VZCZCXRO5983
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0269/01 0910722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010722Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4671
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0406
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0507
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5198

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000269 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND NEA/MAG 
FOR CA/VO/KCC 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC LY
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009 
 
REF: 08 STATE 74840 
 
TRIPOLI 00000269  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.The following responses are keyed to reftel. 
 
a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the 
full range of American Citizen Services, but until January 2009, 
only processed those visas for which applicants are exempt from 
biometrics and personal appearance requirements, primarily A and 
G visas. As of January 25, 2009, we began to process selected 
categories of nonimmigrant visas, and opened for full services 
on March 25, 2009.  Because of Libya's longtime isolation, there 
are few pull factors from the United States, as the Libyan 
diaspora in the US is very small. Because Libya is a relatively 
wealthy country, push factors are also mitigated.  Libyan 
documents are generally unsophisticated, featuring few, if any, 
security features, and we also have heard reports that genuine 
documents with apocryphal information are obtainable from the 
authorities, possibly for a fee, but also through family 
connections. In addition, the host-country government is 
extremely reluctant to share or confirm information about its 
citizens with us, which limits our ability to conduct 
investigations.  Further to this, the GOL requires that all 
law-enforcement related inquiries proceed through only one 
designated host government security service point of contact. 
While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our inability to 
develop consular law enforcement contacts limits ability to 
conduct anti-fraud work. 
 
b. NIV FRAUD: Because Post has only begun to process visas other 
than A and G, we have seen little conventional fraud involving 
presentation of false documents.  However, we have seen cases 
where we suspect applicants of using their personal connections 
to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get a visa for personal 
travel, and avoid fees and interviews.  We have confirmed with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all of these cases that 
the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have issued the visas in 
accord with the request.  We continue to follow up in these 
cases to ensure that the applicants in question return to Libya, 
but have seen no new instances of overstays. one stayed far 
longer than his putative job as a diplomatic courier could 
possibly require.  We continue to monitor these cases closely. 
Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan visa 
applicants sometimes get false job letters from friends who work 
at prominent international companies. Post has implemented a 
Business Visa Program which allows member companies to register 
with us, and provide sample signatures of all employees 
authorized to sign job letters for visa applicants. All of our 
employment-based cases so far have involved petitions from 
international oil companies; we have detected no evidence of any 
fraud. 
 
c. IV FRAUD: Tripoli began to accept petitions for immigrant 
visas from resident AmCits, but Tunis continues to interview 
these cases. We have not seen any instances of fraud or 
questionable relationships.  We do note that Libyan applicants 
often present the "Family Book" as both birth and marriage 
certificates.  While this is a valid civil document, we require 
a birth and marriage certificate, both of which are available. 
All three documents are handwritten, and contain no security 
features to speak of. We have no exposure to employment-based 
IVcases. 
 
d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has 
received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other 
Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants who have 
either seen advertisements or received e-mail from "service 
providers" offering assistance completing the DV forms, andhave 
placed a general warning about the use of service providers for 
any visa services on our website. 
 
e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full 
passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from 
first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth 
in the United States while a parent was attending university. 
These cases require more time to review than  most, in large 
part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the 
identity of applicants.  However, the vast majority of 
applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the 
time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming 
presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast 
amounts of supporting documentation .  We routinely ask for two 
forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants 
because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability 
of the Libyan passport as an identity document.  Libya issues a 
national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most 
Libyans also hold a drivers' license.  Both of these documents 
 
TRIPOLI 00000269  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
include a photo, but are only in Arabic. 
 
f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of 
a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident US citizen 
who is married to a Libyan national or is a dual-national can 
adopt in this country. To date, Post has received only one 
general inquiry regarding adoption in Libya, and has not seen a 
case. 
 
g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for 
DNA testing to date. 
 
h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent 
reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these 
cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and 
Rome.  We have not detected any efforts at fraud or 
misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS 
92/93 cases. 
 
i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST 
TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both 
for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially 
from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the 
production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers 
operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to 
Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya 
does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely 
difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2m irregular 
(illegal) migrants are present here but live outside Libyan 
mainstream society. Post knows that European Embassies routinely 
require a U.S. visa in order to issue a Schengen transit visa 
for travel to the United States, but has received no inquiries 
or reports regarding possible imposters or other misuse of U.S. 
travel documents in order to reach another Western country. In 
the few months we have processed NIV's, we have not noted any 
TCN applicants who appear to be possibly involved in smuggling 
or trafficking-most are executive-level employees of 
international oil or construction companies. 
 
j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's ARSO's previous 
assignment was as an RSO-I, and Post has an SOP for referring 
fraud cases to RSO.  However, to date, we have not had any cases 
to refer to DS. 
 
k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL 
REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly 
handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any 
security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable 
features. While both marriage and birth certificates are 
available, the document in everyday use to show relationships is 
the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue or green cover, 
and is issued to men when they get married. A man's family book 
contains only his photo, and data about his wife and children. 
Unmarried people are in their father's family book, except in 
the case of widows, who are the only women who can have their 
own book. Libya issues both national identity cards and drivers 
licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a photo. We use these 
as secondary evidence of identity. Despite how easy it would be 
to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have not seen or heard of 
cases where identity is falsified. 
 
The Libyan passport is the only document that has an English 
translation, handwritten on one of the last pages. The GOL has 
said that it is planning to use one national ID number which 
will identify a person from the registration of their birth 
through their entire life.  Under this scheme, passport numbers 
would remain the same for a person's entire life. It is not 
clear how the GOL would register lost or expired passports under 
the scheme, or if old passports would remain valid. The GOL is 
in the process of modernizing its passport; it has provided us 
with a series of prospective dates for the rollout of a more 
modern document, some as early as last year. The new passport 
and identity documents are currently slated for release by 
September. The GOL has not shared an exemplar of any new 
passport.  More troubling are reports from the Maltese Embassy, 
one of the busiest visa-issuing countries in Libya, that they 
have identified genuine Libyan passports issued with erroneous 
data. Libyan passports include a note if the passport is a 
replacement for an older passport.  This notation, according to 
the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior passport would 
reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's travel history. 
 This calls the integrity of the Libyan passport as an identity 
document into question.  Post is not aware of any trend in 
alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency and civil 
registry began  the process of "correcting" the last names of 
 
TRIPOLI 00000269  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Libyan citizens, many of whom, as is common in the Arab world, 
use an ancestor's first name as their last name.  The applicant 
told us that this practice was no longer acceptable, and that 
the GOL was now requiring the use of "family" or clan last names 
instead.  In Arabic, there are routinely four names in the 
Libyan passport--the applicant's first name, the father's and 
grandfather's first names, and then the family name.  The 
handwritten English translation of the passport rarely contains 
a full translation of these four names--more frequently, one or 
both of the middle names is written as an initial only.  When 
changes are made, no mention of any previous passports issued in 
another identity is necessarily mentioned.  We routinely use the 
"alias" fields in the consular applications to counteract the 
potential for use of alternate identities by mala fide 
applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the passport number 
on Libya passports.  In September 2008, Tunis detected numerous 
duplicates in their database.  Contact with the Libyan Passport 
Agency indicates that in addition to the six-digit passport 
number, three "series" letters are used.  The Arabic letters 
"wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter" serve to 
differentiate the passport series. These letters do not appear 
on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to find a 
way to capture these letters in the consular applications 
without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where 
inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the 
passport data page. 
 
l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our 
relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated. 
Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and 
even then, are often ignored.  The Consular Section is not 
allowed by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law 
enforcement, as all such contact must be between RSO and a 
designated GOL liaison.  Even with close cooperation with RSO, 
working through this channel often requires repeated requests 
for the same information. In addition, the GOL has repeatedly 
expressed concern about sharing its citizens' personal data with 
foreign governments, which will further complicate efforts to 
investigate identity fraud. 
 
m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: As we open for visa processing, 
we anticipate applications from Libyans for whom travel to Tunis 
has been a financial burden.  Most of these applicants will 
likely be unqualified, and will have more reason to resort to 
fraud in their applications.  We are working with other Embassy 
sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop our 
understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome 
214(b). Early indicators are that demand is lower than expected, 
and few unqualified applicants are presenting themselves for 
interviews. 
 
n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The section chief serves as FPM.  He 
has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in the past 
five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position. 
All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the 
importance of both internal controls and our external image in 
relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa 
or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular 
Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has 
influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are 
required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their 
orientation. 
CRETZ