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DE RUEHNT #0423/01 0910911
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R 010911Z APR 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0673
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0005
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TASHKENT 000423 
 
SIPDIS SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (ADDRESSEES) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-01 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC ENRG PTER PINS ECON SENV KTIA UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: MFA Discusses Regional Security, Economic Issues 
 
REF: TASHKENT 200 
 
TASHKENT 00000423  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, P/E Office; REASON: 
1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Uzbekistan's Acting Americas Department Chief at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared his views of a wide range of 
regional security and economic issues in a recent meeting with us. 
His remarks tracked closely with comments we have recently heard 
from GOU officials--Uzbekistan remains concerned about the 
situation in Afghanistan and skeptical of its government, while 
supportive of U.S. and NATO efforts to promote regional security. 
Uzbekistan also has no plans to participate in the CSTO's Rapid 
Reaction Forces.  On energy, Uzbekistan welcomes proposals for 
pipelines that bypass Russia in order to promote Uzbekistan's 
national interests and sovereignty.  Mamadjanov expressed hope that 
continued dialogue with the United States could spur trade and 
deeper economc ties, citing General Motors' operations in 
Uzbekistan as a model for others to follow.  He also expressed 
concern about the potential for "double standards" to be applied to 
Uzbekistan on human rights and democracy, but stated his interest 
in U.S. support on democratization and civil society.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In a meeting with Poloffs on March 23, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Acting Americas Department Chief Takhir Mamadjanov echoed a 
number of familiar GOU positions in a wide-ranging discussion of 
regional security and economic issues.  Mamadjanov described the 
relationship between the United States and Uzbekistan as improving 
and asserted that it would continue to improve in the future.  He 
noted Uzbekistan's particular interest in cooperation on promoting 
regional security and stability, counterterrorism, 
counterproliferation, and combating organized crime and 
narcotrafficking.  Uzbekistan is optimistic about the new 
administration in the United States and was pleased by recent 
positive statements (he did not specify which) from the U.S. 
 
Still Concerned About Afghanistan, Supportive of NATO-US Efforts 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3. (C) Mamadjanov noted that Afghanistan is Uzbekistan's greatest 
security concern, and he expressed disappointment with the current 
situation there.  He lamented that the positive results achieved 
during the past eight years of the Coalition's presence have been 
insufficient.  The Government of Afghanistan lacks the support of 
the local population and is corrupt, while ordinary Afghans see 
little of the significant material assistance the international 
community provides to Afghanistan.  Moreover, Coalition forces 
undertake certain measures without taking into account local 
traditions and have not made socioeconomic issues a high enough 
priority, he claimed.  Mamadjanov acknowledged that the United 
States and Uzbekistan do not see eye-to-eye on the "6 plus 3" 
proposal that President Karimov had espoused at the NATO Summit in 
Bucharest last April.  Nevertheless, Uzbekistan will continue to 
support NATO's efforts in the region and welcomes the transit of 
non-lethal NATO and U.S. shipments across Uzbekistan's territory. 
Uzbekistan also welcomes new ideas and approaches from the United 
States on Afghanistan. 
 
Uzbekistan's "Special Opinion" on CSTO 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Though Uzbekistan signed an agreement related to the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization's Rapid Reaction Forces 
(CSTO RRF), Uzbekistan had attached a "special opinion" to the 
agreement, Mamadjanov continued.  He emphasized that Uzbekistan's 
view on the RRF differs from that of other CSTO members. 
Mamadjanov indicated that Uzbekistan has no plans to participate in 
the Rapid Reaction Forces, but did not close the door to this 
entirely, suggesting that "if there is an urgent need, we'll be 
ready to participate." 
 
Interest in a Mutually Acceptable Solution on Water Usage 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Mamadjanov asserted that all decisions on the use of 
transboundary water from Amu Darya and Syra Darya be based on the 
consent of all affected countries and should be consistent with 
 
TASHKENT 00000423  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
United Nations principles on the use of water.  Furthermore, 
ecological effects should be taken into account.  Uzbekistan 
continues to oppose attempts to build large-scale hydropower 
stations upstream, and Mamadjanov expressed concern about there 
being insufficient water to support Uzbekistan's agricultural 
needs.  Citing UN-affiliated experts, Mamadjanov asserted that 
these projects can damage the environment of the region.  "If 
independent experts conclude that there is no threat to the 
environment, we'll be ready to support such projects," he said. 
 
Energy Policy and Foreign Economic Relations 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
--- 
 
¶6. (C) Uzbekistan does not export oil, but exports about 40 percent 
of its natural gas.  (Comment: If Mamadjanov's figure correctly 
reflects current GOU gas export policy, this marks yet another 
uptick in the proportion of natural gas that Uzbekistan exports, 
reftel.  End comment.)  Mamadjanov said that the GOU is ready to 
consider any alternate routes for exporting natural gas, with an 
eye toward a proposed route's economic benefits.  (Comment: He 
launched into a clearly well-prepared statement in response to a 
broader question about global energy demand trends that had not 
mentioned pipelines, suggesting that he was looking for an 
opportunity to deliver pre-cleared talking points emphasizing 
Uzbekistan's willingness to consider pipeline routes that bypass 
Russia.  End comment.)  For the time being there is only one 
(major) export route in place--the northern route through 
Russia--but additional routes are in Uzbekistan's interest because 
they increase the country's independence.  Uzbekistan is interested 
in having relations with many partners to avoid dependence on one 
country, he continued.  He stated repeatedly that Uzbekistan is 
open to all pipeline proposals and is willing to study each of 
them.  Uzbekistan would pay particular attention to proposals' 
economic benefits to the country, but would also look for ways to 
make projects generate acceptable returns for investors. 
Furthermore, the GOU prefers to use "civilized" means to make 
agreements and aims to establish mutually beneficial terms. 
Mamadjanov asserted that Uzbekistan's location at the heart of 
Central Asia makes the development of any other route through the 
region impossible without Uzbekistan's support. 
 
¶7. (C) He expressed satisfaction with the prices Uzbekistan 
receives for its natural gas exports to Russia, which he described 
as based on market prices.  Mamadjanov declined to comment further 
on the recent gas price negotiations or prospects for future 
negotiations beyond stating simply that Uzbekistan's prices would 
reflect world prices. 
 
¶8. (C) On specific projects, he noted that Uzbekistan had agreed to 
increase the capacity of the Central Asia-Centre pipeline. 
Uzbekistan had also agreed to allow Turkmenistan to ship gas 
destined for China through Uzbekistan.  Uzbekistan will derive 
benefits simply for allowing the use of its territory for the 
transit of Turkmenistan's gas, but Uzbekistan will consider 
exporting some of its own gas via that route if the project proves 
successful.  Mamadjanov called Nabucco "just an idea," and said 
that no one had pursued steps to make it a concrete 
project--questions about who will build it and who will finance it 
remain unanswered. 
 
¶9. (C) Russia is Uzbekistan's primary economic partner, with trade 
turnover exceeding four billion USD per year, Mamadjanov noted. 
Uzbekistan and Russia cooperate on over 800 joint ventures, and 
some 300 Uzbek enterprises are operating in Russia.  Russia is 
continuing to invest in Uzbekistan, and the GOU has not observed 
any interruptions in its trade or economic relations with Russia. 
He said that both countries are observing and implementing their 
long-term economic agreements. 
 
Domestic Effects of the Global Financial Crisis 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Mamadjanov stated that Uzbekistan's economy does not depend 
 
TASHKENT 00000423  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
on energy exports alone, in contrast to some other energy-producing 
countries.  Uzbekistan has been working toward a balanced, 
diversified economy by developing several sectors simultaneously. 
He said that such efforts had helped to insulate Uzbekistan from 
the worst effects of the global financial crisis because Uzbekistan 
had invested money in diversification while other countries had 
invested too much money in "speculative investments and short-term 
projects."  He acknowledged that Uzbekistan is not entirely 
insulated against the effects of the global crisis because it is 
part of the world, and anything that affects the country's partners 
will have an indirect effect on Uzbekistan.  Uzbekistan is thus 
taking "concrete steps" to protect itself from the effects of the 
financial crisis.  He also asserted that Uzbekistan being closed to 
speculative capital is not such a bad thing for the country. 
(Comment: Though Mamadjanov did not seem troubled by the effect of 
the global financial crisis on Uzbekistan, other sources suggest 
that this is an issue of growing concern for Uzbekistan.  MFA 
recently delivered a copy of President Karimov's most recent 
book--which addresses the crisis and steps Uzbekistan must take to 
deal with it--to us.  We also have obtained a copy of the agenda 
for the recent Eighteenth Plenary Session of the Senate of the Oliy 
Majlis--it lists "On the roles of local authorities for 
unconditional fulfillment of the anticrisis program 2009-2012" as 
its lead item.  End note.) 
 
Hoping to Rejuvenate the Bilateral Relationship 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Mamadjanov said that he hoped Uzbekistan's relationship 
with the United States will be restored to its previous level of 
closeness.  (Comment: Though he stated, in traditional GOU 
parlance, that this should happen "step-by-step" to restore trust 
and openness.  End comment.) He also hoped to spur trade and 
economic ties.  He praised the operations of General Motors (GM) in 
Uzbekistan in particular, citing this as an example for other 
investment projects and business operators to emulate.  Mamadjanov 
also said that the bilateral relationship should not be subjected 
to "double standards" as far as human rights and democracy are 
concerned, and he hoped that these issues would not create 
obstacles to the bilateral relationship.  He hoped that the U.S. 
would take a pragmatic and objective stance on these issues, taking 
into account local "realities" in the region.  Mamadjanov also 
expressed interest in U.S. support for further work on 
democratization and civil society in the country, including U.S. 
assistance on drafting legislation.  He described direct contact as 
key to reestablishing the relationship, noting that all too often, 
relationships could sour because of misunderstandings or due to 
"information from other sources." 
 
Comment: 
--------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Mamadjanov's positive tone and his call for direct contact 
and engagement are encouraging.  Embassy LES Political Assistant 
has described him as a cautious and career-oriented man, suggesting 
that many of his comments had been blessed by more senior 
leadership in the GOU prior to this meeting. 
 
Biographic Note: 
------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) Takhir Mamadjanov, Acting Chief of the Americas Department 
at MFA, is an ethnic Uzbek who was born in Ferghana Province and 
graduated from the Tashkent Institute of Foreign Languages.  His 
position at MFA between 2004 and 2006 is unknown.  He served as 
Uzbekistan's Ambassador to France from 1997 until 2003 (he often 
uses French during interactions with Ambassador Norland). 
Mamadjanov also was a senior consultant in the Presidential Apparat 
from 1995 until 1997, and served in various capacities in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1987 and 1995.  According to 
Embassy LES Political Assistant, Mamadjanov is from a powerful 
Tashkent clan (though he was born in Ferghana Province), and his 
career benefited from the influence of a relative in the Government 
of Uzbekistan who had handled personnel assignments.  Mamadjanov 
 
TASHKENT 00000423  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
rose quickly through the ranks.  Embassy LES noted that later on, 
however, clan rivalries resulted in the ouster of Mamadjanov's 
relative as well as Mamadjanov's recall from France and demotion to 
his current position.  The GOU has failed to confirm Mamadjanov in 
his post for the past three years. 
NORLAND