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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL HO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ZELAYA DISCUSSES THE DOMESTIC SCENE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b & d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  At lunch on March 30, the Ambassador and 
President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya discussed a range of issues 
including current political developments.  Zelaya briefed the 
Ambassador on his plans to consult Hondurans on the holding 
of a constituent assembly for the purpose of seeking 
modification of the "unreformable" articles of the 
Constitution ) including permitting Presidents to seek a 
second, non-consecutive term.  Assuming the poll reveals 
strong support for the proposal, he plans to ask the National 
Congress to approve legislation allowing the holding of a 
referendum or fourth urn during the General Election to be 
held on November 27, 2009.  Zelaya insisted that he had no 
plans to stay beyond his term in office, which ends on 
January 27, 2010.  He added that if the referendum was 
successful, a constituent assembly would be convened in 2010 
during the tenure of the new President.  The Ambassador 
conveyed our strong concerns about the proposal to hold a 
fourth urn, describing it as a distraction from priority 
issues such as mitigating the effects of the global economic 
crisis and combatting the threat of international organized 
crime.  The Ambassador also insisted that while this was an 
issue that needed to be managed by Hondurans, as a friend and 
close ally the U.S. would expect that anything done be legal, 
constitutional and achieved through consensus.  The 
Ambassador also advised Zelaya to seek to reduce tensions by 
reiterating publicly and privately his commitment to 
supporting the upcoming general elections and guaranteeing 
the peaceful transfer of power on January 27, 2010.  Zelaya's 
fourth urn is facing stiff opposition and there is little 
inclination on the part of the National Congress and the 
leaders of any of the political parties to support the idea. 
Driven in part by his left-wing friends and allies here and 
abroad, Zelaya,s goal is to retain his political relevance. 
If he overplays his hand, he may trigger a major 
constitutional crisis.  We will stay in close touch with 
Zelaya and other key players in his government and the 
opposition to influence developments and seek to ensure a 
legal and constitutional way forward.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) On March 30, the Ambassador had an opportunity to 
review the current state of U.S. relations, as well as 
discuss a broad range of issues in a one-on-one lunch at the 
Residence with President Zelaya.  This message covers 
discussion of the domestic issues.  A separate message covers 
the discussion of regional matters. 
 
 
The Domestic Scene:  The Fourth Urn: 
 
¶3.  (C) Zelaya said that an important objective of his 
Administration in its last year in office was to consult the 
people of Honduras on whether the Constitution needed to be 
amended to consider possible modification of the 
&unreformable8 articles of the Constitution.  (Note: 
Nearly all of the articles of the Constitution can be 
reformed by a two thirds vote of the National Congress. 
There are a handful of articles, including those that refer 
to the republican form of government, geographic delimitation 
of national territory and limits on Presidential terms that 
cannot be modified, except through the holding of a 
plebiscite and the convening of a constituent assembly.  End 
Note).  Zelaya argued that limiting presidential terms to one 
four-year term was reasonable when the Constitution had been 
written and approved in the 1980s, since it reflected the 
popular trauma with Honduras, authoritarian past, the real 
potential of military coups, or attempts by politicians to 
cling to power.  He himself agreed that Honduras should not 
allow for consecutive terms as is the case in the U.S., since 
a sitting President could use all of the resources of the 
state to ensure his reelection.  However, he supported 
allowing former presidents to be able to seek a second term, 
in a non-consecutive basis, as is the case with Costa Rica. 
 
¶4.  (C) Zelaya underscored that in meetings with leaders of 
the Liberal and National parties back in early November, 
including with Congress President Roberto Micheletti and 
National Party leader Porfirio Pepe Lobo, an agreement had 
been reached to seek congressional legislation in 2009 
authorizing a fourth urn to be opened for the November 27 
General Elections, in addition to the three urns allowing 
citizens to vote for president, congress and mayors.  He 
reiterated that as the elected president he was obliged to 
fully respect and uphold the Constitution and had no/no 
interest in staying on beyond his term, which expires on 
January 27, 2010, and would turn over power to the 
newly-elected President.  He said that if the fourth urn were 
held and approved, a constituent assembly would be held in 
2010 when he was no longer in power and that the mechanics of 
the assembly would be run and administered by a newly-elected 
President (likely National Party candidate Pepe Lobo or 
Liberal Party candidate Elvin Santos) and overseen by a new 
National Congress. 
 
¶5.  (C) Unfortunately, Zelaya said that following the 
national primaries held last November 30, Micheletti and Lobo 
turned away from their pact on the fourth urn.  Zelaya said 
he felt personally betrayed and was committed to consulting 
the people on this important issue.  In the absence of a 
legally sanctioned law by the National Congress authorizing 
the fourth urn referendum, he was instructing the National 
Statistical Institute to hold a "popular consultation" or 
poll to get a sense of public sentiment on the matter.  An 
executive decree had been issued setting the date for the 
poll for June 30.  He said his own private polling suggested 
that more than 70 percent of the Honduran people supported 
the convening of a constituent assembly to consider changes 
to the constitution.  Once the poll was held and if it 
indicated strong support for the proposal, he planned to 
formally approach the National Congress to consider 
legislation authorizing the National Electoral Tribunal to 
create the fourth urn.  He said that there would be very 
strong public pressure on the National Congress to approve 
the fourth urn.  (Note: While much of the available polling 
suggests strong support for modifying the constitution, the 
same polling shows that few are able to articulate the issues 
at stake and there does not appear to be any significant 
groundswell of support for a continuation of Zelaya in 
power.). 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador told Zelaya that the U.S. government 
was concerned about the situation in Honduras.  He said that 
President Zelaya,s aggressive pursuit of the fourth urn and 
his issuance of a decree authorizing the holding of the 
consultative poll seemed arbitrary and had created widespread 
concern in Honduran and outside that this might signal an 
attempt by him and members of his government to hang on to 
power.  The Ambassador said that the U.S. government had 
received many calls from Hondurans and from human rights 
groups and NGOS here and in Washington expressing concern 
about recent developments here.  The Ambassador noted that 
for the U.S. the fourth urn proposal was an issue that was 
distracting the Honduran government and people away from the 
country's real priorities, which included mitigating the 
impact of the global economic crisis and the violence and 
serious security threat being propagated by international 
criminal and drug trafficking groups.  The Ambassador 
stressed that the U.S. agenda in Honduras was to work on 
these shared core issues of interest, as well as implement 
robust development initiatives across the country.  The 
Ambassador spoke of the increasing polarization in Honduras. 
He noted that obviously the government did not deserve all of 
the blame and recognized that there were many intolerant 
people on the far right that sought to attack Zelaya no 
matter what the issue.  The Ambassador concluded, however 
that as the leader of all Hondurans, Zelaya had an obligation 
to set the tone and seek to establish unity and social 
harmony. 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador stressed that we had worked well on 
numerous issues with his government and that our concern was 
not whether he ruled from the left or right of the political 
spectrum.  Above all else the U.S. supported democracy in 
Honduras.  On the issue of the fourth urn, the Ambassador 
stressed that while this was for Hondurans themselves to 
manage, as a friend and a close ally the U.S. expectation was 
that the management of this issue be strictly legal, fully in 
accordance with the Honduran Constitution, and that it be 
consensual and result from active consultations with all of 
the political parties, the National Congress, and civil 
society.  The Ambassador also strongly advised Zelaya that 
this matter be dealt with in a manner that assured all 
concerned that the issue was not about President Zelaya or 
his interest in staying in power and that all the guarantees 
he could give in this regard  ) public and private ) would 
go a long way to decompress the issue and avoid conflict. 
Speaking of the idea of holding the poll, the Ambassador 
mentioned that in the absence of observers, or the 
participation of the political parties and the National 
Elections Tribunal, the credibility and legitimacy of the 
process would be seriously compromised.  Finally, the 
Ambassador stressed strong U.S. interest in the upcoming 
elections campaign and noted that at the government's 
request, we and the international community would be 
providing technical assistance including the presence of 
election observers, to support a free and fair process. 
 
¶8.  (C) Zelaya admitted he would prefer not to have to move 
forward alone on the poll.  His strong preference was to 
achieve consensus and negotiate a deal with the political 
parties and the congressional leadership to permit the 
holding of the fourth urn.  He said he would be very flexible 
on the details and would be willing to give all public and 
private assurances that he had no interest in staying in 
power one day beyond his term of office, or to manipulate in 
any way the holding of the constituent assembly.  He said he 
had been in discussions with Liberal Party leader and former 
president Carlos Flores to find a creative solution that may 
be workable for all sides.  (Note:  Carlos Flores is strongly 
opposed to Zelaya's plans, but has privately told the 
Ambassador he is trying to find a creative way that will 
avoid a constitutional crisis.  End note). 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶9.  (C) Zelaya is edging the country towards a major 
political crisis.  Influenced by the Venezuelans, Cubans, and 
a small group of left-wing advisors, he is risking his 
political fortunes on a major gamble believing he has mass 
public support for the idea of a fourth urn and the holding 
of a constituent assembly.  The campaign in favor of the 
fourth urn also keeps Zelaya on the political offensive and 
maintains his relevance as a player on the national stage. 
At the same time, Zelaya knows he is an institutionally weak 
President and that his detractors within his own Liberal 
Party and in the opposition National Party control the 
National Congress, the Supreme Court and the Public Ministry 
(the independent Attorney General).  He is also facing strong 
opposition from the leading presidential contenders of both 
parties.  The result is that at this moment he has little 
institutional support for his proposal for a fourth urn. 
Zelaya,s more practical side wants to cut a deal with the 
other players to trade his orderly departure from the scene 
in return for a potential guarantee of political viability at 
some future date.  He believes that retaining political 
viability provides some insurance and a shield against his 
many enemies who might seek to settle scores once he is no 
longer in power.  Finally, while playing with his ALBA 
partners, he covets U.S. approbation and does not want to 
break with us.  We will leverage this, stay in close touch 
and seek to influence him and the other players to ensure a 
legal, constitutional and consensual way forward. 
LLORENS