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DE RUEHNT #0451/01 0961239
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FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0699
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0180
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0177
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0180
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0213
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 TASHKENT 000451 
 
SIPDIS SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, AND G/TIP 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-06 
TAGS: PHUM EAID ELAB ICRC KDEM KIRF KISL KTIP PGOV PREL
SOCI, UZ 
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: THE WAY FORWARD ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
REF: TASHKENT 323; TASHKENT 395; TASHKENT 361; TASHKENT 226; TASHKENT 
343; TASHKENT 271; TASHKENT 277; TASHKENT 194; TASHKENT 222 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Fitzmaurice, Poloff; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: While human rights abuses remain all too common in 
Uzbekistan, the government has taken some positive steps in certain 
areas over the past year. Uzbekistan is not posed to become a 
democracy anytime soon, but we continue to believe that the most 
effective strategy for curbing abuses and generating reform remains 
diplomatic engagement with officials on selected issues.  Over the 
next year, we will seek to consolidate recent gains and prevent 
backsliding in key areas.  This cable outlines a series of specific 
steps that we will urge the Uzbeks take on human rights over the 
next year on prison conditions, child labor, trafficking-in-persons 
(TIP), legal reform and implementation, religious freedom, and 
civil society. Consolidating progress in these areas will help us 
build trust with government officials, identify potential 
reformers, and lay the foundation for more systematic change over 
the long term.  If we are serious about actually promoting human 
rights in Uzbekistan and not only cataloguing abuses, we need to 
take the long view.  In contrast, adopting a more hard-line 
approach with the Uzbeks is likely to be counterproductive.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
 
BUILDING TRUST IS THE KEY TO GREATER REFORM 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) One of the major hurdles to more open dialogue with the 
Uzbeks on human rights remains a lack of trust and lingering fears 
over U.S. government intentions.  As the fallout from the selection 
of independent human rights activist Mutabar Tojibayeva for the 
International Woman of Courage award demonstrated (ref A), 
President Karimov remains deeply suspicious of U.S. government 
motives and still fears that our human rights advocacy efforts are 
fundamentally aimed at regime change.  President Karimov's paranoia 
is most likely fueled by distorted information fed to him by those 
in his government who do not favor improved relations with the West 
and foreign governments with similar objectives, such as Russia. 
At the same time, the Uzbeks are naturally reluctant to make any 
bold moves on human rights or any other issue in the bilateral 
relationship until the new Administration's policy on Central Asia 
comes more into focus.  In order to bypass the Uzbek bureaucratic 
filter as the Administration develops its policy towards Central 
Asia, high-level official visitors need to deliver our message on 
human rights and other issues. 
 
 
 
KEY POINTS TO DELIVER TO THE UZBEKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C)  In our diplomatic engagement with the Uzbeks on human 
rights, we need to stress several key points.  First, we must 
disabuse them of any notion that because they are providing 
increased cooperation on security issues, including assisting us 
with the transport of non-lethal military supplies to Afghanistan, 
we will cease discussing our human rights concerns with them.  One 
benefit of Tojibayeva's selection for the Woman of Courage is that 
it sent this message loud and clear.  Continuing to have high-level 
civilian and military visitors raise human rights issues will 
reinforce this message.  Second, we continually need to stress to 
the Uzbeks, at the highest levels possible, that our efforts are 
 
TASHKENT 00000451  002 OF 008 
 
 
not aimed at regime change, but at assisting the government fulfill 
its international human rights commitments.  Third, we must 
emphasize the clear benefits Uzbekistan will reap from improving 
its human rights record, and with it, its international prestige. 
For example, Uzbek officials routinely complain to us about the 
lack of international investment in their country, but they still 
fail to understand that one of the reasons (among others) why 
international corporations are reluctant to invest in Uzbekistan is 
the government's poor human rights record. 
 
 
 
GOALS FOR 2009: CONSOLIDATE GAINS; PREVENT BACKTRACKING 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) For the first time since the violent Andijon events in 
2005, Uzbek authorities over the past year have made progress in 
some areas, including allowing international observers back into 
prisons, adopting legal measures intended to curb child labor, 
increasing efforts to combat trafficking-in-persons (TIP), 
reforming legislation to strengthen defendants' rights, and 
releasing several political prisoners.  Our goal for 2009 should be 
to consolidate the positive steps taken by the Uzbek government. 
At the same time, we need to prevent backtracking in other areas, 
including on religious freedom and civil society.  The government 
has demonstrated a willingness to engage on many of these issues 
with the international community, including by publicly committing 
itself to improvements during Uzbekistan's recent Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) before the UN Human Rights Council (ref B). 
 
 
 
 
PRISON CONDITIONS 
 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) As a majority of Uzbekistan's human rights abuses continue 
to occur behind prison walls (ref C), one of our main goals for 
2009 is for the government to reach agreement with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to continue prison 
visits this year.  Since ICRC restarted its prison monitoring 
program again on a trial basis in 2008, we have received reports of 
improvements in conditions at several prisons visited by ICRC.  The 
main sticking point remains the intransigence of certain officials 
to allowing ICRC to visit pre-trial detention facilities operated 
by the National Security Service.  In a recent conversation with 
the Ambassador, the ICRC director in Tashkent noted tension within 
the government between reformers, who favor international 
cooperation on improving prison conditions, and conservatives, who 
instinctively distrust international organizations and seek to 
maintain Uzbekistan's relative isolation.  We will continue to urge 
authorities to expand the access of international monitors to 
detention facilities, which we believe is the most effective tool 
for promoting improvements in conditions.  Meanwhile, we also will 
support the government's stated efforts to create several new 
ombudsmen to monitor prison conditions.  For example, we are in the 
process of organizing an International Visitor's program for 
relevant officials to study prison administration in the United 
States. 
 
TASHKENT 00000451  003 OF 008 
 
 
CHILD LABOR 
 
----------- 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) In 2009, we will urge the government to continue 
cooperation with UNICEF on combating the use of child labor during 
Uzbekistan's cotton harvest, a practice which has continued since 
the Soviet era and exists to various degrees throughout Central 
Asia.  We also will ask the government to formally invite a new ILO 
representative to work in Uzbekistan.  As the true extent of child 
labor in Uzbekistan is still unclear, one of our main goals for 
2009 is to encourage the government to allow an independent 
assessment during the fall cotton harvest.  Though some ILO 
officials have expressed skepticism about the practicality of 
conducting such an assessment, UNICEF continues to express an 
interest.  Conducting an assessment is also clearly in the 
government's interest, as it is likely to show that some of the 
more exaggerated claims made by human rights activists, NGOs, and 
political opponents on child labor in Uzbekistan are off the mark. 
In addition, we believe that ILO and/or UNICEF could most 
effectively engage the Uzbeks in the context of a regional program 
involving neighboring countries with similar problems. This way, 
the Uzbeks are less likely to feel that they are being singled out 
for criticism.  Any regional program should not aim at eradicating 
child labor overnight (an unrealistic goal), but rather should 
present a long-term strategy that addresses broader and related 
issues, such as rural poverty, unemployment, labor migration, and 
the perverse effects of cotton quotas.  The U.S. Department of 
Labor can also play a role by providing funding for a regional ILO 
anti-child labor project involving Uzbekistan, as they have done in 
previous years. 
 
 
 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (TIP) 
 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) We believe that the Uzbek government has demonstrated 
sufficient progress to warrant being upgraded again this year in 
the annual U.S. State Department's Trafficking in Persons (TIP) 
report to Tier 2 from the Tier 2 Watch List.  In 2009, we will urge 
the government to continue implementation of its anti-TIP National 
Action Plan, which was adopted in 2008.  To demonstrate its 
commitment to working with international partners, we will 
encourage authorities to finally register the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), which, despite operating as a 
local NGO, enjoys relatively good relations with officials in 
Tashkent and the provinces.  In addition, the government is close 
to opening its own shelter for trafficking victims in Tashkent, the 
first clear example of it providing assistance to TIP victims (ref 
D).  Furthermore, we will suggest that the government allow IOM, 
which already operates shelters for TIP victims in Tashkent and 
Bukhara, to provide training on best practices for the staff of the 
new government-controlled TIP shelter.  Meanwhile, it will remain 
important for the United States to continue its support for the IOM 
shelters, as it will take some time for the state-controlled 
shelters to reach professional standards.  Unfortunately, as long 
as economic opportunities remain limited for Uzbeks, especially 
those from rural regions, we will continue to see a significant 
number of Uzbeks migrants heading abroad for work, and with it, a 
corresponding number of TIP cases (ref E). 
 
TASHKENT 00000451  004 OF 008 
 
 
LEGAL REFORM AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Over the past year, the government has adopted several new 
laws strengthening defendants' rights, including the habeas corpus 
law and a new law on defense attorneys.  In 2009, we will continue 
to urge the government to fully implement these legal reforms and 
provide trainings to prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys. 
Full implementation of these reforms is likely to require time and 
a change in attitudes, which continued training could further 
instill.  We also will carefully monitor the implementation of the 
new defense attorneys' law, which requires all defense attorneys to 
pass new exams and receive certification from the government. 
While the new requirements will hopefully result in defendants 
receiving more competent legal counsel (one frequent complaint 
against defense attorneys in Uzbekistan is that they are poorly 
trained compared to prosecutors and judges), we will watch that the 
government does not use the new law to refuse to certify attorneys 
it does not like. 
 
 
 
PREVENTING BACKTRACKING ON CIVIL SOCIETY... 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Last year, for the first time since the Andijon events, the 
government granted registration to two U.S.-based NGOs: the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Institute for New 
Democracies (IND).  This year, however, authorities are once again 
threatening to backtrack on civil society by denying accreditation 
to foreigners working at NGOs in Uzbekistan, including the new 
AmCit director of IND, a USAID grantee which had played a lead role 
in recent years in advocating legal reform and providing training 
for officials (ref F).  Authorities also recently forced the 
departure from the country of the expatriate director of the German 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation and three expatriates at French 
humanitarian NGOs.  Other international NGOs continue to complain 
about Uzbek bureaucracy hampering their activities.  Some local 
NGOs, including the Ezgulik human rights group, also have come 
under renewed pressure recently. 
 
 
 
...AND REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C) The first few months of 2009 have seen persistent pressure 
on Evangelical groups suspected of proselytism (which is illegal 
Uzbekistan) and a nationwide crackdown on suspected members of the 
conservative Turkish "Nur" Islamic group (ref G).  This is a very 
sensitive issue in Uzbekistan, but we believe we have a chance to 
effect positive change by reaching an agreement with the government 
on a letter outlining specific steps it can take to improve 
religious freedom and to have itself removed from the U.S. State 
Department's Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) list.  On March 
30, MFA Americas' Section Chief Takhrir Mamajanov told the 
Ambassador that the government was still considering the letter, 
and, as he put it, "how to seize the current opportunity."  At its 
 
TASHKENT 00000451  005 OF 008 
 
 
recent UPR at the UN Human Rights Council, the Uzbek delegation 
also announced forthcoming amendments to the current religion law 
(Note: While we no information yet on what the amendments will be, 
we hope they will make the law less, not more, restrictive.  End 
note.) 
 
 
 
POLITICAL PRISONERS 
 
------------------- 
 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Last year, the government released greater numbers of 
political prisoners than in previous years.  Since we submitted a 
list of political prisoners to the government in early 2008, Uzbek 
authorities have released several individuals on the list, 
including Tojibayeva, who, at the time, was Uzbekistan's most 
high-profile political prisoner.  At the same time, the government 
imprisoned a journalist and human rights activist in 
Karakalpakstan, creating two new political prisoners. 
Nevertheless, the total number of political prisoners decreased in 
¶2008.  Human Rights Watch currently lists a total of 11 political 
prisoners in Uzbekistan.  While we will continue to urge the 
government to release more political prisoners this year, the total 
number of such prisoners here is less than in many other countries 
with whom Uzbekistan is frequently compared.  Some independent 
activists claim there are thousands of "political prisoners" in 
Uzbekistan, but the vast majority of cases they cite involve 
individuals who were sentenced on religious extremism charges. 
While we are concerned that at least some of those individuals were 
imprisoned on the basis of coerced or fabricated evidence, they are 
not "political prisoners" in the same sense as imprisoned 
opposition members, human rights activists, or journalists. 
 
 
 
OTHER POSSIBLE AREAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENGAGEMENT 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (C) In addition to the key areas outlined above, we should 
seek to engage the Uzbeks on other human rights issues, including 
the rights of vulnerable groups such as the disabled and women. For 
example, the government recently has adopted the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Disabled and announced a forthcoming law "On 
guarantees of equal rights and opportunities for women and men," 
both of which provide us with opportunities to increase dialogue 
with the Uzbeks on these issues and offer assistance.  During 
Uzbekistan's UPR, Uzbek officials also did not reject out of hand a 
recommendation to adopt the UN Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees.  While this is a more sensitive issue for the government, 
it remains a serious area of concern (refs H and I). 
 
 
 
POLITICAL REFORM 
 
---------------- 
 
 
 
¶13.  (C) Unfortunately, political rights remain an area where the 
government has made little progress.  December 2007 saw another 
flawed Presidential election, and the Parliamentary elections this 
 
TASHKENT 00000451  006 OF 008 
 
 
December, despite featuring the trappings of democratic 
infrastructure, are unlikely to be free or fair.  Uzbek citizens 
are consistently deprived of basic rights, including freedom of 
speech and assembly.  Human rights and opposition activists are 
still routinely harassed, while media remains highly restricted. 
Promoting political reform is naturally much more difficult in a 
country like Uzbekistan than getting the government to address 
other human rights concerns.  Nevertheless, through sustained 
engagement over time, we may be able to build enough trust with 
authorities through cooperation on other issues to eventually 
convince them to ease the clamp on political expression.  We need 
to acknowledge that, as happened in neighboring Turkmenistan, the 
demise of the sitting president is not going to produce overnight 
change in this conservative, clannish society. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (C) At the same time, Uzbekistan is not North Korea or 
Turkmenistan, as is sometimes imagined by outside observers. 
Spontaneous demonstrations over socio-economic conditions occur in 
rural areas, especially during the winter, and such demonstrators 
are usually not dealt with harshly by authorities (political 
protests, however, are routinely disrupted).  Articles criticizing 
socio-economic conditions also occasionally feature in local 
semi-independent media.  While political and human rights activists 
face frequent harassment (and occasionally worse), authorities more 
or less tolerate the existence of a small independent civil society 
here.  Print media is strictly controlled by the government, but 
the number of internet users, especially in urban areas, is on the 
rise.  Many (but not all) independent websites are blocked, though 
most computer-savvy Uzbeks can still access them through proxy 
servers.  However, most ordinary Uzbeks, especially in rural areas, 
are more focused on their daily struggle for economic survival than 
following politics or participating in civil society. 
 
 
 
THE GOU NEEDS TO BE OUR PARTNER ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
¶15.  (C) Independent civil society remains weak and fragmented, and 
the only entity in the country actually capable of affecting human 
rights reforms is ultimately the government.  The current regime 
faces long-term challenges, but it is stable and there is no real 
threat of collapse on the horizon.  The government's imprisonment 
of a large number of suspected religious extremists might be 
fueling the growth of religious extremism in prisons, but there is 
little evidence of religious extremism growing among the general 
populace.  In fact, all indications point to extremist religious 
groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir being much weaker today than they were 
five or ten years ago.  Uzbekistan under President Karimov is not 
Iran under the Shah. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Rather than isolating government officials, we should be 
seeking to further engage and identify potential reformers.  While 
opaque, the Uzbek government is not monolithic, and is composed of 
many different competing groups, some of them are more pro-Western 
than others.  President Karimov is not going to be around forever, 
and we need to be in a position to have influence with whatever 
group comes to power after the dust settles.  We also have the 
opportunity to strengthen the hand of potential pro-Western 
reformers through greater direct contact with them. 
 
TASHKENT 00000451  007 OF 008 
 
 
ENGAGEMENT IS EFFECTIVE... 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶17.  (C) It is notable that the organizations that have gone to the 
greatest lengths to engage the government on their respective 
issues - including ICRC, UNICEF, and IOM - have had the greatest 
relative success in the past year in promoting reform.  In 
contrast, Human Rights Watch (HRW), which consistently has taken a 
rather hard line on the Uzbeks, had its country director thrown out 
of the country and its office effectively shut down for the second 
year in a row in 2008.  While HRW's heart is in the right place, it 
has pursued a counterproductive strategy as far as promoting reform 
is concerned.  However, there are signs that HRW has begun to 
recognize this.  Its current researcher on Uzbekistan, Igor 
Vorontsov (who was denied accreditation in Uzbekistan and continues 
to cover the country from abroad), is leaving the organization, and 
it appears that HRW will move forward with nominating a new 
candidate to serve in Tashkent. 
 
 
 
...WHILE A HARD LINE APPROACH IS UNLIKELY TO WORK 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
 
¶18.  (C) Isolating the Karimov regime might please a small but 
vocal group of Uzbek exiles, but it will make things worse for 
activists remaining in the country and ordinary Uzbeks. We must 
remember these exiles have their own agendas and should not be 
relied upon to provide an objective analysis of human rights 
developments inside Uzbekistan.  Safely residing in the West, these 
individuals have little to lose by calling for Western governments 
to break off relations with the Karimov regime.  On the other hand, 
it is the human rights activists still in Uzbekistan who will pay 
the price later if relations between the United States and 
Uzbekistan go south.  A majority of activists inside Uzbekistan 
consistently support warming relations with the West and further 
engagement.  We have not seen any proof over the years that the 
Karimov regime responds well to outside pressure, a view shared by 
nearly all Western diplomats currently in Tashkent. 
 
 
 
GETTING BEYOND THE TIRED OLD NARRATIVE 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶19.  (C) As cooperation between the United States and the Uzbek 
government continues on the Northern Distribution Network and other 
issues, we can expect more knee-jerk reactions from international 
rights groups like HRW and Uzbek exiles that Western governments 
are seeking to downplay human rights concerns to pursue closer 
cooperation on Afghanistan.  We need to finally get beyond this 
tired old narrative that Western governments need to choose between 
pursuing either security interests or promoting human rights in 
Uzbekistan.  In reality, we need simultaneous engagement on 
security and human rights.  Our efforts to promote political reform 
are aimed at reinforcing Uzbekistan's long-term security.  At the 
same time, as security cooperation improves, this will provide us 
 
TASHKENT 00000451  008 OF 008 
 
 
with more of a forum (and leverage) to effectively engage in 
dialogue on human rights, to which we believe that the government 
is open. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (C) The value-added of the U.S. government with regard to 
human rights is not our ability to impose sanctions and isolate the 
Uzbeks, but the fact that we can engage officials through private 
diplomatic channels, where the Uzbeks are more open to dialogue. 
Uzbekistan is far from becoming a democracy, but we can work with 
reformers within the regime to curb abuses and lay the foundation 
for long-term progress.  We are unlikely to change the views of 
international human rights groups like HRW, but we must be prepared 
to weather their criticisms in the short term in order to make 
substantive progress on human rights over the long term. 
NORLAND