VZCZCXRO5864
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #0765 0910408
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010408Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1254
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000765 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV IS
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BENYAMIN NETANYAHU 
 
¶1.  (U) NOTE:  This profile is the first in a series of reports on 
key members of the new Israeli government, which is scheduled to be 
sworn in on March 31, 2009. 
 
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NETANYAHU'S MATURATION 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is expected to obtain 
from the Knesset tonight a vote of confidence in his government. 
Netanyahu's second stint in office (note:  his first term as Prime 
Minister was in 1996-1999) has prompted a question:  Has Bibi 
changed?  Thus far, political observers have only the tortuous 
coalition negotiations by which to glean how the new premier will 
lead.  On that basis, Netanyahu, who has headed the Likud party 
since 1993 with only one interlude (the Sharon years 1999-2005), has 
clearly learned from at least some of his past errors of judgment. 
Chief among them, by his own admission, was his decision in 1996 to 
form a narrow rightwing government.  On being asked to form a 
government after the 2009 elections, Netanyahu went first to his 
"natural partners" on the right, but he always indicated his 
preference for having a broad-based government with either or both 
the Kadima and Labor parties on board.  In that regard, Netanyahu 
made every effort, going beyond what most previous Israeli 
politicians had done to secure a balanced government. 
¶3.  (SBU) The cost to Likud of cobbling together a coalition that 
would include his rightwing partners and the left-leaning Labor 
party was steep in terms of financial, policy, and portfolio 
concessions.  Netanyahu's ability to slide these deals past his own 
senior party members may be interpreted as indication of his 
improving leadership skills.  But it may just as well signify Likud 
rank-and-file understanding of the new balance of power with 
Israel's party political system in which the existence of Kadima, 
with its 28 seats in the opposition, provides a constant default 
option for the malcontents within the governing coalition. 
------------------------ 
PRAGMATISM OVER IDEOLOGY 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Netanyahu is solidly center-right on the political 
spectrum, and he remains more pragmatic than ideological in most 
matters.  On the peace process he is keeping all options open 
regarding a two-state solution, and may be willing to advance the 
process significantly as long as he is not forced to publicly 
acknowledge the extent of such progress.  To succeed along such a 
path we expect him to rely heavily on his improved skills at 
political wheeling-dealing to keep the right flank on board while 
quietly (but perhaps slowly) cooperating on the peace process 
agenda, which he understands is critical to Israel's relations with 
the U.S..  In his speech to the last Knesset session of the Olmert 
Government March 30, Bibi said his government will be willing to 
offer "generous concessions" for peace with the Palestinians, and 
that his government would "do all in its power to reach peace with 
all our neighbors and with the entire Arab world."  We note that 
while largely non-ideological on the peace process, Netanyahu does 
maintain an ideological passion for free markets, which suggests to 
us that his commitment to facilitating investment in the West Bank 
is more than just rhetoric and will result in active personal 
involvement on his part. 
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FOCUSED ON IRAN 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Netanyahu holds strong views on the Iranian threat.  He 
believes that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad should be taken 
at his word when he says Israel should be wiped off the map, and 
that deterrence theory does not apply to a nuclear-armed Iran. 
Netanyahu argues that Hamas in Gaza and Hizballah in Lebanon 
represent Iranian bases surrounding Israel.  While some have 
suggested that Netanyahu may prefer to pursue negotiations with 
Syria rather than deal with the Palestinian issue, at least so far 
Netanyahu has consistently expressed great skepticism about Syria's 
willingness to give up its strategic ties to Iran in return for 
Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.