoolchildren.  He 
reprimanded the Ambassador for these contacts, noting that 
the German Ambassador had already called him to make an 
"urgent" intervention on this issue.  Lessir also expressed 
displeasure over the fact that GRPO had raised the ACST issue 
with security contacts.  These acts were unfortunate, Lessir 
said, and constituted politicization of what was a "purely 
technical" issue.  This should have been a last resort, he 
said, and we're not yet at the point of last resort.  The 
GOT's doors were always open, he continued.  "We would have 
preferred to have kept these discussions between us." 
 
----------- 
Why?  Why?? 
----------- 
 
¶6. (C)  Lessir said he couldn't understand why the United 
States take the discussion to third parties  "Just tell me 
why," Lessir implored, dramatically.  The Ambassador turned 
the tables on Lessir, saying, "Just tell me why, when there 
are so many communications between the Embassy and the GOT on 
the school, including a 1984 MFA diplomatic note specifying 
that teachers'  salaries are not subject to tax, why does 
this mean nothing?" 
 
------------- 
No Blame Here 
------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador was unapologetic for his consultations 
with key stakeholders in ACST.  He reminded Lessir that the 
school was facing imminent forced closure, due to its 
inability to pay even the down payment of the assessed 
arrears by May 23.  In the face of this sword of Damocles, 
the school -- and the USG -- had no choice but to prepare for 
the worst case scenario -- the forced closure of the school. 
It would have been irresponsible to have not consulted with 
key stakeholders.  The Ambassador advised Lessir that 
consultations with parents have not yet taken place, but that 
many are already aware of the situation; a general meeting is 
planned for Friday, April 17.  The Ambassador also rejected 
Lessir's assertion that the United States had politicized the 
issue.  Notwithstanding the GOT's protestations that tax 
issue was a technical matter, it jeopardized the very 
existence of ACST, which made it a political matter for us. 
The Ambassador pointed out that throughout the build-up of 
this crisis, he had repeatedly made clear to his Tunisian 
interlocutors that they were provoking a crisis. 
 
----------------------------- 
Briefing European Ambassadors 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) After the MFA meetings, the Ambassador informed the 
German and several other EU Ambassadors of the new 
 
TUNIS 00000223  003 OF 003 
 
 
developments.  All welcomed the possibility of progress, but 
agreed that we need (collectively) to keep the pressure on 
the GOT to resolve the ACST issue once and for all. 
 
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Comment 
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¶9. (C)  Lessir's theatrical performance, while tedious, is 
evidence that our actions in Washington and Tunis have 
finally gotten the GOT's attention.  Moreover, as the 
Ambassador noted in his second meeting with Lessir, 
Abdallah's letter represents the first clear indication that 
the GOT is willing to negotiate with the goal of resolving 
this matter in a mutually agreeable fashion.  We should take 
them up on this offer, but stick to the condition that the 
MOF first rescind the final tax decree.  Post will transmit 
to NEA/MAG recommended language for a response to the 
Abdallah letter.  End Comment. 
 
Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm 
Godec